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CIS Coordinative Committee Convenes in Moscow

OW1811082693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Correspondent Georgiy Yakovlev report from Moscow; from the "Utro" program]

[Text] A regular session of the coordination and consultative committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States was held on Monday [15 November] in Moscow under the chairmanship of Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers. Delegations from all commonwealth states participated in the session, as did representatives of the Republic of Georgia. The agenda of the session included 17 points, and issues connected to the creation of an economic union got the most attention. Draft agreements on cooperation in the field of investment activity, on general conditions and mechanisms of assistance for industrial cooperation, on direct ties, on coordinated anti-monopoly policy, and on conditions for joining the economic union as an associate member were discussed and approved.

The session also discussed the question of measures to provide the national economy and the populace with electricity and heat during the fall and winter of 1993 and 1994. Organizational and financial issues of activities of the executive secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States were also discussed. The participant of the session viewed with approval the draft agreement on international legal guarantees of unhindered and independent activity of the "Mir" MTRK [Inter-state Television and Radio Company]. [Video shows session at work, interview with Gadylbek Shalakhmetov, chairman of the "Mir" MTRK]

[Begin recording] [Yakovlev] The last issue, issue No.27 at the current session of the coordinating and consultative committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, concerned the "Mir" television and radio company. What can you tell us about this issue? What decision concerning us and our viewers was adopted?

[Shalakhmetov] A very important decision was adopted. I think that it will make both the staff of the "Mir" television and radio company, and of course our viewers and listeners, very happy. The committee approved an agreement on international legal guarantees for the unhindered and independent activity of our company. What does it mean? It means that we begin... [pauses] we must get used to the fact that we are living in a new international community, where international organizations must have special status and rights. We who are used to living in an atmosphere of a unitary state find it very difficult to get used to being a community of sovereign states. And if this is the case, then there are borders, taxes, customs dues, and all kinds of barriers which frustrate both economic and trade activities, but also the activities of journalists. I think that we will soon engage in acts in the spirit of people's diplomacy, in peacekeeping acts. Conflicts and wars between members of the commonwealth, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, call us to do so. We will have to be present in Tajikistan, where a certain amount of conflict is also going on. How should our journalists act in such acute situations? How can they cross borders unhindered? I think that the adopted agreement will solve these questions if it is soon endorsed by heads of state and ratified by parliaments. So let us hope that we will become the first organization to receive true international protection. [end recording]

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 18 Nov

LD1811064993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0551 GMT 18 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 18 (ITAR-TASS)—Leading Russian newspapers continue to give an extensive coverage to the election campaign to a new Russian parliament. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper writes that "election blocs and parties distributed television time between themselves and candidates rushed to drum up support among their potential voters. There is a lot of appraisals, commentaries and forecasts as well as open attacks and extravagances".

The "Choice of Russia" election bloc, guided by data of public polls, forecasts the following distribution of seats at a state duma (lower chamber of the new parliament): the Choice of Russia—153 seats, other democrats—87, centrists—57, independents—34 and opposition 177 seats.

Commenting on the same topic, the PRAVDA newspaper carries an interview with former legislator of the Soviet Union Yuriy Golik, where he notes: "If elections are held, even many government services estimate that 55-60 per cent of seats will be won by the opposition.

"In this respect, the new parliament will be even in greater opposition than the previous one. Therefore, even now many analysts forecast a short life for a federal assembly (new parliament)."

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper carried out an experiment with collecting signatures for an imaginary candidate. The results of the poll are given in an article entitled "Alas, Beer Influences Elections in Russia Very Much".

"On discussing the results of an election campaign of an imaginary candidate, we have drawn the conclusion that any party can nominate any greenhorn politician to any state body. According to the electoral law, it is enough to collect one per cent of votes from the total number of citizens in a Moscow constituency to nominate a candidate.

"This is about 5,000 signatures. By multiplying the cost of 5,000 cans of good beer, you will get the sum of five million roubles," the daily writes.

Returning to the October 3-4 events in Moscow, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper writes: "Previously circulated information on 1,500 corpses does not hold water. However, it is too early to dismiss this issue. The clarification of some questions does not mean that all blank spots about the number of the dead at the parliament building have been removed.

"According to eye-witnesses, all the 43 corpses inside the parliament building were spotted only on the first two floors. Therefore, the conclusion can be as follows: either tank shelling of the parliament building was totally useless from the military point of view or some part of the dead inside the White House building remained unaccounted for by the chief medical administration."

The same newspaper calls its readers' attention to a statement by Tajik leader Imamali Rakhmanov that the civil war in the republic is over.

"The Tajik-Afghan border is experiencing tremendous pressure from armed Tajik opposition. One should not say that the civil war is over when several hundred thousands of refugees are outside the republic," the newspaper writes.

"The situation in Tajikistan is being aggravated by inside struggle for the post of Tajik parliament speaker.

"To all appearnaces, the statement should be considered as an official point of view predetermined by two events: a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev to Tajikistan and an attempt to call a session of the republican parliament."

PRAVDA examines "the drama of Russians in Tajikistan". "An unheard-of outflow of Russians and Russian speakers from Tajikistan continues. The real number of refugees and forced emigrants runs into many hundred thousands.

"Whether we want it or not, our troops and border guards initially turn into an ideological target and then into a target for firing from all types of weapons." On the other hand, the newspaper claims that under the present conditions a withdrawal of Russian troops will cause much bloodshed, including Russian blood.

"Other ways should be taken to achieve peace and accord," the newspaper underlines.

The TRUD newspaper pays attention to dropping living standards. The newspaper writes the following in an article headlined "A Queue": "Is Not It Nice That Queues Are Disappearing? But Why Are They Disappearing? Polls Show That Every Fifth Respondent Hardly Has Money for Prime Necessities".

The same newspaper features an interview with Yuriy Martyushov, chairman of the Moscow region committee on land affairs, discussing the Russian president's decree on the land.

General Urges Eliminating Some CFE Provisions

LD1811132193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1200 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] First Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Vladimir Zhurbenko stated that Russia is not going to bargain its security and will handle the treaty on the conventional forces in Europe guided by its national interests. He noted, however, that Russia was trying to tackle all problems connected with the treaty in a civilized way.

Zhurbenko told journalists on Thursday that as the Soviet Union's successor, Russia strictly observed the commitments envisaged in the treaty. It has already cut down 880 tanks, 1,582 armored vehicles, 280 artillery systems and 256 combat planes, he continued. He said that Russia had eliminated more weapons than it promised.

He said, however, that "individual provisions, above all the flank limitations, go against Russia's interests." "We do not propose a revision of the treaty, but insist that the related problems be tackled with due account taken of Russia's interests," he said.

In this connection, Russia suggests that NATO eliminate Chapter 5 on flank limitations, which implies above all the presence of troops in the North Caucasus. Zhurbenko said that the situation in the North Caucasus and the Transcaucasian region necessitated the presence of a military grouping. He said that according to Russia's military doctrine, troops may be used for ensuring stability in a number of Russia's regions. The North Caucasus is one of such regions, said Zhurbenko.

Fulfillment of Treaty Hampered

LD1711213293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By correspondent Aleksandr Ostrovskiy; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Ostrovskiy] The first stage of the Treaty on Reductions in Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] has been completed. In the center of Europe, there has been a sharp drop in the concentration of troops and armaments. The geography of deployment has also changed. Now 36 countries are participating in the process of disarmament.

[V. Leshchenko, head of the Center for the Implementation of the Ground Troops Treaty] Altogether 31 inspections have been carried out at the locations where ground troops are being reduced. To date, inspection groups from Great Britain, Norway, the FRG, and Canada are working at locations in our country where reductions are planned.

[Ostrovskiy] Russia is to scrap almost 12,000 units of armaments and equipment, and in the past year some 4,000 old fighting vehicles were destroyed. But, because of a poor material base, it is becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill the reductions treaty, given the fact that dismantling one tank now costs almost 1 million rubles. Dreams that enterprises destroying combat equipment and armaments would pay for themselves have proved to be Utopian.

Reductions Under Treaty Detailed

LD1711164093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0619 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kuzmin]

[Excerpts] Vienna, 17 Nov—Today sees the start of the second stage of implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 by heads of state and government of the CSCE countries. [passsage omitted]

In connection with the start of the second stage of implementation of the treaty and on the eve of the third anniversary of its being signed, Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, head of Russia's delegation in the Joint Consultative Group, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that Russia is complying with its obligations under the treaty under difficult economic circumstances. We have heard frequent statements lately about assistance for Russia in implementing disarmament measures, but as yet there has not actually been any real support. Even so Russia has wholly fulfilled, even over-fulfilled, its obligations for the first period. Up to 16 November this year, Russia had under the treaty made cutbacks of 804 tanks, 2,368 armored fighting vehicles, 173 artillery systems, 324 fighter aircraft, and 25 strike helicopters. A further 446 tanks, 439 armored fighting vehicles, and 219 artillery systems have been scrapped or converted to nonmilitary use under obligations taken upon itself by Russia outside the framework of the treaty. The further destiny of the document will not be a simple matter. Today more than ever it is important to identify and deal with problems arising so as to ensure the viability of this historic document, the Russian diplomat stressed.

Peacekeeping Forces May Fly CSCE Flag

LD1711210093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Russian forces may soon be sent to areas of interethnic conflicts in the republics of the former USSR under the flag of CSCE peace-keeping forces. It is expected that an official decision on this will be adopted at a meeting of CSCE freign ministers in Rome on 30 November.

In this connection, the Russian Foreign Ministry is launching an initiative and setting up a voluntary fund to support peacekeeping activities in the territory of the former Union. The support of European states for Russia's peace-keeping efforts under the CSCE flag in the areas of interethnic conflicts could ensure the legal basis and the necessary financial backing for such actions in the interests of upholding peace and security in both Europe and Asia.

Possible NATO Links With Tatarstan Explored

PM1711132993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Oleg Bedula and Aleksandr Bugay report: "Military Doctrine Taken to NATO..."]

[Text] The 2 November 1993 issue of the Russian-language newspaper IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA published an interview with Rashat Safin, cochairman of the centrist wing of the All-Tatar Public Center, under the headline: "NATO Has Become Interested in Tatarstan's Military Doctrine."

The former colonel in the Soviet Army frankly admits that contacts with NATO specialists began after the All-Tatar Public Center adopted the republic's military doctrine at the beginning of this year. (Incidentally, the doctrine was not taken seriously either in Tatarstan itself or in Moscow.) Nevertheless, according to Safin, a NATO delegation led by Filipp Petersen [name as transliterated] met with the All-Tatar Public Center's leaders and handed them an invitation to visit its headquarters in Brussels.

"The task we had to carry out during the visit was to find a niche for our republic in the common European security system in connection with our beginning to build Tatarstan's statehood," Safin tells the correspondent. "Though the All-Tatar Public Center's military doctrine says that questions of state security are entrusted to the United Nations and the CSCE, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the NATO leadership has also recently developed a new conception of it. Let us suppose that if an organization of unrepresented peoples or the CSCE go along to NATO with a request that it intervene in the event of interference [interventsiya], the military bloc will respond and help will arrive..."

Foreign Ministry Welcomes COCOM Decision

LD1811141293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1256 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS—Russia welcomed the decision to eliminate COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports] before the end of March 1994 which was createdd 45 years ago as an instrument of averting shipments of advanced technologies to communist countries, according to spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry Grigoriy Karasin.

"We would like to stress that the main Russian demand is to immediately cancel all limitations on exports of goods and dual-purpose technologies to our country adopted on ideological motives", he told a briefing on Thursday.

Dwelling on the creation of a possible substitute for COCOM, Karasin said that Russia is "open for discussing the principles of creating and functioning of a new 'post-COCOM' mechanism of control over sensitive technologies".

IMF Welcomes Statement on Economic Policy

LD1711172493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0030 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Loshchilin]

[Text] Washington, 17 Nov—"The IMF management was very pleased to learn that the Russian Government endorsed the recent statement on economic policy," an official spokesman for that very important multinational lending organization told ITAR-TASS on Tuesday. "The implementation of these measures will make an important contribution to economic stabilization and reform in Russia and pave the way for agreement on the 1994 economic program, for which the IMF hopes to be able to provide financial support."

"During the next few weeks the IMF intends to continue discussions with the Russian leadership on its economic program and hopes to conclude an agreement in January 1994," the IMF spokesman stressed.

In saying this, he was implying that there is a real chance that by that time Russia will receive the second half of the $3 billion loan from the so-called fund for system reform, set up by the IMF especially as a means of promoting reform in the former socialist countries.

Russia To Recover Loans if Payments Rescheduled

LD1711184793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1629 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Temnenkov]

[Text] Bonn November 17 TASS—Russia will be able to pay 500 million dollars by the end of 1993 to partly recover its debts to 600 Western private banks if a long-term agreement is reached with the "London Club" on rescheduling Russia's obligatory payments to the banks, Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov said Tuesday at a meeting with leaders of the German federal agency in charge of crediting for national development in Frankfurt-on-Maine.

Nevertheless, Fedorov noted that Russia' budget for 1993 has provisions ensuring the payment of the above-mentioned sum already this year.

Russia's overall indebtedness, including the debts of the former Soviet Union, totals to 70 billion dollars, the Russian official said.

He also described the latest developments in the preparation for establishing the "Russian Bank of Medium Estate", a project which had been proposed by German Finance Minister Theo Waigel and supported by the federal financial agency and German private banks.

According to Fedorov, the new bank, which is to receive from the Russian Government 15 billion roubles as its initial capital, will grant medium businesses of Russia credits amounting to 300 million dollars next year. In the five years to come the volume of credits, offered by the new establishment, is expected to reach one billion dollars.

Nuclear Warning Station Discussed With Belarus

LD1811100393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0948 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS—Russia and Belarus began two-day consultations on Thursday on how to complete a station of early warning against a nuclear attack on the Belarusian territory and Russia said it is ready to finance the the construction and maintenance of the object.

The talks focus on the uncompleted station called "Baranovichi junction" the construction of which began in the 80s according to the Soviet-American ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] treaty, head of the Russian delegation Venyamin Popov told TASS.

"This object is necessary for all states of the Commonwealth to ensure control over space, to preserve nuclear parity", he stressed.

The delegations of both former Soviet republics are to draft an agreement to complete the construction and determine the terms of the maintenance and financing of the station.

Russia is ready to finance the construction and run the station in Baranovichi, according to Popov.

Belarusian, Russian Banks Draft Ruble Accord

LD1711183093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The central banks of Russia and Belarus have drafted interim agreements on the creation of a new-type ruble zone. Experts believe that the two states' monetary systems may be united if this process is preceded by a transitional period during which the national currencies are stabilized in relation to each other and to hard currencies, and become mutually convertible.

The draft agreement, which is available at Interfax, provides for a complete division of the Russian and Belarussian monetary systems and the recognition of the Russian ruble and the banknotes of the National Bank of Belarus as the only legitimate payment units in Russia and Belarus respectively.

The banknotes of the National Bank of Belarus were issued in May 1992 to ease the shortage of ruble banknotes. By now, Belarus has almost entirely switched over to its national banknotes. However, the Belarussian leaders have not yet officially stated that these banknotes are the sole payment units, as this measure might be perceived as the introduction of the national currency.

The draft agreement says that on January 1, 1994, the bilateral clearing procedure should be cancelled. In 1993, about 70% of Russian-Belarussian trade was based on such a procedure.

Talks Held With Kazakhstan on Exchange Rate

LD1811105993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1015 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavek Bogdanov]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS—One tenge—the national currency of Kazakhstan—may be initially exchanged for 250 roubles, according to First Deputy Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Daulet Sembayev who held talks with Russian Deputy Premier Aleksandr Shokhin on Thursday on the problem of mutual settlements after Kazakhstan had introduced its own currency.

Sembayev told reporters that a schedule of further talks on the problem, as well as on the creation of a CIS interstate bank had been agreed.

Shokhin and Sembayev expressed hope that the mechanism of settlements which the two countries are to work out may be used as the basis for relations with other CIS states and will allow to sign a multilateral treaty on a CIS settlement union.

Further on Talks

LD1811135393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1200 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] Russian Vice Premier Alexandr Shokhin and his Kazakh counterpart Daulet Sembayev discussed procedures leading to the drafting of inter-governmental agreements on the proposed merger of Russia's and Kazakhstan's monetary systems and circulation of various currencies. After the talks Sembayev said that the rubletenge exchange rate had been discussed. He thinks that the rate should be about 250 rubles per tenge.

For his part, Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia Vyacheslav Solovov said that the rate coordination mechanism should "harmonize the requirements of the market and the managing system represented by the government and bank."

Sembayev said that Russia and Kazakhstan were discussing the list of goods to which free trade regulations do not apply. The list will not exceed 20 items, he thinks. "Mutual restrictions" will be imposed on most important export goods of both countries such as oil products and oil for Russia and bread and non-ferrous metals for Kazakhstan.

Only the general issues of the payment union had been discussed, Sembayev said.

Solovov said that such a union with Kazakhstan would combine coordination of the rate of exchange and most favored nation treatment for this CIS member nation. He believes that a decision on setting up such a union has to be made as soon as possible and so initially a bilateral union will be set up, following which all members of the CIS economic union will join the payment union.

DPRK Envoy on U.S. 'Blackmail' on Nuclear Issue

*PM1811111193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Nov 93 p 3*

[Vladimir Potapov report: "Pressure Is Inadmissible. Only Dialogue Is Possible"]

[Text] Son Song-pil, DPRK ambassador to Moscow, has met with representatives of the mass media. This was prompted by the campaign of accusations against the DPRK with regard to nuclear affairs, which is now being fueled by certain circles in the world.

Referring to a statement by the head of the DPRK delegation at the Korean-U.S. talks, Son Song-pil pointed out that the United States and its allies are now trying to shape world public opinion on this issue by deliberately distorting the facts. The reality is as follows. As a result of the talks which had started, Pyongyang and Washington published a joint statement. In it the sides agreed that nuclear weapons, the threat to use them, and strong-arm methods in general must not be used. They confirmed both their intention to preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula and to turn it into a nuclear-free zone and their mutual desire to respect sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. They advocated a peaceful path to the unification of Korea.

As a goodwill gesture, in order to realize the aims outlined in the statement, Pyongyang temporarily and unilaterally abstained from announcing its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and resumed consultations with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the dialogue with Seoul. The DPRK froze movements of nuclear substances on its territory, did all it could to assist—and will continue to do so—the continuous inspection monitoring of nuclear installations by the IAEA, and adopted a pledge to replace its own system of graphite moderated reactors by light water reactors.

Ignoring these steps by the DPRK, Washington, as the partner in the dialogue, delayed the start of the third round of the talks, began advancing more and more new conditions and unsubstantiated accusations, and demonstrated its intention to continue the Team Spirit military exercises, which, so Pyongyang believes, are a rehearsal for a nuclear war against the DPRK. Washington also provoked the adoption of anti-Korean resolutions at the IAEA General Conference and the UN General Assembly session.

The idea of the need to take sanctions against the DPRK is now being suggested to the world community. The so clearly displayed ill will puts Pyongyang on its guard and makes it doubt the sincerity of the U.S. desire to resolve the nuclear problem peacefully and by means of talks. These doubts are intensified by history itself: It must not be forgotten that for 40 years now the DPRK and the United States have been in a state of "military truce" and that the United States is to blame for the fact that for 18 years now the UN resolution on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula and the conclusion of a peace treaty has never been fulfilled.

Ambassador Son Song-pil declared that the DPRK resolutely rejects the tactic of blackmail and pressure and proposes to the United States a phased, simultaneous advance along the path to resolving the nuclear problem. Practical actions, which the sides might carry out synchronously, can be the subject of debate at the third round of Korean-U.S. talks. This would remove the tension which is being fueled artificially and make an actual contribution to realizing the principles of the Korean-U.S. statement.

It was reported at the meeting that the Russian Society for Friendship and Cultural Cooperation with the DPRK has issued a statement of resolute support for Pyongyang's position on upholding its sovereignty and its desire for an equitable and peaceful dialogue with Washington to resolve the nuclear problem.

U.S. Firm Aiding Sakhalin Power Station

PM1711134993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By Viktor Korotkikh from Sakhalin; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Video shows Korotkikh over closeup of picture in board room, meeting with U.S. experts, power station installations] A group of experts from the U.S. company Babcock and Wilcox, which specializes in the manufacture of turbine-generators and boiler equipment for thermal power stations, has been studying the possibility of modernizing the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya TETs [heat and electric power station] and converting it from solid fuel to gas. The U.S. side has allocated almost $500,000 for this purpose free of charge. Work on the reconstruction of Sakhalin's main heat and electric power station, with staggered turbine-generator stoppages, is to begin next year. The implementation of this project will facilitate the substantial renewal of delapidated equipment which has gone unrepaired for years for want of funds, increase heat and power generating efficiency by 50 percent, considerably reduce environmental pollution, and also resolve some issues of international importance.

Our participation in the modernization of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya TETs is our first contribution to the development of international cooperation among Pacific littoral countries, Mr. Richard Covers, chief manager of Babcock and Wilcox [name and title as captioned], said.

Britain's Trident Procurement Cutbacks Viewed

PM1711160993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Manki Ponomarev article: "London: Will There Be Fewer Nuclear Missiles?"]

[Text] The strategic offensive arms treaties concluded in 1991 and 1993 (START I and START II), which were designed to lessen the danger of universal destruction hanging over humanity, have not yet come into force, but the nuclear threat has already noticeably receded. According to data from the U.S. research organization World Priorities Inc., the United States' and the Russian

Federation's nuclear arsenals have been reduced by almost one-fourth in the last five years.

Other states possessing weapons of mass destruction are now joining in this process increasingly frequently. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote very recently about how France's Armed Forces are already beginning to climb down from their nuclear tower. Now it is Britain's turn. The FINANCIAL TIMES reports that London is preparing to significantly cut back on its program to equip its submarine fleet with U.S. Trident missiles.

In all it was proposed to build four missile-carrying nuclear submarines of the Vanguard class. Sixteen missiles with eight warheads—a total of 64 missiles—were to be installed on each of them. But the UK Ministry of Defense has in the last few weeks set about reviewing previous plans. In the opinion of military specialists, the 44 Trident ballistic missiles purchased from the United States are in the prevailing circumstances entirely sufficient for Britain. The Ministry of Defense experts think that it is entirely possible to perform the tasks involved in nuclear deterrence with this number of missiles.

The FINANCIAL TIMES describes the upcoming decision on the arming of missile-carrying submarines with Trident missiles as the "most significant change in London's policies in the area of strategic nuclear armaments since the end of World War II."

Of course all this is only in the realm of intention for the moment. We can only hope that it will begin to materialize in the relatively near future. Then this will be of significance not only for Britain. London's example will also serve as an additional incentive for other countries which have nuclear weapons on their territories.

Churkin Holds Talks With Greek Foreign Minister

LD1711220993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1939 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Malyshev]

[Text] Athens November 17 TASS—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin met here on Wednesday with Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias to discuss the situation on the Balkan peninsula, including in former Yugoslavia, and bilateral relations.

The talks revealed identity of the two countries' views on the matters under discussion. The Russian and Greek diplomats agreed to step up efforts to achieve peaceful settlement on the Balkan peninsula. In particular, Greece's upcoming chairmanship in the European Community from January 1, 1994, is "to be used for common benefit".

Navy Denies Russian Sub Netted by Danish Boat

LD1811095393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0831 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS—The Russian navy made it clear on Thursday that the "unidentified submarine" which reportedly got in the nets of the Danish fishing ship "Terse" in the North Sea on November 15 was not Russian.

The press service of the navy said, commenting on Western mass media reports, that no Russian submarines were in the North Sea and in adjacent waters.

Border Guards Chief on China Visit Results

PM1711155593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of Border Guard Troops, by Aleksandr Golts; place and date not given: "Border With China Becomes Zone of Cooperation"]

[Text] Some 10 years ago, the border with China was a line of confrontation. Today relations have changed. Mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields is gaining momentum here. However, even these positive processes are taking place with difficulty and in a disparate manner. The problems of the Sino-Russian border are the center of public attention. Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of Russia's Border Guard Troops, visited the PRC not so long ago. Your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent talks to him about the results of this trip and the problems of the Sino-Russian border.

[Golts] Andrey Ivanovich! Could you tell us about the main results of your visit to China?

[Nikolayev] For all the diverse ties that Russia now has with China, including the talks on border issues, the leaders of our border guard services have not hitherto been in direct contact. These were virtually the first official meetings between the commander of the Russian Federation Border Guard Troops and representatives of the Chinese state structures that deal with border issues. And there are several of these structures. Thus, the PRC Border Guard Troops themselves are part of the People's Liberation Army [PLA] and come under the jurisdiction of the defense minister, while the units implementing border-zone regulations and procedures come under the Ministry of Public Security.

My trip to China gave me an opportunity to establish good contacts both with the Defense Ministry and PLA General Staff and with the Ministry of Public Security. As a result important accords were reached with our Chinese colleagues. We primarily agreed to draft a document on cooperation between the two countries' border guard troops. Understanding was reached on the need for contacts between border guards at three levels. Namely, between the command of the Russian and PRC border guard troops and supreme structures dealing with border issues; then the command of border districts; and, finally, contacts right on the border. We agreed that a document regulating this activity would be drafted in the first quarter of next year.

It was clearly emphasized that our relations with China on border problems have two dimensions as it were. The first involves resolving the problems of the Sino-Russian border. Cooperation here must be developed on the basis of bilateral relations. I think that during the first stage we must cooperate with Chinese border guards in precluding the emergence of conflict situations, learn to resolve problems on the spot, and ensure the qualitative operation of entry points and joint economic activity. And this can be achieved by creating confidence in relations between the Russian and Chinese border guards. I would like to stress that we intend to pursue this policy without under any circumstances forgetting our own national interests. I simply see no need to artificially set our interests against those of the Chinese.

Let us not forget that Russian border guards in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are also guarding the border with China. And here the interests of these states must be taken into consideration. That is why, during the second stage, these relations can also be developed in the western sector with an eye to accumulated experience, enlisting Commonwealth states in the formulation of common approaches to safeguarding the border with China in conjunction with us—Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—or in close cooperation with us—Kazakhstan.

[Golts] You broached the subject of Russia's national interests. The problems of the Sino-Russian border do indeed give plenty of food for thought on this score. At present there is the agreement on the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border, which Russia as the USSR's successor state is implementing. Of late articles have appeared, the authors of which claim that the agreement is actually a violation of Russia's interests. What comment could you make on that?

[Nikolayev] I would first like to point out that it is not simply a question of agreements that have been signed. They have been ratified and have come into force. As for the border guards' tasks, they consist of technical work, primarily in the demarcation of the border.

And, with regard to the essence of the agreement, the diplomats and the border guards who took part in the talks and the formulation of the agreement have convincingly proved that we are not waiving our own interests. What is more, attempts to raise the issue of reviewing our accords with China have nothing to do with patriotism. Such a review would be highly detrimental to Russia's interests.

I would like to say that the border guards involved in the work of state border demarcation know that these questions are resolved on the basis of recriprocal concession and compromise. Geographical and historical conditions are generally taken into consideration. Every inch of Russian territory is dear to us. And this territory must not be the subject of speculation for people who would like to earn political prestige on the crest of a wave of "jingoism."

[Golts] But, you know, the agreements do not cover the entire eastern sector of the border. There are still three sectors on which accords have not been reached. Could you tell us whether progress was made at the talks?

[Nikolayev] Talks are under way; it is premature to anticipate things and voice opinions. But I would like to remark that the Chinese are in principle in constructive mood. And, needless to say, so are we.

[Golts] It is no secret that the headlong development of border trade and other forms of Sino-Russian cooperation and the change in border regulations, apart from obvious positive aspects, have equally obvious negative ones. It cannot be denied that Chinese citizens' commercial and other activity in Russia, and probably that of our citizens in China, sometimes takes bad forms and is detrimental to mutual relations. What, in your view, should be done to lend civilized forms to these processes? And what role should the border guards play in this?

[Nikolayev] That was one of the subjects of my conversations in China. We did not bandy mutual recriminations, but sought, as you have said, a civilized solution. There are indeed irregularities connected with trade and economic activity. What is more, there are breaches of border regulations when people pass through checkpoints.

The main reason for this is, in my view, the fact that there was a curtain between our two states for too long. Then it was lifted and it was said that people can freely cross the border in accordance with the law. But the people and the states themselves have not hitherto gotten accustomed to the openness. Take Russia for example. Just think about it, last year around 10 million people crossed our state border, and in the first nine months of this year the figure exceeded 21 million. Neither we nor our neighbors have yet learned to live in conditions of an open state. Experience and tradition are needed for that. As well as the considerable expenditure involved in opening, equipping, and maintaining crossing points, organizing the requisite services and customs service there, and so on.

As for citizens, they must undergo a certain period of education. Yes, they must be educated, taught not to fear but to respect the border. We have never tackled this in earnest. And the border guard troops are only doing part of this work.

[Golts] Andrey Ivanovich, you are talking about a process and a fairly lengthy one at that. However, attempts are already being made to see the Chinese in Russia as the new "enemy image." Some administrations are talking about the enforced deportation of the visitors...

[Nikolayev] This is not only a problem for Sino-Russian relations. Take a look at the map—Russia has a unique, extremely beneficial geographical position. Fate itself has destined it to link continents, countries, economies, and cultures. And now that the previous obstacles on the border have been removed, some people want to create their own personal "Iron Curtain" so to speak at oblast level...

That is not the solution. The solution resides in a system that lays down on the basis of the laws the procedure for foreign citizens to stay in our country, for them to be granted rights of residence, an opportunity to work, and so on. Russia must not fence itself off from the world, but integrate into it.

But there must of course be laws. Moreover, it is not only a question of the Sino-Russian border. I am talking about the migration of foreign citizens from far-off foreign countries, people coming from the Commonwealth states. Once they have crossed the border in one Commonwealth country, they can go wherever they like and are not monitored. Unified approaches to guarding the Commonwealth's borders must be formulated and comprehensive cooperation implemented in order to ensure that these borders operate by laws that are as similar as possible. If we really want an economic union in the interests of all the peoples of the Commonwealth, we must close the gap as quickly as possible between the CIS countries' border legislation.

Returning to our discussion of the problems of the Sino-Russian border, I would like to mention the most important point. Despite the difficulties and problems, you [illegible] see that cooperation with China is in Russia's str[illegible] interests today. One of the most important tasks facing both countries' border guards is to make the border a zone of such cooperation.

Maritime Kray To Expel Illegal PRC Visitors

LD1711170793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1103 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] A large-scale operation to oust illegal migrants is to begin in the Maritime Territory shortly, head of the local Interior Department's press service Fedor Aslakhanov told Interfax.

The operation is to begin in one of the border regions. Vladivostok may be involved, too. A few months ago, the local authorities adopted a program of measures to regulate the entry and exit regime, and the rules of foreigners' stay in this territory. The neighboring countries' governments and consular missions have been acquainted with it. This document also envisages responsibility of individuals and organizations for inviting foreign citizens to the Maritime Territory.

Most of the offences are committed by citizens of China. As many as 7500 Chinese visitors, twice as many as last year, have been arrested for various offences.

The Interior Department and the Maritime Territorial Administration believes that the cause of the growing crime rate is the open border with China in five places. Chinese citizens can get into the Maritime Territory upon the presentation of their passports. By contrast, Russian citizens going to China must have an invitation or a visa. The procedure of licensing the workforce was not properly regulated, either. Many leaders of enterprises illegally hire foreign workers. From the Maritime Territory foreign workers move to other CIS republics.

The local passport and visa services have registered just about 8000 Chinese citizens. However, according to the Interior Department's sources, more than 200,000 Chinese citizens cross the border daily in one place alone.

Purpose of Adamishin Mission to Syria Examined

PM1711161593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Leonid Mlechin report: "Traveling Healers Hurrying to Damascus"]

[Text] At the beginning of December, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher will begin a new round of Near East talks in Syria. Russian diplomats will be watching the Americans calmly, unlike in the past. Last month Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin also visited Damascus.

President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria can choose between the ideas that the Russian and U.S. diplomats have to offer. Moscow is again playing an independent game in the Near East.

Russia's diplomats are confident that Syria is interested in their participation in Near East policy. This is nothing to do with sentiment: An extra player gives Damascus greater room for maneuver.

Furthermore, 90 percent of the Syrian Army's weapons are from Russia. But further purchases of weapons were stopped by Syria's debt problem.

The diplomats' activeness may engender false hopes of another sensational success similar to Israel's and the PLO's recognition of one another.

But such events are rare. Jordan was close to recognizing Israel back in 1948 but nothing has happened yet. In 1974 Henry Kissinger was confident that Syria and Israel were about to reach a peace agreement. Between the Egyptian-Israeli peace concluded at Camp David in 1979 and the present Palestinian-Israeli agreement 14 years elapsed.

Some believe that so long as Syria is ruled by President Hafiz al-Asad peace with Israel is in principle impossible. Al-Asad will never admit that the Jewish state has a right to exist.

Others are convinced of the opposite: Only al-Asad, who has ruled his country with an iron hand for 23 years, can establish relations with the Jewish state. His successor will hardly have such full power.

Syria has always been considered the most belligerent and intransigent of Israel's adversaries but al-Asad is a very pragmatic politician.

It is not peace with Israel that Hafiz al-Asad needs so much as the Golan Heights, which his predecessor lost in the unsuccessful war of 1967.

Al-Asad realized long ago that Syria could destroy the Near East by beginning a new war but is incapable on its own of winning back its lands and destroying Israel.

It is a question of the price. Al-Asad is taking a great risk when he agrees to talks. What will he get in exchange for Israel's recognition and a peace treaty?

The Golan Heights alone are not enough: After all, this will just be the return of something which should be Syria's by right. As a high-ranking Russian diplomat put it, the Golan Heights need to be wrapped up in something.

It is the form of the packaging and the algebraic formulation of an accord that the U.S. and Russian diplomats are trying to devise.

The Syrian method of holding talks can drive people mad. As Henry Kissinger put it, al-Asad uses the brinkmanship method of negotiating and, to get what he wants, occasionally goes over the brink in the hope that his negotiating partner's nerve will not hold. Saying to a Syrian: "Don't haggle" is like telling a fish not to swim.

You have to understand one simple fact: al-Asad does not want his subordinates and possible rivals to be able to claim later that he let himself be duped.

Hafiz al-Asad and his entourage have a poor reputation in the world community. Syria's leaders are belligerent, intransigent, arrogant, uncompromising, touchy, and full of prejudice; they constantly demand recognition of their own merits.

There is much in common between the Israelis, living in a besieged fortress, and the Syrians, who harbor a grudge against the whole world. But the Israelis cannot understand that Syrian national characteristic, their exaggerated sense of honor, while the Syrians do not understand that Israel's self-confidence is born of fear.

The American diplomats were the first to understand how to begin and started to explain to one side the other side's way of thinking. Now Russia's diplomats are sharing with the Americans the mission of traveling healer.

Political Issues

Shakhray Interviewed on Political Beliefs

PM1711154593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray by Sergey Chugayev; place and date not given: "Sergey Shakhray: For Me the Main Values Are the Family, Property, and the State"]

[Text] One person who can quite rightly be called a typical representative of the new Russian political elite that began to be formed after the 1990 parliamentary elections and soon vitually forced the old Soviet nomenklatura from the political stage is 37-year-old candidate of juridical sciences Sergey Shakhray. At the same time, Shakhray belongs to that part of this elite which from the beginning linked its future to the president. It would be no exaggeration to call him one of the brightest figures in B. Yeltsin's entourage, and he stood alongside him at the most critical moments—in August 1991 and fall 1993. Shakhray is accredited with the authorship of many of the most important laws and presidential edicts.

S. Shakhray began his political career as chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Legislation—one of the main and most effective subdivisions of the former Russian Supreme Soviet where such well-known figures as N. Ryabov, M. Mityukov, and S. Baburin made their names—and made quite rapid and successful progress in the structure of the executive too. He was chief of the State-Legal Administration and coordinated the work of the power departments, he was simultaneously a member of the Security Council and subsequently became vice premier in the Gaydar and Chernomyrdin governments with responsibility for work with the components of the Federation. In that post Shakhray had to tour virtually all of Russia's "hot spots" and for a few months was head of the interim administration in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone.

We now publish the transcript prepared by Sergey Chugayev of a conversation at the editorial office, which opens a series of items on meetings at IZVESTIYA's editorial office with the main participants in the election campaign.

[Shakhray] Before beginning this discussion, I would like to say that for me it is a great honor to be at IZVESTIYA again. It seems that fate is constantly linking me to your newspaper. I remember how back in 1990 before becoming a deputy I published a long article in IZVESTIYA dedicated to the disposition of political forces on the eve of the first congress in which I also ventured a prediction of the most likely development of events at the congress. This article had a great impact, and I think it was largely because of it that B. Yeltsin noticed me.

[Chugayev] Could you predict the development of immediate events in Russia for us here and now?

[Shakhray] I very much fear that Russia could slide toward a military-police state. I am promoted to suggest such a possibility by the very logic of the development of the political and economic situation in the country. We have no parliament now. Once again Russian parliamentarism has suffered a most serious blow. The present executive certainly does not deserve to be charged with authoritarianism—it is so weak. And the military are beginning to acquire ever increasing real political weight. It is a good thing that there are no leaders among those circles just now. But the kind of situation could develop in which it becomes necessary to constantly keep the military machine in operation so as to suppress armed interregional and regional conflicts. Then the Army's political influence will inevitably increase.

Notice this fact: Virtually none of the Russian republic leaders expressed their views of the president's actions. But tacitly they all sided with the republic presidents. You can understand why. A republic president elected by the population is a reliable line of defense against the center. And possibly a line of offense.

That is why I think that if in the next few months we do not make use of the opportunities which the new Constitution and the Federal Assembly give us, if we do not change federal relations and mutual relations between the center and the regions, then the Russian state could face either the threat of disintegration or the prospect of being turned into a military-police state.

[Chugayev] In that connection, how do you view M. Shaymiyev's statement that Tatarstan is not going to take part in the referendum?

[Shakhray] I do not think that the referendum will be banned in Tatarstan. And its results will be the same as in April. Most likely the new Constitution will not receive the necessary majority of the electors' votes in any of the republics. There is nothing terrible in that. In the FRG in the past, Bavaria did not vote for the constitution either. It will simply be necessary to live normally, mindful that there is this superficial problem and that there are quite objective contradictions.

It should be understood that during the entire transitional period Russia will develop as an asymmetrical federation. Therefore, after making the krays and oblasts equal to the republics in terms of the economy and legislation, we will nevertheless not be able to overcome national specifics, including the republic form of government in those regions where 15 percent of the Russian Federation population lives but which occupy 51 percent of Russian Federation territory.

It is also necessary, I think, to take into account such an important factor as the renewal of the process of the formation of the Russian [Russkaya] nation after an interruption of 76 years. Who are the Russians in Tatarstan, for example? A part of the Tatar people or a part of the Russian nation? Unless we understand that the process of the formation of the Russian nation is going on and that it is on the general state of the Russian nation that the general state of all the other nations and peoples of the Russian Federation depends [ot samochuvstviya russkoy natsii zavisit samochuvstviye vsekh drugikh rossiyskikh natsiy i narodov], there could be very regrettable consequences in store for us.

In my view, the problem of federal relations must be resolved politically and practically in a fundamentally new way. First of all, it must be recognized honestly that the right of nations to self-determination, up to and including secession and the formation of a separate state, is unrealizable in Russia. It is impossible to create 150 ethnically pure states on one territory. And, having recognized this reality, we must bear in mind that Russia is our common home and the Russian Federation is the single form of self-determination of all 150 Russian Federation peoples. Such an approach is unusual and causes irritation among national political elites. But in my view this is the only honest way to state the fact. And then we must return to the idea of creating national cultural autonomous entities, an idea which originated in Russia back at the start of the century but was later killed off. Should one, for example, forcibly try to revive the republic of the Volga Germans or is it more expedient to create for millions of Russian Germans the conditions for national and cultural rebirth?

The party's political program states that it advocates the unity and integrity of Russia, the priority of human rights, the supremacy of the law, the inviolability of the rights of property, equality, a civil society, federalism and local self-management, and the separation of powers. In the economic sphere the party intends to defend the right of private property as the main source of prosperity, to fight for the preservation of a single Russian economic area, which should be backed up by the market economy, a single economic, financial, and customs policy, and also the strengthening of the Russian ruble. Firm social guarantees for the socially unprotected strata of the population are to be achieved on the basis of an effective market economy.

[Chugayev] Do you accept the political definition of yourself as an "advocate of a strong state" ["gosudarstvennik"]?

[Shakhray] On certain conditions—yes, definitely. I regard myself as a conservative, and I even wanted to call our party the All-Russian Conservative Party. Not, of course, because I want to conserve the soviet system, you can hardly suspect me of harboring love for Soviet power. I simply believe that today Russian society has grown tired of revolution. [Czarist Prime Minister] Stolypin's words about a great Russia without great upheavals are more relevant than ever before. Thus society needs to rely on traditional conservative values. For me such values are the family, property, and the state. The nation and the state—these are two historic values which must learn to coexist. That is why I advocate the preservation of the Russian state and confederative relations within the CIS framework. Probably that is why I may be considered an advocate of a strong state although I have never used that term about myself.

[Chugayev] But do you accept the description of your party as the "moderate opposition"?

[Shakhray] It was the "Russia's Choice" bloc which called us the opposition. I consider, however, that our party is not so much the opposition as a serious opponent to "Russia's Choice," among others. It is not personal differences or differences of views on, for example, the economy which divide us here. We want our party to be the first political organization not founded on a social-class [soslovno-sotsialnyy] basis. We want to create the kind of political mechanism where the Russian regions, cities, and provinces would have through our party a general political platform in the Russian parliament and government and through this mechanism the center could influence the situation in the regions. So we have our niche. For example, we will view the economy primarily in terms of the regional approach, that is, insofar as economic policy corresponds to the federative character of state organization which the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRUA] advocates. We will hold discussions with other parties from that standpoint.

As for "Russia's Choice," which called us the opposition, it seems to me, in turn, that its characterization as a presidential-government bloc is a great exaggeration. First, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin does not support this bloc "by definition," so to speak. Because "Russia's Choice" is planning to replace him with Gaydar. The prime minister was even forced to take such a step as depriving Ye. Gaydar, N. Fedorov, and a number of other deputy prime ministers of the right to issue credits, licenses, and quotas and also the right to make financial undertakings [finansovaya podpis] for the period of the election campaign. (In this respect it is easier for me because I am on vacation). And second, the president still supports the whole spectrum of democratic movements. Although, possibly, on the eve of the elections, "Russia's Choice" will put pressure on him.

[Chugayev] What does the PRUA represent today? In which camp do you expect to find allies?

[Shakhray] Our party is not large in number; according to our estimates we have around 4,500 members, and we are not trying to force the pace of the process of "growth of the party ranks." So for that reason the party may be regarded as a real organization only after the elections. If we manage to clear the 5-percent hurdle and enter the Duma, the party will come into existence. If not we will exist on paper only, like many similar organizations.

Sergey Shakhray is the son of a military aviator and with evident pride describes himself as a 12th generation Terek Cossack. He also talks with unconcealed satisfaction about how he came to Moscow State University from "provincial" Rostov as a post-graduate student and discovered that he was in no way inferior and in many ways superior to his new academic colleagues. In these discussions, it is not hard to see the origins of one of his party's main slogans—reliance on the Russian provinces. In Shakhray's opinion, the "pack of Moscow politicians" can and must be substantially "rejuvenated." He believes that among the heads of the local administrations and scientists in the provinces today there are quite a few people who are fully capable of working at *government and parliamentary level, and he states in particular that he has in mind a ready-made minister of the economy currently working out in East Siberia. However, he declined to give the name: "I do not want to give him away."*

Speaking on the sensitive theme of finance for the election campaign, he claimed that all the expenditure comes from the official election support fund. In his words, there have been many offers of financial support but the party is taking a highly cautious view of them because it is sure that all its rivals—both on the right and the left—will scrutinize its financial affairs most meticulously.

In Shakhray's words, when entering the election campaign, the PRUA consciously refused to use the term "government party" about itself. It does not intend forming a bloc with anyone and if conditions are favorable hopes to poll around 19 percent of the votes cast. If the president does not support "Russia's Choice," Shakhray believes, the PRUA could possibly even top 30-percent. Nevertheless, in single-seat districts, an alliance with "Russia's Choice," the Movement for Democratic Reforms, Yavlinskiy's bloc, and "Civic Union" cannot be ruled out.

[Chugayev] Could there be an agreement between the PRUA and the communists? Our information is that G. Zyuganov does not rule that out.

[Shakhray] I believe that political cooperation between us is impossible. Probably what G. Zyuganov had in mind was my ability to conduct dialogue with any political force.

[Chugayev] What is your party's economic program?

[Shakhray] Our economic program is based on the decisions which were approved by the president and the government on 6 August. Officially we support V. Chernomyrdin's policy, and thus if I enter the Duma I will continue that line. At the same time we believe that neither the government nor the president has an effective regional economic program at the moment. We see scope for our party's activity here.

[Chugayev] If you and your party are successful in the elections, do you intend seeking any changes to the composition of the present government?

[Shakhray] Having read the draft of the new Russian Constitution, I am convinced that our government will not change and that its composition will remain the same even after the elections to the Federal Assembly. Nevertheless, we believe that the government should place before the State Duma deputies the question of confidence in itself. When our party defined its position toward the new Constitution we decided: We will vote for the Constitution as a whole although we disagree with a number of its fundamental provisions, primarily those regarding problems of federalism. We will work in the new Russian parliament to amend these provisions by normal, civilized means.

Meanwhile I would like to reiterate that I do not intend running for president as everyone is saying for some reason.

[Chugayev] But you have stated that yourself...

[Shakhray] I stated that I will be president. But at the same time I added: Everyone has his day. Morally, ethically, and for all other considerations, I do not intend running for president in the near future and competing with B. Yeltsin because I still consider myself one of his team.

[Chugayev] You began the election campaign in a quite unusual way. You resigned and voluntarily published a declaration of your income in our newspaper. Has anyone copied your example?

[Shakhray] I have not heard of any to date. But the point of the steps to which you refer was that I wanted to set a new tone to the election campaign. Essentially this is an attempt to inject new elements of political culture. But that is not all. For example, formally speaking I was not obliged to make a declaration. But I have three years' experience of work as a deputy behind me, and I had no doubt that my opponents will start looking for something to use. Therefore, so as not to be left in the adverse position of having to justify myself I made a preemptive move. Apart from that it was in my interests to let the press and the tax authorities know what assets I had when I entered the election campaign. The voter must know everything that matters about his candidate—from his state of health to his property status. My next step will be to publish an official account of my work as a deputy and government member.

[Chugayev] However, the other day K. Borovoy accused you of hiding your hard currency earnings in your declaration.

[Shakhray] That allegation does not correspond to the facts. In the declaration, I wrote especially that I have no hard currency accounts either in this country or abroad.

[Chugayev] N. Mikhalkov features on your party's electoral list. Thus you are connected through Mikhalkov to his friend, A. Rutskoy...

[Shakhray] N. Mikhalkov is not on our lists. His candidacy was proposed by the Nizhniy Novgorod regional branch of our party but when we made up the final list N. Mikhalkov was omitted.

[Chugayev] What part did you play in the events of 3-4 October? Do you share the opinion that the government showed a lack of determination during those days?

[Shakhray] I believe that what happened in Moscow in October was that an armed uprising was suppressed by armed means. I regard what happened as a national tragedy, as I stated on 4 October. A tragedy with no victors. Thus when opening our party's founding congress in Novgorod I formulated the position thus: The so-called victors must refrain from persecuting the so-called vanquished (I mean, of course, political persecution rather than prosecution for criminally punishable actions); the so-called vanquished must eschew bloody vengeance. The blood of those who died must have a sobering effect on the living and make them reach agreement on resolving contradictions by civilized means. Through the elections.

As for my part in those events, I did not see the president's edict no. 1400 because I considered that there are other ways to resolve the problem. But having remained in the government and not having resigned, I did not have and do not have the right to criticize this edict. I consider it an enforced and justified step in that situation. And having remained in the government I, like all the members of that government, have begun working to fulfill it.

As for confusion in the government, I believe that there was an element of unpreparedness for the armed uprising. There is no point in hiding this fact. It seemed to us impossible that in such a situation when the political advantage of the president and government seemed beyond question the other side would resort to an armed uprising. The talks that were being held under the aegis of the church were debilitating. In addition, the Constitutional Court and some other regional soviets played their part when they spread the idea about support for the White House in the regions of Russia. In fact there was no real support for anyone from the population, as we know. There was apathy.

[Chugayev] In your opinion, how might these events influence the outcome of the elections?

[Shakhray] I think that they will have a most direct influence. The first consequence of these events will be that few people will turn out for the elections. I believe that the average turnout across Russia will be around 50 percent. In other words, people do not want to vote for anyone, they will say a "plague on both your houses."

[Chugayev] Is the return of the communists to power in Russia a possibility?

[Shakhray] It is possible but not at these elections. If they form a bloc now, and they have the ability to do so, they could poll around 30 percent of the votes. However I am afraid that the analysts at "Russia's Choice," when they have studied the results of the collection of signatures and other signals, may come to the conclusion in the near future their bloc has a chance of winning the elections only if society again splits into "us" and "them" by 12 December. So that the idea can be dinned into the voters: "Yes, we are not perfect but look at those on the other flank—the communo-fascists!"

As a result I believe that there will be five to seven blocs in the Duma. The crucial question will be this: Around whom will the ruling coalition be formed? I am not very sure that it will begin to form on the basis of "Russia's Choice." It may be formed without that particular bloc. In that case, such coalitions will be very unstable, very interesting, sometimes even ludicrous. But since the Duma is deprived of the right to resolve the question of the government [vopros o pravitelstve] and many other thing too, I do not think that this will matter very much.

Possibility of Constitutional Amendments Viewed

PM1711143393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Anatoliy Nikolayevich Antonov, general director of the Center for Sociostrategic Research: "Draft Constitution: Are Amendments Possible?"]

[Text] The draft of the new Russian Constitution has been published. Before commenting on some of its provisions, let us ask ourselves a question that many people are doubtless asking themselves. It is clear that it is impossible to discuss the project extensively, and particularly to compete "nationally" as to who will propose more addenda and amendments, which is what happened with the Brezhnev constitution. And indeed there is no time: It is only a month until 12 December. But anybody may be faced with the following dilemma: By and large he may approve this draft, but some provision or other is, in his opinion, insufficiently specific, something is not taken into account, or even generates categorical disagreement. So what then?

Of course, if the disagreement concerns the very basics of the new social and state system reflected in the draft, a person can vote against it, and that is that. But if he accepts this system, the rest is not an insuperable problem. The text is very well thought out, and everything that could have been taken into account has been taken into account. But if something serious really does arise, there is a procedure for constitutional amendments. It is elaborated in such a way as to rule out the possibility of legislative tyranny such as the former Supreme Soviet practiced as a monopoly, but not so as to hinder improvements to the Basic Law which, naturally, will be suggested by time and experience.

But what will happen if, before the ballot, it turns out that there is fairly extensive negative public opinion concerning a particular point? Well, in that case too, there exists the legal possibility for amendments: Inasmuch as the draft text is presented to the attention of society by an edict of the president, then, if any fairly serious flaws, contradictions, or shortcomings are detected in the text, amendments may also be introduced by presidential edict.

The most important provisions in the draft of the Constitution to have generated much dispute are connected with the concept of sovereignty. Its bearer, according to the draft, is the Russian people. But not the peoples of the individual republics and other components of the Russian Federation. A republic may have its own constitution and legislation, while a kray, oblast, or city of federal significance may have its own charter and legislation. The absence of the concept of sovereignty among the prime components of the Federation means that it is impossible for them to legitimately withdraw from Russia. This is extremely important, because up until the September-October events there was a great danger that a number of regions and territories might start taking practical steps in the direction of withdrawing from the Russian Federation. Under the new draft, this possibility does not exist. This strengthens Russian statehood. But it does not fully eliminate the contradictions between the center and the regions. A certain territorial restructuring cannot be ruled out, and maybe is necessary—for example, the creation of territorial formations larger than individual oblasts, and the transfer to them of a larger volume of the powers which currently belong to the center. The draft Constitution does not block this possibility. Article 65, which contains a list of components of the Federation, relates to that part of the Constitution which, according to the draft, may be changed according to the procedure envisaged for the adoption of federal constitutional law—unlike the sections on constitutional principles and human rights, which are not subject to review by the Federal Assembly.

The principle included in Article 2 is extremely important. It proclaims the individual and his or her rights and freedoms as the highest value, rather than the freedoms of the nation or nationality, which would be likely to result in the most serious negative consequences, possibly even armed ethnic conflicts.

Human rights in Russia, starting with the right to life, must be and will be fully observed, irrespective of nationality, whether an individual is Russian, Tatar, Chechen, Jewish, German, Estonian, French, or whatever.

If it is adopted, the Constitution will enshrine the real right of private ownership of land as established by the recent edict of the Russian Federation president for the first time since October 1917. This will have enormous consequences—hard for us to imagine—not just for the economy and the economic structure but the whole life of the nation.

The experience of the destructive conflicts between the two branches of power has forced the elaborators of the draft to pay special attention to procedures for averting and overcoming such conflicts in the future. According to the draft, the Russian Federation Constitution is the constitution of a rule-of-law state which operates a separation of powers. Although certain analysts feared that the legalization of authoritarianism would be proposed, the draft contains nothing of the sort. I would refrain from making categorical qualifications about whether this will be a presidential, parliamentary, or interim form of rule. Undoubtedly we are talking about a strong presidential power, but by no means about a parliament "in someone's pocket." The equilibrium of powers is ensured by all legal possibilities for checks and balances between their various branches. I would note a particular but important aspect here: It appears that the observations made in the press recently by the general prosecutor, who was worried that the draft of the new Constitution would reduce the role of the prosecutor's office, have been taken into consideration.

The social section has been worked out in detail. I think that close familiarization with it will remove worries that the social rights to which the population has become accustomed will be annulled. The state's constitutional commitments to those who cannot compete on the labor market or have limited possibilities of doing so, and also all other social guarantees for a decent life for every person, are stipulated.

Of course, the correspondence between Constitution and life will not be established automatically. If the Constitution is adopted, and I personally have no doubt about this, it must be translated into the language of practice and made really active.

Commission Official Criticizes Draft Constitution

PM1711171793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with Oleg Rumyantsev by Aleksandr Golovenko; place and date not given: "The Constitution: Salvos Put an End to It"]

[Excerpts] You can easily recall the inspiration with which Social Democrat Oleg Rumyantsev, elected senior secretary of the Constitutional Commission, started elaborating the Basic Law of the Russian Federation three years ago. He saw it as the focus of the highest ideals of good and justice. As he has admitted, all the illusions were shattered once and for all to the thunder of the tank cannonade 4 October.

[Golovenko] Oleg Germanovich, in what way did the RSFSR Constitution, which was in operation in 1990, not suit you?

[Rumyantsev] To my mind, it was too ideologized, peppered with terms like "Marxism-Leninism," "communist education," and so on. [passage omitted] But the present draft Constitution which is being submitted to a referendum only aims to legalize the forcible seizure of power and legalize the state coup. It is finishing the work started by the tank salvos of 4 October.

I would recall that two trends have determined Russia's sociopolitical development since the olden days: autocracy and popular representation—the veche, assembly, duma, soviet. The present draft chooses the authoritarian model, rejecting broad popular representation. This propresidential document, which is cut to fit B. Yeltsin personally, invests him with monarchic powers. It de facto places the president above all branches of power, the head of state runs foreign and domestic policy single-handedly, appoints all judges aside from federal ones, and the general prosecutor and the chairman of the Central Bank are subordinate to him. The independence of the Constitutional Court can also safely be given up as lost. [passage omitted]

I have already said once before that this Constitution is not universally acceptable—many parties, movements, and entire strata of society are rejecting it out of hand. There is no accord around it—that is what is important! It will not be universally binding either, because there is no way of forcing a power which is spoilt and debauched by a lack of control to observe the Basic Law. The draft is made to suit a specific political leader, and as soon as this figure has gone, the need for such a constitution will disappear as well. And that is why I see it as doomed.

But just think: It claims eternal youth! Some very resourceful subject has written in a provision to the effect that parliament cannot change a chapter, let alone the whole constitution. Furthermore, the draft contains the continuation of the Belovezhskaya line toward the destruction of statehood. But we have nevertheless seen Russia within a union with the neighboring states of the former USSR, and it would have handed over a part of its powers to this Union. You cannot just disregard the country's geopolitical environment, and moreover an environment populated by Russians.... [passage omitted]

Agrarian Party Leader Views Draft Constitution

LD1711190693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1705 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Bogdanov]

[Text] Moscow November 17 TASS—Russia's Agrarian Party will not team up with any election bloc, party leader Mikhail Lapshin said.

Speaking at a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday, Lapshin said this does not rule out the possibility of acting in support of those candidates in regions whose programmes protect the interests of the agrarians.

Speaking about the party's attitude towards the draft constitution, Lapshin said that its members "were not invited to take part in the constitutional process." Its proposals were not taken into account. One of the major faults of the draft constitution lies in the lack of regulation of purchase and sale of land and absence of provisions which would "put barriers for attempts to establish latifundia."

Lapshin described as "not very democratic" the terms of elections and their preparation which takes place in the situation when there is no parliament in the country and many mass media which were accessible to the party are now closed.

The party is "against a mechanical and thoughtless application of market doctrines during the transitional period." It is seeking to use legal means to ensure "the transformation of the existing forms of management on a voluntary basis," Lapshin said.

Yeltsin Edict Confers Bravery Awards

PM1711112093 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Award"]

[Excerpt] By edicts of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, the following have been awarded the Order for Personal Valor for valor and courage displayed while performing their official duties in life-threatening conditions: Andrey Nikolayevich Kiselev, third secretary at the Russian Federation Embassy in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Gennadiy Pavlovich Nikitin, operations officer; and Nikolay Vladimirovich Chulkov, chief of the Russian Federal Migration Service Emergency Situations Rapid Response Administration. [passage omitted]

Human Rights Official: Khasbulatov Political Prisoner

LD1711154793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1225 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, 17 Nov—"The people who ended up on 4 October in Lefortovo jail are political prisoners," Chairman of the Human Rights Commission at the Russian president's office Sergey Kovalev said at a news conference today. "But," the chairman of the commission pointed out, "they certainly are not prisoners of conscience." It would be a different matter, he stressed, if they were isolated by the authorities in breach of, for example, fundamental rights of freedom of speech—that really is a cause for concern.

Speaking of the work of the commission, its chairman announced that Sergey Kovalev sees the main functions of its work as lying in the study of cases of breach of human rights and analysis of the human rights situation in the country.

Lawyers: Criminal Code Inapplicable to Rutskoy, Others

MK1811095093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Anna Ostapchuk and Yevgeniy Krasnikov under the "Law" rubric: "Soviet Criminal Code Is Not for Soviet Order Defenders, 'Lefortovo' Prisoners' Lawyers Say"]

[Text] Lawyers for the defense in the case "On the organization of mass unrest on 3 and 4 October" held their first press conference yesterday. It was attended by Vladimir Fomichev, Ruslan Khasbulatov's lawyer; Yuriy Ivanov, Aleksandr Rutskoy's lawyer; and Dmitriy Shteynberg, Viktor Barannikov's lawyer. It was said at the press conference that none of the defendants pleaded guilty and that all of them remained steadfast and courageous.

Yuriy Ivanov laid out the concept of defense in most detail. In his view, those who defended the Soviet order cannot be prosecuted under the Soviet Criminal Code. As proof of this, Ivanov cited Article 13 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (on necessary defense) whereby those who acted in defense of the interests of Soviet power are to be relieved of criminal responsibility.

"According to the Criminal Code's logic, in those days Boris Yeltsin was liable at least to immediate arrest," Ivanov said. In the opinion of Aleksandr Rutskoy's lawyer, Yeltsin's actions contained three corpora delicti according to that same Criminal Code: under Article 171, part 2 (overstepping one's powers); Article 64 (conspiracy for the purpose of seizing power); and Article 79 "prim [as transliterated]" (forcible actions aimed at preventing constitutional bodies of power from carrying out their legal activity). Ivanov said that he planned to file a petition shortly requesting that criminal charges be brought on these counts against Boris Yeltsin. Yuriy Ivanov also believes that those statesmen who were involved in the preparation of edict No. 1400 and those who directly enforced it must share responsibility. At this stage, Aleksandr Rutskoy's testimony is 30 to 40 pages long and is political in nature, not a statement of facts. Rutskoy's lawyer expressed his confidence that his defendant "continues to preserve the honor of an officer and the dignity of a Russian man." So, in the very first days after his arrest, Rutskoy requested that those who carried out his orders (Makashov, Viktor Barannikov, Achalov, and Dunayev) be relieved of responsibility along with Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was engaged in constitutional activity. Regarding corruption charges brought against Rutskoy, Ivanov implied that they were "inspired by Western secret services, which needed to topple Rutskoy as a representative of the patriotically minded opposition."

Dmitriy Shteynberg also assured journalists that "Barannikov has been giving consistent, uniform testimony with regard to his being absolutely not guilty." This can be proved, however, only after certain investigating actions on which the defense has been insisting, but which, according to Shteynberg, "have not been carried out for some reason."

According to Vladimir Fomichev, Ruslan Khasbulatov has not lost his popularity among Russian citizens, which was confirmed by his nomination in the Makhachkala electoral district. While in custody, the speaker has not changed his assessment of edict No. 1400 of 21 September.

Gaydar Seen Having Greatest Influence on Yeltsin

MK1711142193 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 47, 21 Nov 93 (Signed to press 16 Nov) p A6

[Unattributed report in the "Power Lobbies" column: "So Then, Who Influences Yeltsin the Most?"]

[Text] As promised (see MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No. 44), results have been received from a public opinion poll on the question of who within the president's entourage influences him the most. This is how the answers have been distributed by percentage:

Yegor Gaydar—30
Viktor Chernomyrdin—13
Sergey Shakhray—8
Gennadiy Burbulis—8
Vladimir Shumeyko—7
Pavel Grachev—6
Yuriy Luzhkov—4
Mikhail Poltoranin—4
Vyacheslav Kostikov—4
Viktor Yerin—3

The real weight of a politician is often determined not by his competence or official position but by how strongly his word (advice, recommendation, and so forth) will affect the number one man. In other words, at all times and in all countries there have been two tables of rank, as it were: The first is the official hierarchy; the second includes "persons close to the emperor." These tables may not coincide: Madame Pompadour and Grigoriy Rasputin, without holding a state post, had far greater political "weight" than some ministers. They did not rule themselves, but influenced the ruling authority quite effectively.

Therefore the list of influential persons, or rather persons who in the public eye produce the strongest influence on Boris Yeltsin's decisions, does not go beyond the official table of rank. Yet in terms of their influence it arranges these persons in quite a different order. Yegor Gaydar happens to be more "important" than his boss Viktor Chernomyrdin, while retired state secretary Gennadiy Burbulis is still "heavier" than Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko. Again, this is not how things actually are, but what Russian citizens, voters, think, and if within the first five "heavyweights" three belong to Russia's Choice (Gaydar, Burbulis, and Shumeyko), this does not as yet mean that their chances in the upcoming elections to the Federal Assembly are higher than their rivals'. Proximity to the president, in the eyes of the voters, may be not only a plus but also a minus: Your influence, the voters will reason, has not led to my well-being, and he will strike their names out. Or maybe quite the contrary....

Commission for State Coat of Arms Set Up

LD1711164793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0800 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] A commission for developing the design of the Russian Federation state coat of arms has been set up by decree of the Russian president. The presidential press service reports that this has been done because it is necessary to bring the country's state symbols into line with the modern concept of Russian statehood. The commission has been instructed to submit to the president in two weeks time the drafts of the description of the coat of arms and its design, developed on the basis of national Russian symbolism.

Security Ministry Disclaims Responsibility for DEN Edition

MK1711145593 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 47, 21 Nov 93 (signed to press 16 Nov) p A3

[Dmitriy Pushkar report in the "Mass Media" column: "Security Ministry Shifts Responsibility to Press Ministry. Mutiny Organizers Are Not Going To Calm Down"]

[Text] Proof of this [reference to subslug] is another issue of DEN, which came out last week in Lipetsk. Vladimir Varakin, head of the Lipetsk Oblast Security Ministry Directorate, does not regard this as anything criminal and believes that this question should be addressed by the Press Ministry. DEN No. 6, signed to press on 10 October and printed in 60,000 copies by the Lipetsk state publishing house of the Russian Federation Press and Information Ministry, gives false printer's particulars. It is written that publication was registered in Lipetsk in October 1990 by the Lipetsk Press and Information Committee. But at that time there was no such body. Sources in

Lipetsk say that no such publication has ever been registered there. This is not the only, although quite substantial, criminal aspect of the situation. The paper carries notes by one of the rebellion organizers, Vitaliy Urazhtsev, who is wanted by law enforcement bodies. Here President Ilyumzhinov of Kalmykia reflects on the disintegration of Russia carried out by the presidential team according to Western prescriptions. Also here is the fervent Sazhi Umalatova and the fiery Ivan Shashviashvili. There is also a warning signed by the "Security Service of the Den Movement" under the headline "We Shall Remember!" enumerating army units that took part in suppressing the mutiny, their commanders, and the most active officers. The "black list" includes commanders of the Taman and the Kantemirovskaya Divisions, the command of the special purpose troops and the paratroopers, also tactical level officers. Of course, what reason does the Security Ministry have to deal with all that.

The paper did not appear in Lipetsk newspaper kiosks—its entire print run went to Moscow.

Election Issues

Article Views Early Presidential Elections

MK1711130393 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 47, 17-23 Nov 93 (signed to press 16 Nov) p 1

[Aleksandr Yevlakhov report in the "Weather for Tomorrow" column: "Our President Is Not Slave to His Word: He Gives it at Will and Retracts it at Will. Coal Miners Barometer: Early Presidential Elections Are Unavoidable"]

[Text] The Vorkuta coal miners who have demanded the holding of presidential elections on 12 June—this is serious. In any event, far more serious than Grachev, Chernomyrdin, and other "sly courtiers" explaining how right Yeltsin was when he stated that there is no need for these elections. More serious than popularity ratings construed by commissioned sociologists. More serious than the servile voices ostensibly articulating the opinion of the progressive part of society. The coal miners are more than a symptom. This is almost fate. The statement by Nikolay Travkin to coal miners in May 1990, saying that we need a truly people's anti-communist party, began the CPSU's last, funereal march. The coal miners, well before that happened, had signed a verdict on the political career of N. Ryzhkov and subsequently M. Gorbachev.

The point is not the mythical vanguard role of the working class. It is simply that the miners are tough people who cannot stand being lied to. No matter what might cause it. The explanations being made with respect to early presidential elections are totally unconvincing.

We are being told that the presidential edict on holding them was a forced compromise with the deputy corps, but did the demand for fresh elections for both power branches originate only from the White House? We are being told that after 4 October the political situation has changed drastically. It is hard to disagree with this, but this fact only bears out the need for the 12 June elections. The president, who is an ex officio guarantor of civil peace and who has allowed mass bloodshed to happen, must leave the political scene or reaffirm his right to lead the country. References to the votes obtained in the April referendum are absurd—people did not vote for the suppression of the legislative power citadel with tanks. We are again being persistently told that there is no alternative to Yeltsin, but this is a lie! In their businesslike qualities A. Sobchak, Ye. Gaydar, Yu. Skokov, S. Shakhray, G. Yavlinskiy, or B. Nemtsov are every bit as good as he. Addressing an audience four years ago, M. Poltoranin, disproving the belief that there is no alternative to Gorbachev, said: "We are looking only at the first—Politburo—row, but in the third or sixth row there are such people like, for instance, Yuriy Afanasyev." The arguments to the effect that the president should "prepare" a replacement are totally ridiculous. Did Bush prepare Clinton as a replacement for himself or did Landsbergis prepare Brazauskas? Generally, this phrase suggests more a despotic ruler rather than the country's number one official. Although so far "under the rug," preparations for presidential elections have nonetheless gone under way, and with any scenario, Yeltsin will hardly be able to stay on in his post until 1996.

They say that just one phrase may cost a statesman his career. It is not ruled out that this phrase was spoken by B. Yeltsin a week ago. Its devastating effect may turn out to be stronger than a promise to throw oneself under a train should prices rise. At that time the president's image did not suffer too much because reforms followed which more or less filled the store shelves. Moreover, the living standards in Russia are somewhat higher than in the majority of the former Union republics, but B. Yeltsin's refusal to go ahead with early presidential elections has only played into the hands of opponents to the liberal course, raising the rating of the Communist Party which called for the 12 June elections edict not to be taken seriously.

A month will pass and deputies to the Federal Assembly will have the right to state: We have greater legitimacy than Yeltsin because we were elected after the 4 October events, in the post-Soviet period. The mechanism of public pressure, well proven in previous years, will be inevitably set in motion. In a word, the cancellation of the edict on the 12 June presidential elections will have a boomerang effect. B. Yeltsin will have to face early elections in any event, but without a chance for victory.

Yeltsin To Hold Consultations With Election Blocs

LD1811113493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1034 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin will hold political consultations with leaders of several elections blocs running for a new parliament, spokesman of the president Vyachelsav Kostikov announced on Thursday, adding that the meetings will be aimed "to ensure the necessary conditions for the state and constitutional construction".

Kostikov did not name the blocs, but said the choice of the president will be based on the "comprehension of political pluralism in the Russian society and the true balance of public and political forces".

Gaydar Views Election Prospects, Possible Outcomes

MK1711122993 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 47, 21 Nov 93 (signed to press 16 Nov) p A9

[Unattributed report under the "Forecast" rubric: "The New Staraya Square"]

[Text] What will the government be like if Russia's Choice wins on 12 December? The present one is a coalition, transitional government. One can foresee even now that a new cabinet will be a coalition of either Russia's Choice or Sergey Shakhray's "conservative party," or will be a one-party cabinet. In the latter event it would be formed by Yegor Gaydar, leader of Russia's Choice.

The first vice premier and minister of the economy thinks: "Don't count your chickens before they're hatched. But we know what we will do if we gain a secure majority." Refraining from discussing specific personnel changes, Gaydar made it understood that a corresponding plan had already been drawn up and that a reshuffle was inevitable. The execution of the plan depends on the percentage of votes Russia's Choice garners, and on who of today's ministers are elected to the Federal Assembly.

"A new government, should it be formed by Russia's Choice, would be more uniform and more close-knit," Yegor Gaydar said. In the event the president's bloc fails to secure a relative majority, a coalition cabinet little different from the present one would be formed. But "in any event, a new government would definitely carry out an economic policy similar to the one being carried out today. The new cabinet's program, most probably, will be the working program for 1994, whose detailed plan was passed on 15 November."

Thus, if one is to believe the vice premier, the cabinet's first steps in 1994 can be predicted even now with great certainty. Among them are measures to reduce the money supply growth rate and to put a brake on the weekly rate of inflation, which should lead to a real convertibility and stabilization of the Russian currency. A package of measures for carrying through a housing reform is now ready. In industry, the main stress would be laid on a reform of relations in the coal mining industry. The emphasis in agriculture will be on bringing in a new system of purchasing prices and on implementing the president's edict on selling land.

Yegor Gaydar has reason today to be pleased with his role both in Staraya Square and the Kremlin. In the past three months he has managed to consolidate his position as the president's closest aide. Gaydar was indeed one of those who proposed dissolving the parliament and calling elections for the Federal Assembly as soon as possible. He also persistently advised Boris Yeltsin to chuck the idea of early presidential elections. All Gaydar's short-term forecasts have come true with the exception of one: He expected a bloc led by Yuriy Skokov to be Russia's Choice main rival. Despite forecasts, Skokov has vanished in political limbo. "Now I can see that the more serious opposition to us in a new parliament is the bloc of "landowners" (the Agrarian Party) and communists. A harsh standoff will be unavoidable there. It would be a mistake to underestimate the role of an agrarian-communist bloc in Russia given its traditions."

Gaydar's work on details of the plan suggests that he does not intend to leave Staraya Square. The vice premier, though, is not ready to confirm this: "I of course do not rule out that I will remain in today's place in 1994. At the same time I am considering options where I would be much more useful working in parliament."

Ostankino Studio Head on Campaign Airtime

PM1811100593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview under "Russia Ahead of the Elections" rubric with "Ostankino" studio director Aleksey Pimanov by Anri Vartanov: "A Million for a Smile. That Is What a Candidate Deputy Will Have To Pay If He Holds' a Smile on Air for 40 Seconds"]

[Text] Daily from Monday 22 November through Friday 10 December, except for weekends, we will be offering each registered electoral bloc two hours of airtime from 1940 to 2040 hours, with a recorded repeat early the next day as part of the "Utro" program, Aleksey Pimanov, director of the "Ostankino" Television and Radio Company's "Rezonans" ["Resonance"] Studio, told our correspondent.

This studio has the job of organizing broadcasts on channel one in line with the Statute on Information Guarantees for Electioneering. Never before—not, at any rate, in the last three-quarters of a century—has Russia held party elections. It has certainly not had them at a time when television is almost entirely dominant in the sphere of mass information. The "Rezonans" Studio was granted this honor as the most experienced studio: It puts out 22 programs on political issues. Now it will have a 23d. It will be called "Voter's Hour."

[Vartanov] As I understand it, in accordance with the "Statute on Information Guarantees," the electoral blocs will get this hour free of charge. But what about paid time? What would it cost those who want it?

[Pimanov] We will also be making paid time available at those hours that are called "prime time," that is, those that attract the biggest audience. Half an hour, at 2140, after the evening "Novosti" bulletin. We calculated how much it would cost anyone who wanted it. It is 1.212 million rubles [R] per minute if the party provides its own video material. And approximately R1.5 million if we are providing the services: studio, cameras, and so on.

[Vartanov] Impressive figures, I must say.

[Pimanov] But don't think that we intend to make money out of the election campaign. On the contrary, according to our calculations we will be losing approximately R8 million per minute. Add to that the fact that for these three weeks we will be unable to show such programs as "Kinopanorama," "Tema," and many others that are attractive to advertisers and viewers. So it is a matter of carrying out our duty, not of making commercial profits. A broadcast in paid time can be recorded or live, as the candidate wishes. He also decides what form the broadcast takes. He can say nothing and just smile for the entire half hour if he likes.

[Vartanov] What about "Voter's Hour"? How do you intend to start work on this program?

[Pimanov] "Voter's Hour" will be of the nature of a live television debate. In our preparations for the program we have decided first of all to meet with representatives of all 13 electoral blocs and draw lots. In view of the fact that we will have 14 programs, we will plan 13 for the moment, keeping one in reserve. Since two blocs will participate in each of them, each will be able to draw two rivals overall. The original idea was to divide them in such a way that supporters of opposing political camps met on the air on each occasion, in order to make it more dramatic and interesting for viewers. But the idea was later abandoned.

[Vartanov] Why? After all, wouldn't it be more interesting to have a debate between "Russia's Choice" and Zhirinovskiy's party than between "Russia's Choice" and, say, the "Movement for Democratic Reforms"?

[Pimanov] That is a moot point. But what we fear most is being accused of not being objective enough, of political bias, and so on. So we decided to remain as neutral as possible, and perhaps even sacrifice some of the allure of the debates. Even the journalists chairing the debates will be instructed to be no more than moderators: give everyone a turn to speak, make sure the rules are observed, and prevent it turning into a slanging match. In order to reduce the risk, so to speak, of excessive subjectivity as much as possible, we want to place 50 questions in a drum so that each question a party gets is dictated by chance. Moreover, there will be a timer in the studio, so that the viewers can be sure that each side has exactly the same amount of time as the other.

[Vartanov] What about the fact that three employees of "Ostankino"—V. Bragin, his first deputy K. Ignatyev, and your deputy L. Radzikhovskiy—intend to run; in fact all three are in the same bloc—"Russia's Choice"?

[Pimanov] I am not going to talk about the "Ostankino" bosses, they can answer this question themselves, I hope. As for Radzikhovskiy, he has submitted his resignation. Maybe he will remain in the studio as an observer, but even then he will not appear on the air for the duration of the election campaign. This is in line with the Statute on Information Guarantees.

[Vartanov] Everyone's television set receives several channels. You have said what will be on "Ostankino." How will this relate to other television companies' programs?

[Pimanov] It was decided rightaway that regional channels—in our case, Moscow and St. Petersburg—would disregard the candidate deputies on the federal lists. They would stick to candidates running in single-seat districts in those regions. Channel four will not be involved in the election campaign at all. We have coordinated broadcast times with Russian TV so that we do not overlap. My understanding is that they will be broadcasting before us. I also know that a common price has been agreed on, which candidates and blocs will pay for their airtime.

[Vartanov] You have talked only about one form of broadcast for electoral blocs—the television debate. But others are named even in the Statute we talked about: news conference, interview, roundtable. I must say I thought television's creative staff would extend what is, after all, a meager list.

[Piamnov] You can accuse us of lacking imagination, but that is better than being accused of lacking objectivity. Of course, certain forms of television, not just those that have been named—the talk show, for instance—are very attractive. But we have heard and read so many times (including articles by respected television critics) about "Ostankino's" "wooing of" "Russia's Choice" that we decided to opt for the most austere—albeit maybe somewhat "flat"—genre of calm debate in which respect for one's opponent prevails. Although we are afraid that even then we will come in for insults and accusations....

From The Editorial Office

After carrying out an overview of the experience of many countries of the world, the Russian-American commission on television policy, headed on the U.S. side by former President Jimmy Carter and on the Russian side by Eduard Sagalayev, chairman of the Confederation of Journalists' Unions, drew up recommendations on the relationship between television and the state and political parties during election campaigns. In the United States, for example, candidates have the right to obtain airtime at the television companies' lowest advertising rates. At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the limits imposed by federal government on the funds a candidate might spend on political advertising are a violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. There is a way to avoid this contradiction, the recommendations' authors write. On mutual agreement among the parties, there will be a voluntary limit on funds to be spent on the election campaign, in particular on political advertising. If a candidate exceeds that limit, his opponent will get a similar sum from the government.

Our budget would not be able to cope with that, of course. But the actual idea of a mutual agreement is very sensible. Why don't the blocs and parties form such an alliance in the days that remain before the debate opens? It is maybe the only way both the parties and the television companies can avoid the accusation that the airwaves are up for sale and it's the fattest wallet rather than the best man that wins.

In the meantime we can report that the Information Arbitration Tribunal, formed as a result of the Russian Federation president's edict to ensure equality for candidates, has exercised its right to publish its documents in the press free of charge and has passed to the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Editorial Office the following account of its first session:

"Report of the Information Arbitration Tribunal

"At the 11 November session of the Information Arbitration Tribunal, the question of the size of the payment for broadcasting television and radio programs containing electioneering material was examined with representatives of the Ministry of Communications, state television and radio companies, and the Association of Independent Television and Radio Companies.

"The session participants agreed that the suggested rates were too high and needed to be lowered to ensure equal access to the electronic media for electoral associaitons and candidate deputies. Agreement was also reached on devising a more efficient system of payment for airtime, taking into account the specific types of services provided by television and radio companies.

"The tribunal also decided to prepare urgent proposals on a specific mechanism for compensating nonstate commercial television and radio companies for any disparity arising in payments for services during the election campaign and to send the proposals to the government.

[Signed] "V.V. Sukhomlinov, secretary of the Information Arbitration Tribunal"

Allocation of Election Airtime Begins

LD1711165693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 17 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The drawing of lots for the allocation of airtime took place today at the Central Electoral Commission. Let me remind you that, according to the resolution on elections, federal television and radio companies have an obligation to provide no less than one hour of airtime to electoral associations during three weeks before the elections.

Today the allocation was for airtime on Ostankino and Russian Television channels, as well as on the Mayak, Radio Rossii, and Radio Odin radio stations. The drawing of lots became protracted because every electoral association wanted to have a chance to speak at a convenient time close to the elections. Some have decided to split their hour into three slots, others have decided to speak twice for 30 minutes.

The battle for votes on television and radio airwaves will begin on 22 November. On that day viewers of the Ostankino first channel will be addressed by the Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Court Decides on Air Time

LD1711173793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 17 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Two questions are being discussed at today's routine session of the Information Arbitration Court: the first is connected with the explanation of a number of normative regulations on information guarantees during the period of the election campaign at the request of the Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress, and also of two TV and radio companies—Russian Television and Ostankino. The organizations who have approached the court are asking for an explanation of whether these TV and radio companies should, during the period from 21 November up to election day, in addition to the free time allocated, offer candidates from the election associations the opportunity to buy additional air time.

In a preliminary order, the court gives an explanation which says in particular that during the period up to 21 November air time is offered only for payment, but from 21 November candidates also have the right to obtain additional paid time on the basis of agreement and it will not be provided free.

Furthermore, the Russian Television and Radio Company is interested in the following question: how much can rates for airtime be raised from 1 December - this is connected with the greater cost of services provided to the company by other organizations. Here the court thinks that the TV and radio companies have the right to raise the price to be paid for the air time provided, but at the same time they are obliged to justify their decision.

Court Says Media Not Observing Procedures

LD1811111693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0915 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 18 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—"The electronic mass media are failing to observe the requirements of the legislation applying to coverage of the election campaign," the Media Arbitration Court believes.

A statement published by the court here says that, in the course of the electioneering, "covert party political broadcasts for individual candidates and electoral associations are being put out, despite the fact that the procedure for transmitting party political broadcasts is strictly regulated." The specific example is given of a speech by Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin on the radio on 14 November on his actions as a member of the government, when he was asked about the views of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord electoral association, which has nominated him to stand for deputy, about the Russia's Choice association. "This gave Aleksandr Shokhin the opportunity of making a party political broadcast on behalf of his own electoral association and of making critical remarks about his rivals," the court points out.

The court also notes the widespread practice whereby journalists support candidates, electoral associations, and election platforms in their programs or remarks or, on the contrary, attempt to be negative in their coverage or to discredit them. In the court's view, this is occurring in a variety of forms, sometimes wholly unethical. The court regards such cases as breaches of the legislation on guarantees of airtime for election campaign purposes.

The court sees the fact that some heads of television and radio companies are breaching certain articles of the legislation on guarantees of airtime for election campaign purposes as one of the reasons why journalists are not complying with legislation on electioneering. Several radio and television heads who are listed as candidates and are nevertheless continuing to carry out their professional duties in the mass media are cited as an example.

The court warns that should breaches of the provision on guarantees of airtime for election campaign purposes be discovered in future—namely, covert party political broadcasts, journalists giving candidates, election associations, and election programs support or preferential treatment, failure by candidates who are journalists and the agents of such candidates to meet requirements on suspending their participation in the making of television and radio programs, or other breaches, the appropriate measures will immediately be taken against them.

Details of Air Time Allocation

LD1711180793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] We have already reported that the draw for slots on television and radio between parties and public associations has been made at the Central Electoral Commission. We remind you that, according to the statute on the elections, state television and radio companies are obliged to provide daily, on working days for a period of three weeks before the elections, a minimum of one hour of airtime to electoral associations. This campaign begins on 22 November. How have these places been allocated?

On Channel 2 of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company on 23 and 30 November, and 1 December, on three occasions each of 20 minutes duration, will appear representatives of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, Russia's Choice, and the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc. Representatives of the Agrarian Party, the Russian Women's Association, and the Russian Unity and Accord Party will present their programs on 22, 26 November, and 3 December.

The Liberal Democratic Party on 24 November and 6 December, Civic Union on 22 and 29 November, the Kedr Constructive Ecological Movement on 29 November and 8 December, Dignity and Charity on 6 and 7 December, Russia's Future-New Names on 25 November and 8 December, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation on 25 November and 7 December, and the Democratic Party of Russia on 24 and 29 November will each get 30 minutes.

On Channel 1 of the Ostankino Television and Radio Company, on three occasions each of 20 minutes duration, on 30 November and 2 and 8 December will appear the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, and Russia's Choice. The same amount of time, but on 26 November and 1 and 3 December will be given to the Russian Unity and Accord Party, the Russian Agrarian Party, and the Russian Women's Association.

The Liberal Democratic Party will appear on two occasions of 30 minutes each on 25 November and 7 December; the Civic Union on 23 November and 6 December; the Kedr Movement on 22 and 29 November; Dignity and Charity on 24 and 29 November; Russia's Future-New Names on 25 November and 6 December; the Communist Party of Russia on 22 November and 7 December; and the Democratic Party of Russia on 23 and 24 November.

As far as the latter is concerned, the Democratic Party of Russia intends to protest at the draw. This was said to the RIA agency by Sergey Tokarev, the party's press secretary. We had no other choice, he said.

Paper Views Media Coverage

MK1811090093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 80, 18 Nov 93 (Signed to press 17 Nov) p 2

[Petr Zhuravlev report under the "Agitation" rubric: "Electoral Blocs Have Divided State-Owned Airwaves. Casting of Lots as an Embodiment of Justice"]

[Text] The procedure for the distribution of free air time on state television and radio between 13 electoral associations contesting seats to the State Duma continued late into 16 November. The casting of lots would have taken perhaps much less than three and a half hours but the snag was that some parties wished to split one hour of the air time each party is entitled to into 20-minute slots and use them on different days, whereas the other would rather split their's into 30-minute slots. Besides, authorized representatives of the parties often launched into long discussions about the effectiveness of political ads, the honesty of television and radio companies, and the need to arrange for equal chances for all during the casting of lots.

"Ostankino" television company sets aside the time from 1945 to 2045 every weekday for electoral campaigning.

22 November—the first half-hour received by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the second half-hour won by the ecologists of the Cedar movement.

23 November—Civic Union.... and the Democratic Party of Russia go on the air.

24 November—the Democratic Party of Russia again and the Dignity and Charity bloc.

25 November—Russia's Future bloc and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

26 November—the Women of Russia bloc, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and the Agrarian Party each have 20 minutes.

29 November—Cedar, and Dignity and Charity.

30 November—Russia's Choice, Women of Russia, Yavlinskiy- Boldyrev-Lukin blocs, and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms.

1 December—the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Women of Russia, and the Agrarian Party.

2 December—the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, Russia's Choice, and Yavlinskiy....

3 December—the Agrarian Party, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and Women of Russia.

6 December—Russia's Future...., and Civic Union....

7 December—the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

8 December—Yavlinskiy...., the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, and Russia's Choice.

Russian Television also plans a daily electoral campaigning hour on the same days from 1845 to 1945. The schedule is as follows:

22 November—Civic Union...., and Russia's Future.

23 November—Russia's Choice, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, and Yavlinskiy....

24 November—the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and the Democratic Party of Russia.

25 November—Cedar, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

26 November—the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Women of Russia, and the Agrarian Party.

29 November—the Democratic Party of Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

30 November—Yavlinskiy...., Russia's Choice, and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms.

1 December—the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, Yavlinskiy...., and Russia's Choice.

2 December—the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, the Agrarian Party, and Women of Russia.

3 December—the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Women of Russia, and the Agrarian Party.

6 December—the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Dignity and Charity.

7 December—Civic Union, and Dignity and Charity.

8 December—Cedar, and Russia's Future.

This schedule, like the timetable on three radio channels (it is now being finalized), is to be confirmed by the Central Electoral Commission. The electoral associations are free to chose the form of filling their air time (their spokesman's monologue or dialogue with a host, and so forth), and they are supposed to notify television people of their plans no later than two days before the broadcast. It should be also noted that having access to free air time does not prevent them from campaigning on the air on a "commercial basis." This was once again confirmed by the Arbitration Information Tribunal chaired by Anatoliy Vengerov.

Russian TV's Lysenko on Coverage

PM1711133193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview with Anatoliy Lysenko, general director of the Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, by Stas Stremidlovskiy; place and date not given: "'A Journalist Cannot Retire'"]

[Text] [Stremidlovskiy] The election campaign is under way. How will Russian Television cover the election battle?

[Lysenko] In strict accordance with the Central Electoral Commission's instructions. Each bloc will be allocated a precise amount of time. However, in my opinion, our part will be more on the technical side.

But in parallel to this we will also be making some political programs not directly connected with the upcoming elections. The "I Am a Leader" series, for example, which, incidentally, we are coproducing with KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. This series is not connected with the elections. I would describe it as a political game in which hypothetical situations are put to real, specific politicians.

[Stremidlovskiy] But let us get back to the elections. You are giving some airtime to candidates free of charge and some for a fee....

[Lysenko] A total of 350 minutes for 15 days at advertisement rates. But they are nominal advertisement rates and only cover our expenses with the Ministry of Communications. Consequently, we will be making a loss, rather than a profit, because we will not be carrying our normal advertisements. And it is hard to get by without advertisements nowadays, considering journalists' pitiful wages and the shortage of equipment. But what can you do? Democracy demands that sacrifices be made.

[Stremidlovskiy] On the subject of sacrifices, speaking in Kaliningrad Oblast, Minister of the Press and Information V. Shumeyko said that Russia does not need two television channels—one would be enough....

[Lysenko] We love saying that Bolivar cannot carry two [reference to O. Henry novel]. However, I do not think Russia is a country that could have just one television channel. I understand that we are now poor, but we cannot close down the Tretyakov Gallery for that reason. Or, even better, we could amalgamate the Little Theater and the Arts Theater to produce the Theater of Little Art.

[Stremidlovskiy] Perhaps it would be worthwhile to more actively involve businessmen? The "Bridge" Group, for example, which supports Independent Television?

[Lysenko] There is logic in what you say. But take the airtime used by "Russian University," for example. From a financial point of view, it is a real drain on our resources, as we are obliged to invest large sums of money without any financial return. But we cannot give up this channel at a time when education is at a crossroads.

[Stremidlovskiy] How strong is government influence? Do you receive telephone calls telling you what to take out and what to put in?

[Lysenko] No. That is a thing of the past. What they say now is: Why did you put that in? There is no need to take that out! Mr. Kvasov, who runs the Council of Ministers apparatus, recently said that Russian Television provides poor coverage of government activity.

[Stremidlovskiy] Perhaps that is why the Council of Ministers decided to appropriate the property of "Parliament" Television?

[Lysenko] Everyone wants to have court artists. At one time, there were talented court artists. But that cannot now be said of those being moved closer to the court.

[Stremidlovskiy] It is now three years since Russian Television first went on air. What have been the television company's biggest mistake and biggest achievement?

[Lysenko] The fact that Russian Television was created at all is its biggest achievement. Its biggest mistake is that for three years we have believed the promises of successive governments that they will provide some assistance with basic materials and equipment.

[Stremidlovskiy] Although even before that you had the difficult experience of working in "Vzglyad"....

[Lysenko] That was another era.

[Stremidlovskiy] Would you like to go back?

[Lysenko] Yes, of course. After all, they say I was quite a good journalist before "Vzglyad." I made dozens of broadcasts and lots of films on history and am not ashamed of any of them. Do you know how historical films used to be made? Step to the right, executed by firing squad to the left. Jump on the spot—provocation. But now.... I do not wish to grumble, but a new style of television journalism is being established.

[Stremidlovskiy] Perhaps it is just that a new generation has appeared in television?

[Lysenko] I do not know. You see, my generation—men and women of the sixties—has unfortunately shown itself to be of indifferent ability and largely conformist, so it is not needed now. I went into television to do things my own way. But there have been three stages in my life: I was born, I created a new program, and now—new television.

[Stremidlovskiy] Perhaps you could retire?

[Lysenko] I do not want to retire. I want to write and come up with new ideas. I do not believe that a journalist can retire.

Criteria for Registering Candidates Clarified

LD1711182793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission has not disqualified any candidates merely because their name appeared on the lists of more than one election bloc. None of them have had their rights infringed, an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the Central Electoral Commission. Candidates were simply asked to choose a single list. All of them agreed to do so.

Federation Council Candidates Continue Registration

MK1811091093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Nov 93 p 1

["NG"-report under the "In Brief" column: "Few Candidates So Far"]

[Text] According to information yesterday morning, 111 people out of 490 have been registered as candidates for the Federation Council. More than 30 of them are leaders of executive branches in various components of the Russian Federation, and almost the same number are administration heads of lesser importance. Chairmen of regional soviets are few. The second-most widespread profession of Federation Council candidates is practicing jurists, namely heads and staffers of internal affairs administrations, a prosecutor, militia investigators or agents, judges, etc. Next in line are industrialists and entrepreneurs. As a matter of fact, they are more numerous among State Duma candidates. So far 242 out of 1,541 of the latter have been registered to date.

Regional Roundup of Registration of Candidates

LD1711201093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1817 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 17 TASS—Not a single candidate has been denied registration by the Central Electoral Commission on the ground that his name appears in the lists of several election blocs, commission officials said on Wednesday [17 November].

They said that during the examination of federal electoral lists submitted by various political parties and election blocs the commission found out that some names appeared in several lists simultaneously. This is inadmissible under the regulations on elections to the State Duma. Every candidate should be included in the lists of only one election bloc.

However, neither of those candidates has been denied registration and all of them have been allowed to run elections from one of the parties they have been registered with. The proposal was accepted, commission officials said.

Meanwhile, the registration of candidates to the new parliament continues.

The Kalininsky constituency in the city of Chelyabinsk, Urals region, has taken the lead—its 12 candidates are competing for one mandate to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia's new parliament. Ten of them have already been registered.

Four more candidates were registered today in the Amur region, bringing the total number of the region's candidates to five. Documents submitted by other candidates are being considered by regional electoral commissions.

In the city of Pyatigorsk, head of the city administration Yuriy Vasilyev, who has collected more signatures than needed to register as a candidate to the State Duma from the Kavminvodskiy constituency, withdrew his candidature on Wednesday. Vasilyev explained his decision by the fact that his transfer to the parliament would entail personnel reshuffling in the region, which could further complicate the situation there.

Former Soviet deputy Aleksey Ruchkin filed documents for registration as a candidate to both the State Duma and the Federation Council, but after he was warned that under law he was allowed to stand only for one house, Ruchkin decided he would run for a seat in the Federation Council, the upper house of the new parliament.

In the Vologda region, five candidates will run for two seats in the Federation Council.

Reports from Vladikavkaz say that the North Ossetian electoral commission has registered 28 candidates to the Federal Assembly. Fourteen of them will stand for two seats in the Federation Council and as many for two seats in the State Duma.

The centrist election bloc Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress is optimistic about its chances for success despite the fact the election campaign is proceeding in an unfavourable for the bloc situation.

Vasiliy Lipitskiy, chairman of the board of the People's Party of Free Russia, expressed the hope that a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday that his party will easily overcome the five per cent barrier and can count on a considerable representation in the State Duma.

Lipitskiy doubts that all those who voted for President Boris Yeltsin in the April referendum will give their votes for the pro- government bloc. "Russians associate the election campaign not so much with the president and his team, as with concrete politicians who have entered the election race," Lipitskiy said.

The working groups set up by the inter-bloc commission held their first sessions in Moscow today. The commission includes 13 blocs which participate in the elections to the State Duma.

The working groups began discussing the problems connected with the operation of the future parliament, including [illegible] concept, principles of work, formation of commissions and committees, and the rights and duties of the parliamentary majority and minority.

List of Agrarian Party of Russia Candidates

PM1811091193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 4

["Federal List" of candidates for State Duma Elections from the "Agrarian Party of Russia" electoral association]

[Text] The following have been nominated as candidate deputies to the State Duma from the "Agrarian Party of Russia" electoral association on the basis of the decisions of the Second (Extraordinary) Congress of the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) of 16 October 1993:

1. Lapshin, Mikhail Ivanovich, born 1934, chairman of the APR, president of a joint-stock company; Dubnevo Village, Moscow Oblast.
2. Davydov, Aleksandr Semenovich, born 1932, member of the APR, chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Working People in the Russian Agro-Industrial Complex; Moscow.
3. Zaveryukha, Aleksandr Kharlampiyevich, born 1940, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government; Moscow.
4. Asayev, Rais Badygutdinovich, born 1931, member of the APR, chairman of a kolkhoz [collective farm]; Chishmy City-Type Settlement, Republic of Bashkortostan.
5. Nazarchuk, Aleksandr Grigoryevich, born 1939, member of the APR, chairman of the Agro-Industrial Union; Barnaul.
6. Shcherbak, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1939, member of the APR, Russian Federation first deputy minister of agriculture; Moscow.
7. Abdulbasirov, Magomedtagir Medzhidovich, born 1935, member of the APR, chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for the Food and Processing Industry; Moscow.
8. Klochkov, Igor Yevgenyevich, born 1939, chairman of the Trade Union Bank; Moscow.
9. Kharitonov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, born 1948, member of the APR, chairman of a joint-stock company; Obskoy Settlement, Moshkovskiy Rayon, Novosibirsk Oblast.
10. Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich, born 1946, political scientist; Moscow.
11. Dyudyayev, Gennadiy Timofeyevich, born 1947, member of the APR, chairman of Leninsk-Kuznetskiy Rayon Agro-Industrial Union; Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, Kemerovo Oblast.
12. Bystrov, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1937, member of the APR, scientific associate; Shpakovskoye Village, Shpakovskiy Rayon, Stavropol Kray.
13. Kotov, Nikolay Savelyevich, born 1936, member of the APR, chairman of the "Kuban" Joint-Stock Company; Berezanskaya Village, Vyselkovskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray.
14. Isakov, Vladimir Borisovich, born 1950, jurist; Moscow.
15. Medentsov, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, born 1936, member of the APR, chairman of the oblast committee of the Trade Union of Working People in the Agro-Industrial Complex; Volgograd.
16. Mikhaylov, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, born 1929, deputy chairman of the APR; Moscow.
17. Popov, Andrey Anatolyevich, born 1963, expert financier; Volgograd.
18. Kulik, Gennadiy Vasilyevich, born 1935, member of the APR, adviser to a firm; Moscow.
19. Ivanov, Nikolay Vasilyevich, born 1952, member of the APR, employee; Dubrovka Settlement, Dubrovskiy Rayon, Bryansk Oblast.

20. Vershinin, Vasiliy Fedorovich, born 1940, private farmer; Moscow.

21. Naumov, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1929, member of the APR, chief of the Main Territorial Administration of the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture; Moscow.

22. Gukov, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, born 1948, member of the APR, chairman of the Association of Rural Commodity Producers; Kursk.

23. Sukhoy, Nikolay Avksentyevich, born 1941, vice president of the Water Conservancy Corporation; Moscow.

24. Puponin, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1940, rector of the Agricultural Academy; Moscow.

25. Ivantayev, Petr Vasilyevich, born 1942, member of the APR, chairman of the republic committee of the Trade Union of Workers in the Agro-Industrial Complex; Cheboksary.

26. Skoptsov, Viktor Aleksandrovich, born 1939, Mordovian Soviet Socialist Republic minister of agriculture and food; Saransk.

27. Luchin, Viktor Osipovich, born 1939, professor, doctor of juridical sciences, jurist; Moscow.

28. Mikulin, Vyacheslav Viktorovich, born 1957, deputy chairman of the city council of the Health Care Workers Trade Union; Moscow.

29. Krylov, Vasiliy Stefanovich, born 1939, member of the APR, director of a vocational and technical school; Olenino City-Type Settlement, Tver Oblast.

30. Khangeldyyev, Boris Bayliyevich, born 1928, jurist; Moscow.

31. Biryukov, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, born 1947, member of the APR, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Working People in the Agro-Industrial Complex; Moscow.

32. Mikov, Petr Grigoryevich, born 1940, member of the APR, director of a joint-stock company; Krasnopolyanskoye Village, Nazarovskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

33. Dontsov, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, born 1936, member of the APR, chairman of an agrarian facility; Kavaleriyskiy Village, Yegorlykskiy Rayon, Rostov oblast.

34. Giryayev, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, born 1948, chief of the Russian Federal Forestry Service Main Administration; Moscow.

35. Kara-Murza, Sergey Georgiyevich, born 1939, publicist; Moscow.

36. Nazeykin, Anatoliy Georgiyevich, born 1946, chairman of the Central Committee of the Communications Workers Trade Union; Moscow.

37. Stanin, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 1948, chairman of the Central Committee of the Russian Trade Union of Working People in the Chemical Sectors of Industry; Moscow.

Krasnodar Kray

38. (1.) Kiriy, Petr Yakovlevich, born 1940, member of the APR, chairman of the kray trade union council; Cheburgol Settlement, Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon.

39. (2.) Kisterev, Valentin Ivanovich, born 1936, director of a sovkhoz; Akhtanizovskaya Village, Temryukskiy Rayon.

40. (3.) Belobritskiy, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, born 1940, member of the APR, chairman of a collective enterprise; Krupskaya Village, Vyselkovskiy Rayon.

41. (4.) Martynenko, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1945, general director of a partnership; Konstantinovskaya Village, Kurganinskiy Rayon.

Moscow Oblast

42. (1.) Ryabtsev, Petr Zinovyevich, born 1933, member of the APR, director of an agricultural enterprise; Lenin Sovkhoz post office, Leninskiy Rayon.

43. (2.) Sokolov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 1947, engineer; Moscow.

44. (3.) Perov, Vitaliy Ivanovich, born 1951, deputy chairman of the Moscow Oblast Soviet Agrarian Commission; Moscow.

45. (4.) Kornilov, Valentin Fedorovich, born 1935, secretary of the Moscow Oblast Soviet Agrarian Commission; Podolsk.

46. (5.) Nigkoyev, Sergey Georgiyevich, born 1938, general director of a joint-stock company; Khimki.

47. (6.) Agilin, Petr Ivanovich, born 1928, leader of a group of advisers to a corporation; Moscow.

48. (7.) Isayev, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, born 1929, adviser to a corporation; Moscow.

49. (8.) Serbin, Nikolay Porfiryevich, born 1944, deputy chief of a corporation administration; Moscow.

50. (9.) Yesin, Ivan Nikolayevich, born 1950, veterinary physician; Gorki-II, Moscow oblast.

Stavropol Kray

51. (1.) Kostyukov, Ivan Petrovich, born 1950, member of the APR, chief of a rayon agricultural administration; Novopavlovsk.

52. (2.) Moroz, Vasiliy Andreyevich, born 1937, director of a scientific research institute; Stavropol.

53. (3.) Sergeyev, Nikolay Sergeyevich, born 1952, director of a rural vocational and technical school; Blagodarnyy.

Rostov Oblast

54. (1.) Zhivotov, Aleksey Aleksandrovich, born 1950, director of a livestock breeding center; Krasnyy Kut Village, Oktyabrskiy Rayon.

55. (2.) Morkovskoy, Nikolay Anatolyevich, born 1955, director of an agrarian firm; Verbovyy Log Village, Dubovskiy Rayon.

Altay Kray

56. (1.) Vernigora, Vladimir Sergeyevich, born 1937, general director of the "Altayvodmeliorator" Joint-Stock Company; Barnaul.

57. (2.) Openyshev, Sergey Pavlovich, born 1949, chairman of the rayon soviet of people's deputies; Rodino Village, Rodinskiy Rayon.

Volgograd Oblast

58. (1.) Novikov, Yevgeniy Fedorovich, born 1930, member of the APR, chairman of a kolkhoz; Olenye Village, Dubovskiy Rayon.

59. (2.) Kusakin, Viktor Matveyevich, born 1927, member of the APR, director of a joint-stock company; Novyy Rogachik Village.
60. (3.) Chumakov, Pavel Pavlovich, born 1946, chairman of a kolkhoz; Yelan Village, Yelanskiy Rayon.

Krasnoyarsk Kray
61. (1.) Yaroshenko, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1937, chairman of a joint-stock company; Bolshaya Urya Village, Kanskiy Rayon.
62. (2.) Levchenko, Nikolay Pavlovich, born 1937, chairman of a joint-stock company; Sayany Village, Krasnoturanskiy Rayon.
63. (3.) Gladchuk, Valeriy Yakovlevich, born 1941, member of the APR, chairman of the Kray Agrarian Union Council; Krasnoyarsk.
64. (4.) Bykovskiy, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, born 1939, general director of an agrarian center; Krasnoyarsk.
65. (5.) Voshchenkov, Boris Borisovich, born 1946, chairman of a kolkhoz; Partizanskoye Village, Partizanskiy Rayon.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast
66. (1.) Chernov, Boris Nikolayevich, born 1937, member of the APR, secretary of the oblast Agrarian Specialists Council; Nizhniy Novgorod.
67. (2.) Kosterin, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1952, head of a rayon administration; Uren.
68. (3.) Puchkov, Bronislav Pavlovich, born 1936, director of an agricultural college; Arzamas.

Moscow City
69. (1.) Zarubin, Vladimir Konstantinovich, born 1933, vice president of a joint-stock company; Moscow.
70. (2.) Muradova, Shamsiyat Asamudinovna, born 1952, chief of a Rosrybkhoz [expansion unknown—?Russian Federal Fish Farming Service] administration; Moscow.
71. (3.) Cherekayev, Aleksey Vasilyevich, born 1932, academician; Moscow.
72. (4.) Konkin, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, born 1931, academician; Moscow.
73. (5.) Chernikov, Grigoriy Vasilyevich, born 1946, director of the champagne wines combine; Moscow.
74. (6.) Ivanov, Aleksandr Serafimovich, born 1930, head of department at an agricultural academy; Moscow.
75. (7.) Tsypkin, Yuriy Anatolyevich, born 1962, president of the Rural Youth Union; Moscow.
76. (8.) Romanov, Anatoliy Yefimovich, born 1937, deputy director of the Scientific Research Institute of Economics; Moscow.

Kursk Oblast
77. (1.) Luneva, Valentina Grigoryevna, born 1942, member of the APR, chairman of a rayon committee of the Trade Union of Working People in the Agro-Industrial Complex; Fatezh.

Orenburg Oblast
78. (1.) Zelepukhin, Aleksandr Grigoryevich, born 1937, member of the APR, chief of the oblast agricultural administration; Orenburg.
79. (2.) Chernyshev, Aleksey Andreyevich, born 1939, Russian Federation deputy minister of agriculture; Moscow.
80. (3.) Semashkov, Petr Yevgenyevich, born 1949, chairman of the oblast Agrarian Union; Abdulino.
81. (4.) Teykhrib, Petr Petrovich, born 1949, chairman of a joint-stock company; Komsomolskiy Settlement.

Vologda Oblast
82. (1.) Ruchnin, Aleksey Stepanovich, born 1947, member of the APR, chairman of a kolkhoz; Sobolevo Village, Ustyuzhenskiy Rayon.
83. (2.) Bulanov, Vladimir Viktorovich, born 1951, member of the APR, director of a poultry factory; Gribkovo Settlement, Vologodskiy Rayon.
84. (3.) Zhdanov, Boris Vladimirovich, born 1947, member of the APR, chairman of a joint-stock company; Totma.

Tomsk Oblast
85. (1.) Krikunov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, born 1946, deputy head of a rayon administration; Tomsk.

Leningrad Oblast
86. (1.) Dmitriyev, Nikolay Grigoryevich, born 1926, chairman of the presidium of the branch of the Russian Agricultural Academy; St. Petersburg.

Bryansk Oblast
87. (1.) Subbotin, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 1944, member of the APR, deputy head of the oblast administration; Pochep.
88. (2.) Vorontsov, Anatoliy Yevgenyevich, born 1933, member of the APR, chairman of a cooperative; Glinishchevo Village, Bryanskiy Rayon.
89. (3.) Yefimenko, Petr Ivanovich, born 1935, chairman of a kolkhoz; Staryy Vyshkov Village, Novozybkovskiy Rayon.
90. (4.) Pasko, Stepan Ivanovich, born 1946, member of the APR, chief agronomist of a rayon agricultural administration; Bryansk.

Tver Oblast
91. (1.) Borisov, Vladimir Andreyevich, born 1936, president and executive director of the "Agrotver" Planning and Design Office; Tver.
92. (2.) Mokeyev, Nikolay Alekseyevich, born 1947, member of the APR, chairman of a kolkhoz; Sandovo Settlement, Sandovskiy Rayon.

Orel Oblast
93. (1.) Poznukhov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1948, deputy chief of the oblast agricultural administration; Orel.

Penza Oblast
94 (1.) Morozov, Stepan Andreyevich, born 1934, deputy chairman of "Penzaselkhozsoyuz"; Penza.

Tula Oblast
95. (1.) Gurov, Anatoliy Pavlovich, born 1952, director of a state pedigree breeding farm; Malakovo post office, Zaokskiy Rayon.
96. (2.) Bogdanova, Yelena Mikhaylovna, born 1955, chief forestry officer; Tula.

Smolensk Oblast
97. (1.) Anosova, Valentina Ivanovna, born 1955, member of the APR, chairman of the trade union committee of a joint-stock company; Rudnya.
98. (2.) Balalayev, Vyacheslav Yefimovich, born 1946, member of the APR, general director of the "Safonovskoye" Joint-Stock Company; Safonovo.
99. (3.) Ignatenkov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 1949, member of the APR, chairman of a joint-stock company; Dinkovo Settlement, Pochinok.

Tambov Oblast
100. (1.) Ivanov, Aleksandr Anatolyevich, born 1955, director of the "Michurinskiy Konservnyy Zavod" Joint-Stock Company; Michurinsk.

Voronezh Oblast
101. (1.) Litvinov, Dmitriy Afanasyevich, born 1949, dotsent at the Glinka Agrarian University; Voronezh.
102. (2.) Sorokin, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1942, chairman of a kolkhoz; Azovka Village, Bobrovskiy Rayon.
103. (3.) Motyashov, Petr Ivanovich, born 1942, chief of a rayon agricultural administration; Pavlovsk.

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)
104. (1.) Sosin, Spiridon Spridonovich, born 1935, chairman of the Trade Union Federation of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); Yakutsk.

Chuvash Republic
105. (1.) Chichaykin, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, born 1950, chairman of a board; Ibresi Settlement, Ibresinskiy Rayon.

Belgorod Oblast
106. (1.) Beskhmelnitsyn, Mikhail Ivanovich, born 1956, chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies; Belgorod.
107. (2.) Kravchenko, Vasiliy Dmitriyevich, born 1956, member of the APR, private farmer; Streletskoye Village, Belgorodskiy Rayon.

Lipetsk Oblast
108. (1.) Kuznetsov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, born 1957, chairman of a collective agricultural enterprise; Yelets-Lozovka Village, Khlevenskiy Rayon.
109. (2.) Repkin, Viktor Pavlovich, born 1938, chief of the oblast agricultural administration; Lipetsk.
110. (3.) Ivannikova, Galina Vasilyevna, born 1955, chairman of an agricultural cooperative; Chernava Village, Izmalkovskiy Rayon.

Vladimir Oblast
111. (1.) Churkin, Gennadiy Ivanovich, born 1937, member of the APR, director of a joint-stock company; Vladimir.
112. (2.) Buchenkov, Yevgeniy Viktorovich, born 1938, director of a state livestock breeding center; Mezhishi Village, Muromskiy Rayon.
113. (3.) Viktorov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1941, chairman of a partnership; Mayskiy Settlement, Aleksandrovskiy Rayon.

Irkutsk Oblast
114. (1.) Turusin, Anatoliy Afanasyevich, born 1939, head of a rayon administration; Nizhneudinsk.
115. (2.) Ovchinnikov, Ivan Mefodyevich, born 1934, chairman of the "Irkutskagropromstroy" Production Association; Irkutsk.
116. (3.) Nikolayev, Anatoliy Stepanovich, born 1953, director of a sovkhoz; Klyuchi-Bulak Village, Bratskiy Rayon.

Kaliningrad Oblast
117. (1.) Vatutin, Gennadiy Izmaylovich, born 1936, general director of the "Kaliningradmelioratsiya" Joint-Stock Company; Kaliningrad.

Kaluga Oblast
118. (1.) Burdukov, Pavel Timofeyevich, born 1947, director of a sovkhoz; Troitskoye Village, Kuybyshevskiy Rayon.
119. (2.) Fedunov, Yuriy Alekseyevich, born 1961, chairman of a partnership; Komlevo Village, Borovskiy Rayon.

Kirov Oblast
120. (1.) Yerdekov, Anatoliy Vasilyevich, born 1950, deputy head of a rayon administration; Kotelnichi.

Ulyanovsk Oblast
121. (1.) Stakhorskiy, Mikhail Vasilyevich, born 1935, deputy chief of the oblast agricultural administration; Ulyanovsk.

Chelyabinsk Oblast
122. (1.) Novikov, Vitaliy Pavlovich, born 1938, director of a milk plant; Chelyabinsk.
123. (2.) Lomakin, Mikhail Nikolayevich, born 1957, director of a joint-stock company; Stepnoye Village, Verkhneuralskiy Rayon.

Republic of Dagestan
124. (1.) Chartayev, Magomed Abakarovich, born 1941, chairman of the Union of Owners and Co-Owners; Shukty Village, Akushinskiy Rayon.
125. (2.) Magomedov, Aygun Khalidovich, born 1937, republic minister of agriculture; Makhachkala.
126. (3.) Gadzhimuradov, Baday Magomedovich, born 1943, vice president of the republic Association of Private Farmers; Kizlyar.
127. (4.) Kasimov, Biyarslan Ramazanovich, born 1936, member of the APR, first deputy minister of agriculture of the Republic of Dagestan; Makhachkala.
128. (5.) Nasrutdinov, Umalat Ilmutdinovich, born 1950, member of the APR, chairman of a collective enterprise; Kakashura Village, Karabudakhkentskiy Rayon, Republic of Dagestan.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic
129. (1.) Klevtsov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich, born 1936, chairman of the Committee for Land Resources and Land Use Measures; Nalchik.

Republic of Kalmykia-Khalmg Tangch
130. (1.) Dordzhiyev, Vladimir Pavlovich, born 1934, director of the Institute of Beef Cattle Raising; Elista.

Perm Oblast

131. (1.) Kovaleva, Nina Matveyevna, born 1943, director of an institute; Perm.

Pskov Oblast

132. (1.) Bukashkin, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1956, member of the APR, chairman of a kolkhoz; Bukino Village, Velikolukskiy Rayon.

133. (2.) Malyshev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1955, member of the APR, chairman of a kolkhoz; Porkhov.

Sverdlovsk Oblast

134. (1.) Tokareva, Tamara Petrovna, born 1940, chairman of the Land Reform Commission; Yekaterinburg.

Chita Oblast

135. (1.) Pavlov, Valeriy Yemelyanovich, born 1947, deputy head of the oblast administration; Chita.

Yaroslavl Oblast

136. (1.) Konstantinov, Grigoriy Yefremovich, born 1938, member of the APR, director of an agricultural cooperative; Dubki Settlement, Yaroslavskiy Rayon.

137. (2.) Karnaukhov, Valentin Nikolayevich, born 1946, general director of the "Yaroslavlagropromstroy" Joint-Stock Company; Yaroslavl.

Amur Oblast

138. (1.) Nesterenko, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, born 1947, president of the oblast organization of the Association of Russian Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives; Blagoveshchensk.

139. (2.) Denisenko, Nikolay Anatolyevich, born 1941, chairman of the rayon soviet of people's deputies; Konstantinovka Village, Konstantinovskiy Rayon.

Arkhangelsk Oblast

140. (1.) Bogatin, Vasiliy Davydovich, born 1949, chief of a rayon agricultural administration; Velsk.

141. (2.) Gintov, Valentin Viktorovich, born 1949, chief of the oblast agricultural administration; Arkhangelsk.

Astrakhan Oblast

142. (1.) Gromov, Yuriy Girgoryevich, born 1937, member of the APR, chairman of a joint-stock company; Balkhuny Village, Akhtubinskiy Rayon.

Komi Republic

143. (1.) Kuznetsov, Anatoliy Petrovich, born 1946, director of a sovkhoz; Polevida Village, Syktyvdinskiy Rayon.

144. (2.) Mokiyev, Aleksandr Ananyevich, born 1950, deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers; Syktyvkar.

Murmansk Oblast

145. (1.) Bogushevich, Pavel Petrovich, born 1956, member of the APR, director of a hothouse combine; Tuloma Settlement, Kolskiy Rayon.

List of Democratic Party of Russia Candidates

PM1811093993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 93 pp 9, 10

["Federal List of Candidates" for State Duma Elections from the Democratic Party of Russia]

[Text] The following have been nominated as candidate deputies to the State Duma from the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR] on the basis of the decision of the Fifth DPR Congress and the DPR Board (Protocol No. 1 of 5 November 1993):

1. Travkin, Nikolay Ilich, born 1946, DPR leader, head of Moscow Oblast's Shakhovskiy Rayon Administration; Moscow.
2. Govorukhin, Stanislav Sergeyevich, born 1936, movie director, no party affiliations; Moscow.
3. Bogomolov, Oleg Timofeyevich, born 1927, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, no party affiliations; Moscow.
4. Fedorov, Nikolay Vasilyevich, born 1958, attorney; Moscow.
5. Glazyev, Sergey Yuryevich, born 1961, economist; Moscow.
6. Zapolskiy, Sergey Vasilyevich, born 1947, chief of a legal advice office; Moscow.
7. Kotlyar, Valentin Alekseyevich, born 1951, deputy chief of the Oblast Administration, DPR member; Voronezh.
8. Tropin, Nikolay Maksimovich, born 1947, attorney; Tyumen.
9. Zubkevich, Irina Borisovna, born 1944, chairman of the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast DPR Organization; Nizhniy Novgorod.
10. Talanov, Viktor Lvovich, born 1951, chairman of the City Soviet Standing Commission on Trade, DPR member; St. Petersburg.
11. Leushkin, Aleksey Ivanovich, born 1967, chairman of the Samara Oblast DPR Organization; Samara.
12. Karelin, German Yuryevich, born 1956, chairman of the Sverdlovsk DPR Organization; Yekaterinburg.
13. Yakovlev, Yuriy Nikolayevich, born 1950, chairman of the Maritime DPR Organization; Slavyanka settlement, Khasanskiy Rayon, Maritime Kray.
14. Pashennykh, Feliks Semenovich, born 1952, director of the Krasnoyarsk Regional DPR Organization Fund; Krasnoyarsk.
15. Malkin, Yevgeniy Borisovich, born 1957, secretary of the DPR Board; Moscow.
16. Pushko, Gennadiy Ivanovich, born 1952, head of the Novyy Urengoy City Administration, DPR member; Novyy Urengoy, Tyumen Oblast.
17. Shcherbachev, Yuriy Nikolayevich, born 1951, entrepreneur, DPR member; Arkhangelsk.
18. Plekhanov, Gennadiy Georgiyevich, born 1953, chairman of the Balashikha City Soviet; Saltykovka settlement, Moscow Oblast.
19. Babayev, Karim Kazimovich, born 1953, entrepreneur; Rostov-na-Donu.
20. Zimina, Margarita Ivanovna, born 1947, lecturer, DPR member; Moscow.

21. Morozov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1949, entrepreneur, DPR member; Voronezh.
22. Kosenkov, Gennadiy Ivanovich, born 1946, chairman of the Smolensk Oblast DPR Organization; Smolensk.
23. Smolyannikov, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, born 1952, entrepreneur, DPR member; Moscow.
24. Urusov, Aleksey Borisovich, born 1963, chairman of the Penza Oblast DPR Organization Executive Committee; Zarechnyy, Penza Oblast.
25. Konov, Ildar Saitovich, born 1945, director of the Democratic Initiatives Fund, DPR member; Kazan.
26. Popov, Sergey Fedorovich, born 1952, director of the "Zapsibkombank" branch; St. Petersburg.
27. Yevdokimov, Andrey Mikhaylovich, born 1945, director of the Small Enterprise Support Fund; St. Petersburg.
28. Bogdanov, Andrey Vladimirovich, born 1970, chairman of the DPR Youth League; Moscow.
29. Spitsa, Galina Vasilyevna, born 1959, member of the St. Petersburg City Soviet Planning, Financial, and Budget Commission, DPR member; St. Petersburg.
30. Semenenko, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, born 1968, lecturer; Ivanovo.
31. Shalayev, Vladimir Anatolyevich, born 1948, chief of the "Kirovenergo" joint-stock company power supply networks service; Kirov.
32. Buravlev, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, born 1950, director of the Ryazan Oblast Association of Entrepreneurs; Ryazan.
33. Ivanov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1956, entrepreneur, president of the "Russkiy Dom" joint-stock company, DPR member; Vladimir.
34. Mitskevich, Anatoliy Yevgenyevich, born 1948, shop chief, DPR member; Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast.
35. Lizin, Aleksey Ivanovich, born 1949, oblast soviet deputy, lawyer, DPR member; Ulyanovsk.
36. Karpov, Oleg Igorevich, born 1964, chairman of the Saratov Oblast DPR Branch; Saratov.
37. Novikov, Konstantin Gennadyevich, born 1968, executive secretary of the DPR Youth League; Kostroma.
38. Khachaturov, Rafael Ivanovich, born 1950, lawyer; Sochi, Krasnodar Kray.
39. Vertsinskiy, Boris Nikolayevich, born 1941, doctor, DPR member; Chita.
40. Petrov, Anatoliy Viktorovich, born 1937, chairman of the Volgograd Oblast DPR Organization; Volgograd.
41. Dyuldin, Viktor Gavrilovich, born 1944, chairman of the Lensk River Port trade union committee, DPR member; Lensk, Sakha Republic (Yakutia).
42. Galaktionova, Tatyana Nikolayevna, born 1960, staffer of the republic administration, DPR member; Maykop, Republic of Adygea.
43. Zarochentsev, Sergey Georgiyevich, born 1951, chief of the DPR Election Campaigns Department; Moscow.
44. Moskalets, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1958, head of Saltykovka Settlement Administration; Balashikha, Moscow Oblast.
45. Alekseyev, Vitaliy Vasilyevich, born 1944, head of administration; Cheboksary.
46. Kuzin, Eduard Nikolayevich, born 1937, mechanical engineer, doctor of sciences; Moscow.
47. Yevseyev, Yevgeniy Valeryevich, born 1957, chairman of the Tver DPR Organization; Torzhok, Tver Oblast.
48. Piunov, Vyacheslav Yevgenyevich, born 1954, lawyer, DPR member; Gorno-Altaysk.
49. Shirokov, Vladimir Viktorovich, born 1949, chairman of the Novosibirsk Oblast DPR Organization; Novosibirsk.
50. Asanin, Andrey Sergeyevich, born 1969, director of the "Agrotek" limited liability company, DPR member; Samara.
51. Latkin, Aleksandr Pavlovich, born 1945, director of the International Institute for Economic Conditions and Forecasting; Vladivostok.
52. Slyusarev, Anatoliy Sidorovich, born 1940, lecturer, DPR member; Nizhniy Novgorod.
53. Ilin, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1959, serviceman; Kemerovo.
54. Terentyev, Sergey Anatolyevich, born 1968, administrator of affairs of the Samara DPR Organization; Samara.
55. Zyabkin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1944, lecturer, DPR member; Orel.
56. Soldatov, Nikolay Borisovich, born 1963, acting chairman of the Penza DPR Organization; Penza.
57. Noskov, Boris Nikolayevich, born 1949, worker, DPR member; Kirov.
58. Sitko, Sergey Yuryevich, born 1943, designer, DPR member; Kazan.
59. Margolina, Svetlana Albertovna, born 1967, department chief at the "Ekonomika" NPP [expansion unknown], DPR member; Smolensk.
60. Lukinykh, Valeriy Fedorovich, born 1948, president of the "BELT" joint-stock company, DPR member; Krasnoyarsk.
61. Safikanov, Valeriy Kavyyevich, born 1950, chief of the Novyy Urengoy City Administration Housing and Municipal Services Administration, DPR member; Novyy Urengoy, Tyumen Oblast.
62. Degterev, Ivan Yegorovich, born 1939, general director of the "Arkhangelskiy Tralovyy Flot" joint-stock company; Arkhangelsk.
63. Bardakov, Mikhail Semenovich, born 1949, lecturer, DPR member; Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Rostov Oblast.
64. Borisov, Mikhail Orestovich, born 1957, chief specialist at the Yekaterinburg Property Fund, DPR member; Yekaterinburg.
65. Shin, Yuriy Minginovich, born 1968, lawyer; Vladivostok.
66. Kulikov, Sergey Leonidovich, born 1957, chairman of Kurganinsk City Soviet; Kurganinsk, Krasnodar Kray.
67. Petrov, Nikolay Alekseyevich, born 1950, chief of laboratory at the Russian Academy of Sciences Siberian Department's "Microbiology" Institute, DPR member; Koltsevo settlement, Novosibirsk Oblast.
68. Glazunov, Viktor Vladimirovich, born 1955, trade union committee chairman, DPR member; Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast.

69. Bakhmurov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 1950, chairman of the City Soviet Control Committee, DPR member; Samara.

70. Khodyachenko, Vladimir Borisovich, born 1947, senior lecturer at the St. Petersburg State Specialist Economic Academy, DPR member; St. Petersburg.

71. Prikhodchenko, Aleksey Aleksandrovich, born 1942, private farmer, DPR member; Buzuluk, Orenburg Oblast.

72. Yurin, Sergey Viktorovich, born 1958, deputy chairman of the Samara DPR Organization; Samara.

73. Saldeyev, Salavat Sabirovich, born 1950, engineer, DPR member; Beringovskiy settlement, Chukotka.

74. Voronin, Kirill Konstantinovich, born 1930, cochairman of the Novgorod Chamber of Commerce, DPR member; Novgorod.

75. Adamov, Dmitriy Nikitovich, born 1933, department chief, DPR member; Volgograd.

76. Maksimov, Nikolay Andreyevich, born 1955, lecturer, DPR member; Cheboksary.

77. Pavlov, Vasiliy Anatolyevich, born 1969, chairman of the Stavropol Kray DPR Youth League Organization; Stavropol.

78. Protsenko, Vadim Nikolayevich, born 1969, foreman geodesist, DPR member; Novgorod.

79. Tokarev, Viktor Anatolyevich, born 1947, head of the "PKT" peasant farm; Kolyshley worker settlement, Penza Oblast.

80. Lisser, Semen Meyerberovich, born 1954, deputy administrator of affairs of the "Permskiye Motory" joint-stock company; Perm.

81. Yermakov, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1952, chief of department at a long-stay psychoneurological hospital, DPR member; Korenovsk, Krasnodar Kray.

82. Kozlov-Birskiy, Valentin Nikolayevich, born 1948, director of the "Imidzh" limited liability company, DPR member; Birobidzhan, Khabarovsk Kray.

83. Zakharova, Natalya Ivanovna, born 1941, expert on privatization questions, DPR member; Krasnodar.

84. Sulkovskaya, Irina Petrovna, born 1958, chairman of Belgorod DPR Organization; Belgorod.

85. Eytingov, Yuriy Isakovich, born 1945, doctor, DPR member; Yelizovo, Kamchatka Oblast.

86. Akhmetov, Rashit Rakipovich, born 1954, cochairman of the Tatar DPR Branch; Kazan.

87. Lartsev, Yevgeniy Yuryevich, born 1951, scientific associate, DPR member; Samara.

88. Marushak, Valeriy Pavlovich, born 1940, chief of shift, DPR member; Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

89. Katkov, Anatoliy Stepanovich, born 1947, entrepreneur, DPR member; Nizhniy Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

90. Volostnykh, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1949, director of the "Pavlovskgranit" joint-stock company; Pavlovsk, Voronezh Oblast.

91. Morozov, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, born 1967, student, DPR member; Rostov.

92. Yelkin, Aleksandr Ivanvich, born 1954, chairman of a Rayon DPR Organization; Volzhskiy, Volgograd Oblast.

93. Mazur, Leonid Vasilyevich, born 1938, electrician, DPR member; Vladivostok.

94. Semenov, Mikhail Yuryevich, born 1953, engineer, DPR member; Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

95. Arkharov, Leonid Petrovich, born 1952, deputy general director of the "Olga" joint-stock company, DPR member; Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast.

96. Rumyantsev, Gennadiy Matveyevich, born 1950, chairman of the Nizhniy Novgorod DPR Organization Executive Committee; Nizhniy Novgorod.

97. Churakov, Gennadiy Viktorovich, born 1966, technician, DPR member; Tambov.

98. Vasilevskiy, Valeriy Vladimirovich, born 1954, mechanical engineer, DPR member; Safonovo, Smolensk Oblast.

99. Alekhin, Nikolay Anatolyevich, born 1946, president of the "SAN" joint-stock company, DPR member; Voronezh.

100. Gorkovenko, Valeriy Andreyevich, born 1941, director of the "Gippokrat" private individual enterprise, DPR member; Chita.

101. Mikhalchenkov, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, born 1940, secondary school director, DPR member; Zaozerye village, Belizhskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast.

102. Nikishin, Igor Vladimirovich, born 1962, entrepreneur; Penza.

103. Fomin, Vladimir Alekseyevich, born 1962, chairman of the City DPR Organization; Arzamas, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

104. Sheyerman, Ivan Yakovlevich, born 1948, seminar leader at the Tomsk Property Fund, DPR member; Tomsk.

105. Prudnikov, Igor Vasilyevich, born 1957, executive director of the Fund for Social Support for the Population, DPR member; Nevyansk, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

106. Novikov, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, born 1948, chairman of the Kazan DPR Branch; Kazan.

107. Surkov, Aleksandr Viktorovich, born 1968, chairman of Turkovskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, DPR member; Turki settlement, Turkovskiy Rayon, Saratov Oblast.

108. Telnykh, Gennadiy Vladimirovich, born 1961, Ryazan Oblast Soviet deputy, DPR member; Ryazan.

109. Osokin, Nikolay Avenirovich, born 1944, director of a motor transport enterprise, DPR member; Severskaya station, Krasnodar Kray.

110. Berkunov, Viktor Nikolayevich, born 1945, doctor, DPR member; Novgorod.

111. Sokolov, Artem Gennadyevich, born 1939, senior lecturer at Ivanovo State Power Industry University; Ivanovo.

112. Ratner, Arkadiy Khaimovich, born 1949, scientific associate at the VAMI [All-Russia Aluminum, Magnesium, and Electrode Industry Research and Design Institute], DPR member; St. Petersburg.

113. Rakhmatulin, Radik Rashidovich, born 1947, attorney, DPR member; Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan.

114. Odinokov, Pavel Fedorovich, born 1943, deputy chairman of the Promyshlennyy Rayon Soviet Control Committee; Samara.

115. Sergeyev, Sergey Ivanovich, born 1953, entrepreneur, DPR member; Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast.

116. Naumov, Anatoliy Alekseyevich, born 1948, director of a small enterprise, DPR member; Novovoronezh, Voronezh Oblast.
117. Shulgin, Vladimir Anatolyevich, born 1942, radio technician, lecturer, DPR member; Norilsk.
118. Bandorin, Konstantin Vladimirovich, born 1969, chief specialist in Youth Affairs Department, DPR member; Saratov.
119. Kostyuchenko, Valeriy Yevgenyevich, born 1947, college lecturer, DPR member; Smolensk.
120. Ovcharov, Gennadiy Vasilyevich, born 1958, entrepreneur, DPR member; Volgograd.
121. Zhavoronkov, Mikhail Davidovich, born 1957, general director of the Ivanovo Ecological Insurance Fund, DPR member; Ivanovo.
122. Molodtsova, Saviya Gamaletdinovna, born 1941, entrepreneur, DPR member; Ufa, Bashkortostan.
123. Klepikovskiy, Gennadiy Rafailovich, born 1949, team leader, DPR member; Koryazhma, Arkhangelsk Oblast.
124. Dmitriyev, Nikolay Eduardovich, born 1958, journalist, DPR member; Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast.
125. Trukhachev, Boris Filippovich, born 1953, head of Verkhnemamonskiy Rayon Administration; Verkhniy Mamon settlement, Voronezh Oblast.
126. Mikhaylin, Nikolay Sergeyevich, born 1941, entrepreneur, DPR member; Volgograd.
127. Isayev, Yevgeniy Vladimirovich, born 1950, senior lecturer in the Penza State Technical University Department of Applied Mathematics, DPR member; Penza.
128. Lukshin, Vyacheslav Andreyevich, born 1944, lawyer and consultant, DPR member; Krymsk, Krasnodar Kray.
129. Shepiguzov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1952, design studio director, DPR member; Perm.
130. Isakov, Mikhail Fedorovich, born 1946, chief specialist at an administrative and technical inspectorate, DPR member; Nizhniy Novgorod.
131. Mikhaylovich, Izyaslav Aronovich, born 1936, scientific consultant for the "Diskaveri" firm, DPR member; Moscow.
132. Klochkov, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich, born 1948, director of the rayon movie theater network, DPR member; Pervomayskiy settlement, Tambov Oblast.
133. Sytenkov, Eduard Vasilyevich, born 1940, chief of a laboratory at the Russian Specialized Management and Agribusiness Academy's Smolensk Branch, DPR member; Smolensk.
134. Boyko, Vadim Anatolyevich, born 1965, journalist; Sochi.
135. Rakhno, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1942, chairman of a cooperative, DPR member; Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar Kray.
136. Buchkov, Sergey Mikhaylovich, born 1964, leader of the "Serna" firm, DPR member; Penza.
137. Mayfat, Lyubov Vladimirovna, born 1955, member of the "Lyubava" private farm, DPR member; Stayki village, Khislavichskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast.
138. Tsvetov, Sergey Vladimirovich, born 1971, chairman of the Pavlovo Territorial DPR Organization; Pavlovo, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.
139. Bodrov, Anatoliy Viktorovich, born 1972, student at the Penza State Teacher Training Institute, DPR member; Penza.
140. Stalash, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1937, temporarily unemployed, DPR member; Belinskiy, Penza Oblast.
141. Bryukov, Vladimir Georgiyevich, born 1958, journalist, DPR member; Kamyshin, Volgograd Oblast.
142. Zarochentsev, Aleksey Georgiyevich, born 1967, unit machine operator at Heat and Power Station 25 of the Mosenergo REU [expansion unknown]; Moscow.
143. Vladimirov, Vladimir Sergeyevich, born 1949, instructor of the "Unity" ["Yedineniye"] Committee of Trade Unions, DPR member; Smolensk.
144. Kuznetsov, Aleksandr Kadyrovich, born 1967, cafeteria deputy director, DPR member; Moscow.
145. Govorukhin, Eduard Aleksandrovich, born 1937, chief of a legal advice office; Ryazan.
146. Kozharov, Vladimir Leonidovich, born 1950, chief of department at the "Zagorsk" firm, DPR member; Krasnozavodsk, Sergiyevo-Posadskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.
147. Kim, Valentin Fedorovich, born 1943, journalist, DPR member; Aldan, Sakha Republic (Yakutia).
148. Kostogryzov, Yevgeniy Igorevich, born 1965, entrepreneur, DPR member; Yoshkar-Ola, Republic of Mari El.
149. Levin, Lev Grigoryevich, born 1933, pensioner, DPR member; Belebey, Bashkortostan.
150. Menukhov, Ivan Ivanovich, born 1944, entrepreneur, DPR member; Tyumen.
151. Panteleyev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1952, property fund chairman; Byksa, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.
152. Pushenkov, Mikhail Vasilyevich, born 1950, member of the Ryazan Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Control Committee; Ryazan.
153. Roshchin, Sergey Borisovich, born 1956, section chief in the "VyatkaIzhKamasetelektrostroy" joint-stock company's Mechanized Column No. 24, DPR member; Kirov.
154. Serdyukov, Sergey Borisovich, born 1959, manager of the "TEK" limited liability company, DPR member; Bolshevo, Moscow Oblast.
155. Spanovskiy, Nikolay Stanislavovich, born 1954, attorney; Ivanovo.
156. Uralskiy, Sergey Ilich, born 1951, editor of the legal desk on the newspaper AMURO-YAKUTSKIY MERIDIAN [Amur-Yakut Meridian]; Neryungri, Sakha Republic (Yakutia).
157. Khusainov, Msravir Abramovich, born 1942, deputy chairman of the Oblast DPR Organization; Pervouralsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast.
158. Tsarevskiy, Lev Arkadyevich, born 1935, director of the "Tekom" NPP, DPR member; Moscow.
159. Cherenkov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1948, serviceman; Kotlas, Arkhangelsk Oblast.
160. Shilin, Gennadiy Alekseyevich, born 1957, entrepreneur, DPR member; Bryansk.

161. Shushkin, Boris Aleksandrovich, born 1941, consultant on the expert council under the head of administration, DPR member; Kaliningrad.
162. Shcherbakov, Vladimir Yuryevich, born 1942, deputy chairman of the Ryazan Association of Entrepreneurs; Ryazan.
163. Ulanova, Kira Nikolayevna, born 1945, graphic artist, DPR member; Moscow.
164. Saushkina, Svetlana Ivanovna, born 1965, journalist; Moscow.
165. Tokarev, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1965, electromechanical engineer; Moscow.
166. Stolypin, Vladimir Sergeyevich, born 1947, secretary of the DPR Board; Moscow.
167. Khomyakov, Valeriy Alekseyevich, born 1949, chairman of the DPR Board; Moscow.

List of Liberal Democratic Party Candidates

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["Federal List of Candidates" for State Duma Elections from the "Liberal Democratic Party of Russia"]

[Text] The following have been nominated as candidate deputies to the State Duma by the "Liberal Democratic Party of Russia" [LDPR] electoral association on the basis of the decision of the LDPR Higher Council of 3 November 1993.

1. Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir Volfovich, born 1946, lawyer, chairman of the LDPR; Moscow.
2. Kobelev, Viktor Vasilyevich, bortn 1943, sociologist, member of the LDPR Higher Council; Moscow.
3. Marychev, Vyacheslav Antonovich, born 1939, engineer, LDPR regional organization leader; St. Petersburg.
4. Ivanov, Vladimir Pavlovich, born 1946, doctor, LDPR regional organization leader; Krasnoyarsk.
5. Mitrofanov, Aleksey Valentinovich, born 1962, international economics expert; Moscow.
6. Zhebrovskiy, Stanislav Mikhaylovich, born 1942, publishing worker, member of the LDPR Higher Council; Moscow.
7. Gvozdarev, Vladimir Zakharovich, born 1951, economist, deputy chairman of the LDPR Higher Council; Moscow.
8. Vengerovskiy, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, born 1953, scientific worker, member of the LDPR Higher Council; Moscow.
9. Abeltsev, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1961, agricultural worker, member of the LDPR Higher Council; Moscow.
10. Kashpirovskiy, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, born 1939, doctor and psychotherapist; Moscow.
11. Gusev, Vladimir Kuzmich, born 1932, economist, doctor of technical sciences; Moscow.
12. Buzov, Yuriy Yevgenyevich, born 1955, bank worker, member of the LDPR shadow cabinet of ministers; Moscow.
13. Sidorov, Anatoliy Stepanovich, born 1932, economist, academician; Moscow.
14. Lisichkin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1941, economist, academician; Moscow.
15. Lemeshev, Mikhail Yakovlevich, born 1927, ecologist, doctor of economic sciences; Moscow.
16. Finko, Oleg Aleksandrovich, born 1941, political scientist, journalist, chief editor of YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA; Moscow.
17. Kozyrev, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1949, economist; Moscow.
18. Kuznetsov, Yuriy Pavlovich, born 1947, psychologist, medical narcotics specialist; St. Petersburg.
19. Zhuravlev, Vitaliy Yevgenyeivhc, born 1964, humanitarian foundation chairman; Moscow.
20. Kalashnikov, Sergey Vyacheslavovich, born 1951, psychologist; Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast.
21. Sidorov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, born 1947, professor and doctor of economic sciences; Moscow.
22. Pchelkin, Vladimir Viktorovich, born 1967, LDPR youth organization leader; Moscow.
23. Borzyuk, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, born 1952, worker, LDPR regional organization leader; Orel.
24. Korobov, Sergey Aelskandrovich, born 1958, historian, regional organization leader; Penza.
25. Korniyenko, Viktor Ulyanovich, born 1937, serviceman; Moscow.
26. Loginov, Yevgeniy Yuryevich, born 1965, serviceman; Moscow.
27. Churkin, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born 1956, worker, LDPR regional organization leader; Vologda.
28. Sychev, Sergey Vladimirovich, born 1962, Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy student; Moscow.
29. Snezhkov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, born 1945, economist; Moscow.
30. Novikov, Vladimir Ilich, born 1960, businessman and entrepreneur; Glazov, Udmurtia Republic.
31. Bulgakova, Tatyana Ivanovna, born 1945, director of the "Meteor" children's club; Moscow.
32. Mitrofanova, Eleonora Valentinovna, born 1953, international economics expert; Moscow.
33. Vishnyakov, Viktor Grigoryevich, 1931, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, leading scientific staffer at the Institute of Legislation and Jurisprudence; Moscow.
34. Astafyev, Nikolay Pavlovich, born 1940, lawyer, section chief of the Moscow Oblast prosecutor's office; Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast.
35. Ishchenko, Yevgeniy Petrovich, born 1946, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, chief of the Ural State Juridical Academy criminal law department; Yekaterinburg.
36. Ivanov, Viktor Petrovich, born 1937, journalist, deputy chief editor of the newspaper VSEROSSIYSKIYE NOVOSTI; Moscow.
37. Tuinov, Yevgeniy Vyacheslavovich, born 1954, writer, sociologist, legal information department chief; St. Petersburg.
38. Moiseyev, Boris Vasilyevich, born 1935, journalist, deputy chief editor of the YURINFORM agency; Moscow.

39. Kiselev, Vyacheslav Viktorovich, born 1948, lawyer, chief of the Moscow Oblast lawyers collegium Shchelkovo legal advice bureau; Shchelkovo, Moscow Oblast.
40. Bolshakov, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich, born 1949, lawyer, general director of a joint-stock company; Vladivostok.
41. Pronin, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1949, construction worker; Moscow.
42. Kostyutkin, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, born 1948, laywer; Moscow.
43. Ruda, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, born 1958, worker; Kursk Oblast.
44. Lukava, Georgiy Grigoryevich, born 1925, philosopher, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor; Moscow.
45. Ustinov, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1937, serviceman; Moscow.
46. Panferov, Konstantin Nikolayevich, born 1932, political scientist and professor; Moscow.
47. Zarichanskiy, Stanislav Konstantinovich, born 1962, radio engineer; Khimki, Moscow Oblast.
48. Filatov, Aleksandr Valentinovich, born 1967, diesel engine driver; Moscow.
49. Maksakova, Larisa Sergeyevan, born 1946, chemical engineer; Moscow.
50. Gagut, Luiza Dmitriyevna, born 1949, scientific worker and economist; Moscow.
51. Zhuk, Edvard Georgiyevich, born 1961, economist; Moscow.
52. Skum, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, born 1961, mechanical engineer; Moscow.
53. Zvyagin, Aleksey Alekseyevich, born 1936, professor and academician; Moscow.
54. Zuyev, Aleksey Alekseyevich, born 1970, architect; Moscow.
55. Bolshakov, Vadim Ivanovich, born 1930, historian; Moscow.
56. Krivelskaya, Nina Viktorovna, born 1948, militia staffer; Moscow.
57. Kapustin, Anatoliy Vladimirovich, born 1939, mining engineer; Moscow.
58. Burlakov, Mikhail Petrovich, born 1952, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences, senior lecturer; Tolyatti.
59. Moiseyev, Anatoliy Semenovich, born 1947, cultural worker; Kaliningrad Oblast.
60. Dorovskikh, Andrey Mikhaylovich, born 1959, laywer; Balashov, Saratov Oblast.
61. Vasilishin, Aleksey Viktorovich, born 1945, mechanical engineer; Tobolsk, Tyumen Oblast.
62. Shipov, Aleksandr Borisovich, born 1959, artist; Moscow.
63. Berezovskiy, Gennadiy Yevgenyevich, born 1942, writer; Yakutsk, Sakha (Yakutia) Republic.
64. Syskina, Valenintina Dmitriyevna, born 1946, business school director; Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.
65. Kireyev, Anton Valeryevich, born 1972, trade worker; Moscow.
66. Sergeyev, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 1943, school director; Moscow.
67. Bukovkin, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1946, mechanic; Moscow.
68. Mormin, Sergey Valeryevich, born 1963, entrepreneur; Vologda.
69. Pimenov, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1950, economist; Moscow.
70. Zhurkov, Vasiliy Vasilyevich, born 1963, driver; Achinsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.
71. Demeshchenko, Stanislav Leonidovich, born 1954, dispatch clerk; Milkovo, Kamchatka Oblast.
72. Bogatov, Vladimir Vladimirovich, born 1960, economist; Chita Oblast.
73. Dunets, Mikhail Ivanovich, born 1950, serviceman; Moscow.
74. Khalitov, Akhmet Kharisovich, born 1929, agricultural worker; Moscow Oblast.
75. Voykin, Pavel Anatolyevich, born 1962, LDPR Central Committe section chief; Murom, Vladimir Oblast;
76. Semenov, Anatoliy Sergeyevich, born 1945, private farmer; Lobnya, Moscow Oblast.
77. Valberov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, born 1962, mechanical engineer; Ulyanovsk.
78. Shvedkov, Veroslav Timofeyevich, born 1941, Internal Affairs Ministry serviceman; Velikiye Luki, Pskov Oblast.
79. Zvyagin, Andrey Alekseyevich, born 1961, economist; Moscow.
80. Senko, Vyacheslav Igorevich, born 1951, LDPR coordinator for the Urals and West Siberia; Sverdlovsk Oblast.
81. Sokolov, Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich, born 1939, journalist; Moscow.
82. Bedevkin, Valeriy Fedorovich, born 1940, physicist; Moscow.
83. Chubur, Artur Arturovich, born 1966, Russian Academy of Sciences Archeology Institute research student; Kurchatov, Kurchatov Oblast.
84. Zhuk, Boris Aleksandrovich, born 1945, engineer; Voronezh.
85. Lednev, Igor Dmitriyevich, born 1967, journalist; Vologda.
86. Izotov, Aleksandr Valeryanovich, born 1945, teacher, candidate of pedagogical sciences; Yoshkar-Ola, Mariy El Republic.
87. Yermakova, Galina Ivanovna, born 1954, teacher; Moscow.
88. Lazanskiy, Oleg Gennadyevich, born 1969, fitter; Voronezh.
89. Anoshina, Yevgeniya Anatolyevna, born 1970, artist; Voronezh.
90. Nikitin, Igor Vladimirovich, born 1971, student; Moscow.
91. Shorenko, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1949, lawyer and legal expert; Mtsensk, Orel Oblast.
92. Shmelkov, Nikolay Sergeyevich, born 1956, heating engineer; Murom, Vladimir Oblast.
93. Kazakov, Petr Vasilyevich, born 1942, electromechanical engineer; Moscow.
94. Rumyantsev, Yuriy Nikolayevich, born 1947, serviceman; Moscow.

95. Tulin, Sergey Valeryevich, born 1963, entrepreneur; Vologda.
96. Shmelkov, Yuriy Sergeyevich, born 1947, enrepreneur; Sokol, Vologda Oblast.
97. Slutskiy, Valeriy Alekseyevich, born 1946, serviceman; Moscow.
98. Grebenshchikov, Mikhail Andreyevich, born 1926, hydraulic engineer; Tambov Oblast.
99. Glebov, Sergey Yevgenyevich, born 1960, electrical mechanic; Moscow.
100. Ivanov, Vladimir Antonovich, born 1937, mechanical engineer; Tomsk.
101. Rozhdestvenskiy, Andrey Stanislavovich, born 1967, station duty officer; Podolsk, Moscow Oblast.
102. Nikulin, Aleksandr Arkadyevich, born 1963, entrepreneur; Glazov, Udmurt Republic.
103. Korobov, Vladimir Andreyevich, born 1948, scientific worker, candidate of technical sciences; Ulyanovsk.
104. Kovgan, Aleksandr Anatolyevich, born 1958, microbiologist; Moscow.
105. Reutova, Valeriya Nikolayevna, born 1950, institute lecturer; Vologda.
106. Korolev, Viktor Vitalyevich, born 1949, entrepreneur; Vologda.
107. Zlobin, Valeriy Veniaminovich, born 1950, chief engineer; Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.
108. Serdyukov, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1967, journalist; Krasnodar.
109. Didenko, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1951, mechanical engineer; Stavropol.
110. Bryksin, Oleg Aleksandrovich, born 1946, president of the International Commercial University; Moscow.
111. Mikhaylov, Yevgeniy Eduardovich, born 1963, historian; Pskov.
112. Moiseyev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1963, electrician; Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic.
113. Bareldzhan, Sarkis Sergeyevich, born 1948, trade worker; Krasnodar Kray.
114. Akhmetshin, Boris Nuryevich, born 1951, electrical engineer; Kazan.
115. Shkolnikov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich, born 1955, doctor; Khabarovsk.
116. Iskhakov, Askhat Gannarovich, born 1966, doctor; Ufa.
117. Akhtariyev, Zhaudat Faatovich, born 1951, correspondent; Glazov, Udmurt Republic.
118. Khlopkov, Sergey Alekseyevich, born 1964, Ministry of Internal Affairs serviceman; Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.
119. Veletminskiy, Igor Lvovich, born 1964, engineer; Nizhniy Novgorod.
120. Khvorikov, Yuriy Petrovich, born 1959, history lecturer; Voronezh.
121. Ivanov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, born 1949, serviceman; St. Petersburg.
122. Afinogenov, Sergey Vladimirovich, born 1958, lawyer and legal specialist, candidate of juridical sciences; Moscow.
123. Fokin, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1937, candidate of economic sciences; Moscow.
124. Ryzhov, Spartak Vladimirovich, born 1971, student; Pskov.
125. Potapov, Velen Alekseyevich, born 1934, engineer; Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.
126. Zaynullin, Abudar Gatovich, born 1951, lawyer and consultant; Osa, Perm Oblast.
127. Lyubovskikh, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1946, chief of the Yaroslavl Oblast Physical Culture Committee Sports Training Department; Yaroslavl Oblast.
128. Sizov, Sergey Sergeyevich, born 1957, mechanical engineer; Ruzayevka, Mordovian Republic.
129. Filippov, Valeriy Faddeyevich, born 1949, bookkeeper and economist; Kanashkiy Rayon, Chuvash Republic.
130. Kurtasov, Aleksandr Pavlovich, born 1957, journalist; Saratov Oblast.
131. Tyutyayev, Anatoliy Konstantinovich, born 1952, auto mechanic; Dzerzhinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.
132. Blaginin, Aleksey Yuryevich, born 1967, mechanical engineer; Omsk.
133. Fedorov, Leonid Aleksandrovich, born 1952, driver; Kurgan.
134. Volobuyev, Kirill Vladimirovich, born 1968, electrician; Novosibirsk.
135. Monchenko, Valeriy Ilich, born 1946, mine section chief; Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast.
136. Yalovenko, Aleksey Fedorovich, born 1951, economist; Chelyabinsk.
137. Zolotov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1946, passenger traffic organizer; Vladivostok.
138. Vakulenko, Mikhail Yuryevich, born 1964, teacher, Kirov.
139. Potapov, Sergey Vladimirovich, born 1969, historian; Irkutsk.
140. Lavrinov, Aleksey Alekseyevich, born 1962, serviceman; Nizhnevartovsk, Tyumen Oblast.
141. Kits, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1956, pilot and engineer; Orenburg.
142. Yezoyan, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born 1972, lawyer; Ulan-Ude.
143. Marin, Yuriy Nikolayevich, born 1950, economist; Khabarovsk.
144. Denisov, Vasiliy Nikolayevich, born 1959, electrician; Rostov Oblast.
145. Panfilov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, born 1949, lecturer; Murmansk.
146. Sveshnikov, Mikhail Fedorovich, born 1951, political scientist; Moscow.
147. Krichevskiy, Georgiy Vladimirovich, born 1938, joint-stock company president; St. Petersburg.

Communists Assess Situation in Russia as Favorable

LD1711164393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1330 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Manvelov]

[Text] Moscow November 17 TASS—Russian communists do not feel anti-communist pressure on the mass-media, but insist that the publishing of their newspaper be resumed.

"From the point of view of our (communist) ideas, the present situation (in Russia) is quite favourable", Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation told a news conference on Wednesday [17 November].

"We do not feel any anti-communist pressure on the mass media", he said adding that fifteen pressmen are included in the electoral lists of the Communist Party.

He said communists closely cooperate with the Agrarian Party, Russian All-People's Union, Constitutional Democratical Party and the Russian Christian Democratic Party.

Reporters were informed at the news conference about a message of a group of communist lawyers to the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission reiterating the demand upon the authorities to lift ban on the publishing of the "SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA" (SOVIET RUSSIA) newspaper. "Otherwise we will be forced to appeal to the court and cast doubt on the objectivity of the results of the electoral campaign", the lawyers stressed accusing government that it has "deliberately deprived" communists of the possibility to use the newspaper in the election campaign.

The issuing of "SOVYETSKAYA ROSSIYA" was suspended by the government for an active role it played in the October hard-line revolt in Moscow.

Aims of Democratic Reforms Movement Outlined

PM1711160593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Article by Professor Svyatoslav Fedorov: "Society of Money-Changers or Producers"]

[Text] Over my troubled life I have often been convinced that science, production, politics, and spirituality (faith) are inextricably linked. And many of the misfortunes that Russia is experiencing today come from the fact that the priorities of these main components of human progress are determined not always correctly, often to each other's detriment.

Today Russia is at the crossroads, seeking ways out of the socioeconomic and political crisis—ways that will rally people together. Many parties and movements are urging citizens to support their programs, to confirm this by their votes at the elections to the Federal Assembly.

As one of the coordinators of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms [RMDR], I often think about what specifically we can offer voters, how our strategic and tactical approaches coincide with or differ from, for instance, the "Russia's Choice" bloc.

The RMDR concept has basically been shaped. It is being polished, honed, and individual positions and approaches are being perfected. In that sense, I would like to voice a few ideas.

We see the main aim of reforms and of our movement as the growth of Russian citizens' welfare. The second aim is to build a civilized Russia. To achieve these aims, we will need the building of democratic capitalism in the economy and a democratic state structure in politics. The technology for transition in the economy is the movement from hired labor in the sphere of state production toward the creation of closed joint stock companies which are producers. Above all it is necessary to move profitable enterprises to this system. They must be handed over on credit terms for a moderate price. The raw materials base and power engineering should belong to citizens and should pass into the hands of collectives so that they can construct power stations, for instance, independently and sell electricity more cheaply than the state. Then there will be an end to the state monopoly of the most important thing—energy carriers. After all tomorrow a powerful monopoly system will not have enough money for development, and it will increase prices twofold, fivefold, or tenfold. In that case, all our profits will go on expenditure to maintain the bureaucratic system, which is a monopolist.

The new economic system is unwanted in the enormous army of bureaucrats, which has the country by the throat. And it is difficult to break out of this obsolete system of management. The old bureaucrats have been joined by new ones. There were 8 million, now there are 20 million. If you consider that each bureaucrat costs the taxpayers 1.5 million rubles [R] a year with all his dachas and automobiles, then that is R30 trillion a year. And the country's budget is equal to R45 trillion. Thus 63 percent of the entire budget is spent on bureaucratic administration. We need the decentralization of economic power. Instead of rushing about and storming in the field of privatization, we must persistently introduce the first option for a mixed economy according to a socially oriented scheme and consider that there is the property of the collectives and private and joint-stock property of the state and organs of local self-administration. We must implement as rapidly as possible the first stage of agrarian reform, giving each citizen of the country one tenth of a hectare. Ten percent of land close to villages and cities must be allocated for private farmers. We must pursue a policy of state support for all collective and state farms which operate effectively.

We must consider that the land is a powerful economic and social incentive. People who have money will give the government large amounts. But we cannot allow speculation with the land. The majority of Russians do not have that kind of money.

Recently EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN published a list of leading businessmen. It is surprising that in the list, which contains 100 names, 94 head organizations produce nothing. They change money, sell goods, in brief they clip coupons. The result is that the economy of a very great country is based not on powerful plants and chemical combines, not on over 100,000 small enterprises, but on banks, exchanges, and money-changing offices. There are no analogues to this in the world.

Democratic reforms must be implemented under clear slogans. As was the case with Lenin: "Land for the Peasants," "Factories for the workers." Everything must be simple. Our slogans are: "The tools of production for the producers," "a share of the profits for all producers," "raw material resources for Russia's citizens," "Demonopolization of state structures," and "the maximum return from hired labor." Only then will people realize what the movement for democratic reforms is, what the Constitutional Democratic Party is. Today you cannot understand any of it: Constitutional Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats. Zhirinovskiy says: Elect me and tomorrow vodka will be free.

Many of our goals naturally coincide with the ideas included in the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, which has just been published. The movement's main political task is to create, instead of a unitary state, a new federal type of democratic republic and to ensure the real separation of functions between the federal level and the components of the Federation and at federal level between the president—the leader of the state—and the government—the practical organizer of reforms—and parliament.

The president is the guarantor of reforms, parliament is the guarantor of democracy, and government is the organizer of reforms. Another task is to strengthen the center, to free it from the tutelage of the regions, leaving at federal level only what is necessary to preserve the state's integrity. But there is a danger that in practice parliament will be created just as it was under socialism. Of all ministers and major politicians, on joining it, adopt laws for themselves and control themselves. According to the draft Constitution, it turns out that a minister can work in the State Duma but a professor or businessman cannot. If we make parliament entirely professional that is not the best way out. In the West all parliaments are professional but each parliamentarian has his own job. And they know what taxes are needed, what economic, financial, or state incentives are needed. Their hands are constantly on the economic pulse.

That is why we need a State Duma which consists primarily of producers and partly of lawyers, economists, sociologists, politicians, and figures of culture and science. The fate of a purely professional parliament divorced from life is to adopt laws which will not help but hinder professional transformations. And that means that once again it will not last long.

Election Could Produce 'Two-Party Electoral System'

PM1711164993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with political scientist Dmitriy Olshanskiy by Nikolay Ivanov under the "Opinion" rubric; place and date not given: "We Are Heading Toward a Two-Party System"]

[Text] The well-known political scientist Dmitriy Olshanskiy, who is running for office on the Moscow regional list of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRUA], believes that one of the present election campaign's results could be the formation of a two-party electoral system in Russia. He sees "Russia's Choice" and his own PRUA bloc as candidates for the roles of the two sides.

[Olshanskiy] In terms of its program and organizational structure, "Russia's Choice" could grow into something like the Democratic Party in the United States. Whereas PRUA is a party of the regions and could play the same role as the U.S. Republicans.

[Ivanov] But Russia already has republican and democratic parties. These are Nikolay Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia and Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy's Republican Party of the Russian Federation, which is part of the "Yabloko" [Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin] bloc. What about them?

[Olshanskiy] Actual names are unimportant—sometimes they do not reflect a party's political essence. The important things are the functions and distribution of roles, and in terms of this criterion, only "Russia's Choice" and PRUA can currently claim a place in a two-party system. They will be able to cooperate without causing upheavals, and to share power.... [Olshanskiy ends]

Indeed, there are no fundamental differences between the two parties' programs. They are unlikely to compete against one another (despite the polemic initiated by "Russia's Choice" against PRUA); instead they mutually complement each other: "Russia's Choice" is squeezing out Communists and national patriots in the big industrial centers, whereas PRUA can diminish the influence of the agrarian lobby in the provinces, and together they will substantially restrict the potential for a maneuver by "Civic Union."

However, the prospects for the establishment of a two-party "swing" are limited by the polemic that began after the official opening of the election campaign, but will it hinder the implementation of an interesting idea?

Old Names Dominate Lists of Candidates for Federal Assembly

MK1811102093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 80, 18 Nov 93 (signed to press 17 Nov) p 1

[Report by Petr Zhuravlev under the "Marathon" rubric: "The Bolsheviks Will Wield More Clout in the Fifth Duma Than They Did in the Fourth. Tomorrow Will Mark the End of the Registration of Candidates to the Federal Assembly"]

[Text] District electoral commissions keep sending to Moscow data on the registration of candidates for the State Duma and the Federation Council. The reception of signatures and other requisite documents in support of candidates ended last Sunday, so what keeps changing now in reports from the field is the number of officially registered candidates for deputy seats who have already been given receipts and certificates. Regarding the rest, district electoral commissions continue until next weekend the procedure of verification in order to decide whether they will be registered or not. As of yesterday, a total of 242 people out of 1,541 nominees have been registered as candidates for the State Duma in majority districts. In North Ossetia, they include Aleksandr Dzasokhov, former communist party functionary; in Chuvashia, Valentin

Agafonov, former deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet; in Orenburg Oblast, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha; in Chelyabinsk Oblast, Deputy Finance Minister Aleksandr Pochinok. In Moscow, those registered include Yevgeniy Kozhokin, deputy chief of the State Committee for the Affairs of the Federation and Nationalities and former people's deputy; Aleksandr Braginskiy, deputy prime minister of the Moscow government; and Boris Kondrashov, deputy chief of the Moscow Internal Affairs Main Administration. In Moscow Oblast, Kronid Lyubarskiy, a well-known human rights activist; Valentin Chikin, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA chief editor; and Vladimir Kvasov, chief of the Russian Government's staff.

Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was nominated in Dagestan; Ilya Konstantinov, leader of the National Salvation Front (in Novosibirsk Oblast); and Stanislav Terekhov, chief of the Officers Union (in Volgograd Oblast), on the contrary, will not be registered as candidates for the State Duma. According the Central Electoral Commission's press service, this was prohibited by presidential edict No. 1661 of 19 October, "On some measures to ensure state and public security in the period of the electoral campaign." It says in particular that "those against whom charges have been duly brought in connection with the events of 3 and 4 October, and earlier in connection with the attack on the CIS Joint Armed Forces main office, may not be nominated as candidates to the new parliament."

A total of 111 out of 490 nominees have been registered as candidates to the upper chamber—the Council of the Federation. They include Ramazan Abdulatipov and Mr. Magomedov, Dagestani Supreme Soviet chief; Kalmykian President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov; his Yakutian counterpart Mikhail Nikolayev; Tuva President Mr. Oorzhak; Mr. Dzharimov, Adygean president and head of government; Akhsarbek Galazov, North Ossetian Supreme Soviet chairman, and the republic's head of government, Sergey Khetagurov; Kemerovo Oblast Council Chairman Amangeldy Tuleyev; and Viktor Zhigulin, former deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Council of the Republic. In Moscow, those vying for "senate" seats are Yuriy Chernichenko, Nikolay Gonchar, Vladimir Komchatov, and Oleg Tolkachev, chief of the city's Southern District.

In 18 Federation components it is the chiefs of local executive authorities who have been registered as candidates to the upper chamber (Kalmykia, Yakutia, Tuva, Adygea, Chuvashia, Primorskiy and Stavropol Krays; Omsk, Orel, Penza, Saratov, Sakhalin, Tver, Ulyanov, Vologda, Voronezh, and Kostroma Oblasts; and also Koryakskiy Autonomous District). In five regions (Dagestan, Kurgan, Kemerovo, Ivanovo Oblasts, and Altayskiy Kray) the chiefs of legislative authorities are running for the Council of the Federation. A total of seven regions (Buryatia, North Ossetia, Volgograd, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orenburg, and Tambov Oblasts) have nominated both.

Evidently, on the eve of the elections chances of one candidate or another can be assessed only tentatively. The elections to the Federal Assembly, however, are unlikely to help uncover new names. The Soviet elite, regardless of its current attitude to its own political past, is more disposed toward continuity than innovations.

'Might Makes Right' Governing Campaign

MK1711140793 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 47, 17-23 Nov 93 (signed to press 16 Nov) p 3

[Boris Pugachev report under the "Forecast" rubric: "The Right of Might Lives on and Triumphs"]

[Text] Elections by "parties" are contrary to Russian traditions because they deny citizens the possibility to assess concrete individuals as personalities. The very analysis of party tickets shows that this is "the very same people" who share with the executive and legislative branches the political responsibility for "bloody October." I believe that a new parliament may prove professionally much worse than the previous one. I am convinced that whatever its composition it would once again be inconvenient for the president.

The present ministers are supposed to "rule the roost" in the newly elected legislature. That is the idea. The presence of ministers in the legislative assembly generates no drama per se. It would be different if the "government party" dominates there. A number of signs show that such plans are being hatched in the silence of Kremlin offices, but this is not going to work. Given any lineup of forces (even if the radical-democrats dominate) a new parliament would offer tough opposition to the present cabinet.

I think that the regional elites are not going to be happy with a new composition of the legislature. Today they have been upstaged by ambitious Moscow politicians. Right after the elections, the war between the central and regional elites would flare up with renewed force. The reason is not so much the deletion from a new draft constitution of the notion of republics' sovereignty and the withdrawal from the fundamental law of the Federation Treaty. The in-depth reason for the conflict lies in the fact that the present authorities have no well-considered and consistent policy of a federative organizational development.

The general conclusion is that for Russia, the coming elections are not going to solve a single problem. More than that, the absence of a reformist course matching Russia's requirements in the country's political leadership today will inevitably lead to further deepening of the social, political, and economic crisis. The present generation of Russian politicians is unable to offer anything else. As for authority itself, Russia will be retreating from democracy until it finds itself under the heel of a "dictatorship." The authority will go through the same things it did in the times of Russian sedition. Namely, its political pattern will be close to the political regime of the "favorites" complete with powerful behind-the-scenes palace intrigues, favoritism, lawlessness, and "bad authoritarianism." At any rate, all this already happened under the communists.

The electoral campaign that is now under way is happening against the backdrop of a frustration of public conscience. The authorities and society are conscientiously retreating from the recent past, as if there were no events of 3-4 October. The question of political responsibility for the massive bloodshed on part of the parliament, the president himself, and the government is being sidestepped. No independent commission has been set up to this day to investigate all the circumstances of the September-October event. There is no clarity about the number and circumstances of the deaths. Everything is being done for the tragedy to be forgotten.

Political circles do not even discuss the question of why indeed these elections should go at the bidding of the president's team in the same manner as a new constitution is being drawn up on its terms. No one is asking the question, by what right is all this taking place? Undoubtedly, everybody can clearly see that all that is happening is based on one right—that might makes right. It is this big political lie multiplied by the voluntary self-delusion of all today's political extras that creates an unreal background to the current electoral campaign. Once again, as it was quite recently in Russia, Solzhenitsyn's call "Live Not by the Lie" is becoming topical.

Military Issues

Gaydar Promises More Nuclear Research Subsidies

LD1711182393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Additional subsidies from the Russian budget will be set aside for the International Center for Nuclear Research in Dubna (near Moscow) before the end of 1993. The agreement was reached Wednesday at a meeting between Russia's vice-premier Yegor Gaydar and nuclear researchers in Dubna, and also included Minister for Science and Technical Policy Boris Saltykov.

Answering a question by Interfax, Saltykov said that the researchers told Gaydar about the difficult financial situation at the Dubna Center. The research work conducted by the center, which involves scientists from Russia, other CIS nations, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Germany, and other countries, demands large-scale capital investment. For example, expenditures for electricity are running at 600 Mn [million] rubles a month.

Under discussion were possible subsidies for nuclear research and electricity, and the indexing of salaries (the average salary at the center is 36,000 rubles), said Saltykov.

The minister said that Gaydar intends to give relevant instructions to the Finance Ministry. Saltykov was unable to name the sum to be set aside for the Dubna Center, but he said that scientists are asking for 6 Bn rubles.

Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine

MK1811093093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 47, 21 Nov 93 (signed to press 16 Nov 93) pp C10-11

[Report by Aleksandr Zhilin, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI military commentator, in the "Army" column: "War Policy and the War of Politicians"]

[Text] The military doctrine, recently approved by the Security Council and the president of Russia, is remarkable if only in that such a document has appeared for the first time in the state's history. Specialists point out, however, that it carries a stamp of rivalry between various political interests. The doctrine has reflected a battle between the "moderates" and the "hawks" outside the walls of the General Staff.

According to Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the doctrine's authors have worked on the assumption that as of now "Russia has no probable adversaries" or potential enemies. Nonetheless, commentators did not ignore the fact that the document, which rose on the yeast of political declarations first by the Soviet Union and then Russia about the renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, does not contain such an obligation in its text. On the other hand, it contains references to the possibility of "exporting" military force. Presumably, the world will not draw a conclusion from this that Russia is making preparations for an offensive war, but it will hardly add to its neighbors' calm.

According to a military expert, Lieutenant General (retired) Dmitriy Yevsiyenko, such formulations in army language often cover up readiness for full-scale aggression. He believes that up until recently a tough struggle has been going on within the Defense Ministry between the "moderates" and the "hawks." The final variant of the doctrine, in his opinion, testifies to a victory by the latter. Possibly there is a certain exaggeration in this but, as MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has found out, the concept of a "preemptive" strike is acquiring a second wind in upper military circles. In any event, it is again being actively aired in the General Staff and has a sufficient number of influential supporters.

The trend is at least alarming. It will be recalled that Russia's nuclear missiles are still targeted at the installations of the former "potential adversary"—the United States, the West European countries, Japan, and so forth. In addition, the Russian Defense Ministry, having become sole owner of the strategic nuclear forces, is not unwilling to flex its military muscle before neighbors in Eastern Europe and the CIS. Pavel Grachev makes no secret of the fact that he regards nuclear weapons as a lever of political pressure against the neighboring states. According to a military analyst, Major General (ret.) Gennadiy Dmitriyev, this in itself is normal: "Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and also Ukraine, which are dreaming about entering NATO, should realize that if they do that, they will immediately fall among the list of targets for Russian strategic nuclear forces with all the consequences this entails."

As for the former union republics, "the more Russian military bases are located on their territory," Dmitriyev believes, "the quicker a single economic and military union will be restored." Therefore he is not worried over the fact that observers read into the military doctrine Russia's possible expansion over the entire CIS. This expansion does not mean that tomorrow new wars will begin. These may also be "cold," when the state maintains its interests from a position of force. Which is what we are seeing in Russia's relations with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan....

And if Russia itself does not see "probable adversaries" around itself, the foreign policy section of its military doctrine will hardly pacify the neighboring and the more distant countries, which are accustomed to look back at it as a potential threat.

Another dubious aspect of the military doctrine is the provision about the possibility of using army subdivisions "to assist the law enforcement bodies." Because the document does not specify in what instances this "assistance" is allowed, there is a high likelihood of this provision's being interpreted loosely. In effect, it sanctions the use of the army in internal political conflicts.

Some military analysts therefore suspect that what they regard as an overhasty adoption of the doctrine was designed to provide some justification for the authorities' actions on 3 and 4 October. The president, who received support from the army in those days, apparently hopes for it in the future as well. Few will know that not all the troops brought into Moscow have been withdrawn from the capital. A special purpose airborne regiment is being formed with the facilities of a communications division in Sokolniki. The 27th Motorized Brigade of the Moscow Military District is being attached to paratroop forces. The stationing of commando units in and around the capital in the absence of facilities to airlift them to zones of potential military conflicts suggests that these troops are designed for "internal use."

The paradox consists in that at another spiral of political confrontation, military force may turn also against the president.

At any rate, the army is increasingly inclined to think that it alone is capable of putting things in the country in order. "Pavel Grachev has made the most of the 4 October victory. At present no one has any doubts that it is the army that controls the situation in the country. I think that as of now the period of endless compromises has finished and an era of order begins, and it will be enforced by us, the military"—this conclusion from the military doctrine was made by military expert Colonel (ret.) Dmitriy Kharitonov. He is not alone in his appraisal. It was not accidental that at one of the recent sessions of the military collegium Pavel Grachev, responding to a remark about the likelihood of the doctrine's being amended by the new parliament, noted: "We shall amend the parliament."

In the opinion of Colonel Konstantin Ivanov, an officer at the General Staff, "never before have the power ministers moved so close to the helm of political power." And should the incumbent president become unamenable to them for some reason or other, "Boris Yeltsin's illusions about his power functions will be dispelled at once."

In presenting the military doctrine to journalists, the defense minister said that it will not be considered by the Federal Assembly. It seems that society is again being deprived of the right of oversight in a sphere that affects both its well-being (as a taxpayer) and its security.

Official Denies Military To Pay Income Tax

LD1811115193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1047 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS—The Russian military, in contrast to all other citizens of the country, do not and will not pay an income tax.

Spokesman of the Russian president Vyacheslav Kostikov denied on Thursday mass media reports that it is planned to introduce the income tax for the military.

"These rumours contradict the principled position of the president towards the Russian Armed Forces," he said, adding that the new military doctrine, signed by Boris Yeltsin, not only fixes the military-strategic principles, but also "proceeds from the necessity to ensure an adequate material and monetary allowances for servicemen, from the necessity to raise the prestige and the status of military professions."

Navy Commander Gromov Reviews Northern Fleet

LD1711155293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1326 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 17 Nov—Today Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Navy, arrived at the main base of the Northern Fleet, Severomorsk. As the ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the chief headquarters of the Russian Federation Navy, Admiral Gromov will personally head a routine review of the Northern Fleet being held here from 15 to 24 November inclusive.

In the course of the Russian Navy Commander in chief's trip there will be examination of questions of the state of combat alert including with practical performance of live firing. Admiral Gromov will also check the quality of execution of tasks of combat training by formations, units, and ships of the fleet, and will make an on-site study of the state of martial discipline and equipment of the forces of the Northern Fleet.

Stepashin Views Security Ministry's Tasks

PM1711095193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Sergey Stepashin, first deputy security minister, by observer Boris Sopelnyak; place and date not given: "Sergey Stepashin: There Will Be No Purge in Russian Security Ministry"]

[Text] ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's observer talks to Lieutenant General Sergey Stepashin, Russian first deputy security minister.

[Sopelnyak] In your recent interviews and appearances at news conferences, you have repeatedly said that the Security Ministry needs to be reformed and that preparations for this work are already under way. At the same time, newspaper reports devoted to this subject have been followed by fairly strong denials, including from representatives of the Russian Federation President's Administration. What lies behind this: lack of coordination between two departments or something else?

[Stepashin] Putting it delicately, these kind of pronouncements can be seen either as total irresponsibility by certain journalists or...the desire to knock the heads of two major power structures together. After all, what are these newspapers writing about? The existence of a "working group to reform the Russian Security Ministry," which has allegedly been set up in the president's administration and which has been tasked with carrying out a "tough purge" of the Security Ministry's central apparatus and territorial organs, a performance evaluation review of a number of staffers, and suchlike. God only knows who draws up these kind of "documents" and how they get to certain newspapers' editorial offices. This forgery was evaluated not by us but by the operational information center of the president's administration, which called it a gross political provocation.

As regards reforming the Security Ministry, this idea did not come from the top, but was prompted by life itself, but these organizational and structural changes have nothing to do with a purge.

[Sopelnyak] All the same the Security Ministry needs changes... You said that this was prompted by life itself. Could you elaborate?

[Stepashin] Certainly. But first of all I must recall something that might seem a truism but is in fact an extremely important truth: Whatever we have done and whatever we have undertaken, we have always been guided by, and have always operated and will operate within the framework of, the Law "On Federal Organs of State Security." The law was passed recently but the problem of economic security was not reflected clearly and the state doctrine of economic security has still not been formulated.

[Sopelnyak] But economic security has always been associated with the forms of ownership. It is one thing to protect a state enterprise's secrets but quite another to protect those of some joint enterprise or limited partnership.

[Stepashin] That's just it. Previously state secrets in the economic sphere rarely became a commodity; interest in them was shown only by special services engaged in industrial espionage, but now they are the subject of buying and selling, and how! The nature of this phenomenon is understandable: A businessman has nothing to do with protecting state secrets, the most important thing to him is profitability, profit, and competitiveness. But many joint enterprises, small enterprises, joint-stock companies, and limited partnerships have been set up on the basis of so-called "post office box numbers," secret research centers and design bureaus, so that they now have the commodity I was talking about before and it is sometimes extremely valuable.

So what should we do in these conditions? Does it not seem to you that such questions as what should be protected and how to protect it are looming large?

[Sopelnyak] What is so complex about that? Every normal person would reply that the people's interests should be protected, that is, the very same state secrets, and that the Russian Security Ministry and nobody else should do this.

[Stepashin] You think so? Why should state secrets not be sold, seeing that they are a most expensive commodity and a buyer will always be found for them? I am talking about secrets that have become obsolete, but only two or three people know this. In other words, the secret information's aging process must be constantly monitored, and it must be converted into a commercial commodity. Incidentally, we have repeatedly observed the way in which some foreign firms have, by hook or by crook, pushed obsolete technologies onto our market or forced ultramodern Russian enterprises to produce a load of garbage, thereby reducing our specialists' intellectual level and taking up the capacity of our advanced equipment with useless trash. There is also other information: Some foreign firms and joint enterprises have been set up on the special services' initiative in order to carry out intelligence activity against us in the economic sphere. If unable to set up a joint enterprise, they entice specialists abroad. Relatively recently our staffers foiled a large-scale action by the North Korean military-industrial complex and special services. Our Korean "friends" were able to inveigle a large group of Russian specialists in the space rocket industry and almost sent them to Pyongyang. There was a big furor and the operation's organizer and executor, Major General Nam Ke-uk, counselor at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow, was declared persona non grata and expelled from Russia.

[Sopelnyak] The Korean general was going after brains, some foreigner was going after a high-precision instrument's design secrets, one was expelled and the other arrested—it serves them right. But what should be done with those who are not only robbing Russia but also dumping on it, in the bluntest sense of the word?

[Stepashin] It is sad, shameful, and painful, but I simply cannot fail to say that certain circles are trying to turn Russia into a world garbage dump and toxic waste storage facility! Let us say that the West's representatives can be understood: They want to cleanse their territory of toxic waste. But our people, our so-called businessmen, how can they sign such contracts?! Because more than one generation of Russians will have to pay for the easy money they are going to make! Here are the very latest examples. The Austrian firm "Glassimpex" tried to bury over 7 million tonnes of toxic waste in various Russian oblasts, with Novorossiysk's "Stromekologiya" Science and Production Association acting as middleman. How priceless were the attempts by certain West European firms to conclude agreements to construct sports facilities and roads virtually free of charge in St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, and other oblast centers, admittedly on one small condition: The construction material used would be the slag obtained from burning everyday garbage which would, of course, be delivered from these countries. It would seem that slag is slag, but when it was examined by specialists it turned out that it contained a vast quantity of highly toxic and carcinogenic compounds.

[Sopelnyak] But surely it is not the Security Ministry but completely different departments which should prevent this kind of sabotage.

[Stepashin] Yes, they should. But they do not. So we continue to play the role of the shield [reference to KGB's role as "shield and sword" of the state].

[Sopelnyak] I recently got hold of a copy of the newspaper EUROPA, which is published in a West European country. Here is what one of its items says: "Moscow has become one of the major trade centers being used by unscrupulous dealers specializing in deliveries of rare animals to private collections, zoos, circuses, and medical research institutes in various countries of the world." Does this correspond to the facts?

[Stepashin] Unfortunately, yes. Incidentally, the trade in rare and disappearing plants and animals is one of the most profitable types of smuggling. According to UN data, the volume of this illegal trade is approaching $5 billion a year, which is second only to the drugs business. Relatively recently our staffers intercepted the export to the Czech Republic and Slovakia by citizens of these countries of an entire collection of reptiles and insects which are in the Red Book.

But it is not only "guests" who are carting things off; the hosts, if you will, are also doing this. You have probably heard about Operation Trawl, which we carried out from January through August this year. Even case-hardened investigators were staggered by the results! Everything was being exported through the cordon: oil and oil products, nonferrous and rare earth metals, timber and sawn goods, food and medical supplies, consumer goods, and...cash. Our staffers discovered 600 such attempts, preventing the loss of 120 billion rubles [R]. And do you know who was committing these thefts, because the illegal export of unlicensed goods cannot be called anything else? Commercial structures in 369 cases, and state enterprises in the remaining cases.

Here is a continuation for you of the subject we were talking about earlier: What to protect, how to protect it, and whom to protect. But these thefts are nothing compared with the problem of ensuring the protection of nuclear materials and radioactive elements. Not only have anonymous threats to blow up nuclear electric power stations become more frequent, this kind of statement has been made by certain political parties' extremist leaders. Threats are threats, but there have also been cases of uranium and uranium products being stolen. At the end of last year a consignment of low-grade uranium was stolen from Chepetskiy Mechanical Plant in the city of Glazov. As a result of the investigation around 60 kg of uranium was seized in Izhevsk and over 35 kg was seized in Brest and Glazov. Eleven people including a Polish citizen were arrested in this case.

We also have a type of crime which is relatively new to us—the theft of computer data. After all, besides the theft of banking or commercial secrets, there is the problem of the downloading of information from computers of the General Staff, the Strategic Rocket Forces command, and a government residence. And the notorious computer viruses! They can be used to paralyze any department's operations.

[Sopelnyak] Are you studying a problem which everyone is hearing about now—I mean the privatization of state and municipal property?

[Stepashin] Of course we are, although it should apparently be the MVD's [Ministry of Internal Affairs] prerogative. It is not just a question of their simply being unable to cope alone—the pie is very big, and there are more than enough people wanting to grab a slice. So that is what we are doing. Few people know that besides normal privatization there is also nomenklatura privatization—this is when leading employees and officials of the organs of state power illegally take part in commercial activity: They are our main clients. There are countless examples. For instance, the "Belimpex" foreign economic company was set up in Belgorod Oblast, its main activity being to siphon off state resources and pump them into commercial structures.

[Sopelnyak] Now a question in the delicate category. You said that one of the main tasks of the czarist Okhrana and subsequently of the Cheka and KGB was to monitor political parties and movements and, of course, ruthlessly fight them. How do things stand now? Does the Russian Security Ministry have such a task now?

[Stepashin] No, this is not within our terms of reference. We do not engage in any monitoring of the activities of political parties or public associations. At the same time the Law "On Federal Organs of State Security" lays down that the Russian Security Ministry combats unlawful infringements of the Russian Federation constitutional system. In particular, the Russian Security Ministry checks all information received about the activities of parties and public associations that set up illegal armed formations or use force in a political confrontation. On the basis of these checks, we pass on the relevant information to justice and prosecutor's office organs, and in some cases we institute criminal proceedings ourselves. That was the case with Vorobyev, one of the leaders of the Russian National Union, who attempted to set up an armed formation in Yekaterinburg with, according to him, the aim of carrying out mass and individual terror.

[Sopelnyak] It is known that organized crime knows no borders and has become international in the full sense of the word and consequently dangerous not just to one but to several states at once. In this context it is evidently impossible to do without contacts and cooperation with special services which until only yesterday were, if not our enemies, then at any rate not our friends.

[Stepashin] I make no secret of the fact that contacts with the special services of the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Israel, South Africa, and a number of other states have begun not without looking back at the past, but the interests of the cause have made themselves felt. I can now state with complete certainty that the inertia of the past has been overcome and that we are cooperating increasingly actively. Suffice to say that representatives of the security organs and special services of a number of foreign states are working on a completely official basis in Moscow. It was efficient and businesslike cooperation that helped us and our Polish colleagues to arrest a fairly high-ranking diplomat in Warsaw, in whose baggage over 12 kg of heroin was found at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport. In collaboration with the special services of Israel and a number of other states, the activity of an international criminal grouping which tried to smuggle into our country a whole tonne of cocaine originating in Colombia was foiled: The executors of this smuggling operation were arrested first in Russia and then in Tel Aviv. An operation concerning the "controlled delivery" of several kilograms of narcotics which had been discovered at post offices was carried out jointly with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency—all the figures in this drugs business were arrested.

There are many examples of this kind of activity—this year alone over 40 joint measures have been carried out, but this is just the beginning. I think that in a year or two the results will be even more tangible—after all, we and they have plenty of experience and, by pooling our efforts, we will shake organized crime hard by the tail.

[Sopelnyak] Nonetheless I propose to return to the question that began our conversation: Do any changes lie in store for the Security Ministry and, if so, which changes precisely?

[Stepashin] Yes. And I can say which. The point is that we sent a memorandum with our proposals to the Russian president, and on 5 November there was a meeting between our minister and Boris Nikolayevich at which Yeltsin supported all our proposals and stated that he would not allow the system of federal organs of state security that has developed to be destroyed.

Our proposals include, for instance, the following: To introduce the post of national security adviser to the president, who would be in charge of and coordinate the activity of the Security Ministry, MVD, Foreign Intelligence Service, Main Protection Directorate, and General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate. We are proposing that a new section be organized in the Directorate for Combating Terrorism, whose duties would include the discovery, prevention, and termination of anticonstitutional activity by extremist groupings which hide behind the status of political parties and public associations. We are perfectly well aware that one of the Russian Security Ministry's primary tasks is to radically improve the quality of information destined for the country's president and government about domestic and foreign threats to Russian security. In this context work to prevent and forecast every kind of emergency situation is becoming very important—the president has paid special attention to this. Nor can we do without a strong enforcement subunit capable of quickly and effectively terminating actions by both extremist groupings and terrorists. There are also other proposals but they are, I would say, of a technical nature and unlikely to interest readers.

[Sopelnyak] An enforcement subunit—that is the sword, isn't it? Does that mean the shield and the sword again? Does that mean not only protection but also punishment?

[Stepashin] No, our sword is not a punitive one, our sword is a deterrent. The punitive sword is in the hands of others—the prosecutor's office and the judiciary—but it is still in the state's hands. Therefore everyone who is thinking of encroaching on the state's—and that means the people's—interests must think long and hard and remember the Biblical truism: "Put up again thy sword into its place: for all who live by the sword shall die by the sword." We do not have to look far for examples, everyone has heard them. We do not need any more such examples. They should never arise! That is why our ministry exists—it is the shield and the sword of a renewed Russia.

Northern Fleet Holds Open Day for Draftees

PM1811095993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Report by G. Smirnova and Ye. Abramov from Murmansk; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Today is Russian Call-Up Day. It was marked for the first time in the Russian Federation a year ago—15 November 1992—by decision of President Boris Yeltsin.

[Smirnova] [video shows people disembarking from bus] This is now the second year running that such a large landing force of different age groups has invaded the warships and even submarines of the Northern Fleet. Its command constantly seeks and, it has to be said, finds new and highly productive forms of cooperation with future servicemen and their parents. Recently, a group of mothers of Northern Fleet sailors who had come to serve with the fleet on contract basis spent some time on a nuclear submarine, and even went out to sea on it. It was the fleet command itself which issued the invitation to these future servicemen, their parents, their brothers, sisters, and friends. Naturally, it was the warships which aroused greatest interest. The youngsters were keen to find out about the hardware, while their mothers were more concerned with the day-to-day life of sailors, the ships' galleys, and the on-board menu. Representatives of the command, lawyers, and the military commissariat held a discussion with draftees in the House of Officers. They assured the parents that three-fourths of the young men remain to serve in the Polar Region. And the most diligent Northern Fleet sailors will certainly qualify for annual leave. [video shows people arriving at the Northern Fleet base in Murmansk, warships, nuclear submarine, meeting in House of Officers]

Economic Issues

Regulations on Accepting Dollar Bills Cited

PM1711151593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 1

[BIZNES-TASS report: "Bank, Present Yourself for Examination"]

[Text] The selective examination of currency exchange centers at commercial banks and authorized enterprises, with the aim of exposing violations of the rules for exchanging U.S. dollars established by the Central Bank, is starting in the capital. We found this out from a source at the Central Bank of Russia's Main Administration for Moscow.

A press release prepared for BIZNES-TASS by the Central Bank of Russia's Moscow Administration notes that special attention during the examination will be paid to the observance by banks and official enterprises of the following requirements in work with clients:

U.S. dollar bills of all years of emission starting from 1928 must be bought and sold unhindered by Russian official banks (or exchange centers), as well as accepted without fail by authorized enterprises.

Insignificant bank note defects which have arisen from natural wear and tear—dirt, tears, shabbiness, small stains, and writing which do not change the basic indicators of authenticity—cannot serve as a reason for a bank to refuse to buy the currency. The main criterion in the purchase and acceptance of dollars is their authenticity; special equipment (testers) is needed to determine this.

In the event of failure to carry out the aforementioned requirements, the Central Bank of Russia's Main Administration for Moscow stresses, violators will be punished in accordance with the Central Bank normative documents currently in effect. Furthermore, if the authorized banks (exchange centers) and authorized enterprises do not have the relevant technical equipment for verifying the authenticity of the dollar bills, the Bank of Russia will suspend their license to handle currency transactions.

Volskiy Report to RUIE Congress Summarized

PM1711165193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 1, 2

[Rustam Arifdzhanov report: "'Chernomyrdin Is With Us!'—Stated Arkadiy Volskiy at the Fifth Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in the Hall of Columns of the House of the Unions on 16 November"]

[Text] The congresses of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [RUIE] have in recent times been visited by both the president and premiers, although they were held only in a ball bearing plant's palace of culture. The present presidium is not so outstanding, although Shokhin, Gerashchenko, a number of ministers, the new leader of the trade unions, a cosmonaut, an admiral, and youth representatives were present. But, on the other hand, the hall was—unlike the State Bearing Plant Palace of Culture, sumptuously decked out.

Every congress consists of delegates, a report, a presidium, debates, resolutions, a refreshment room, and off-the-record talk.

The presidium and the hall have been mentioned. We will skip the refreshment room. We have briefly gotten to know the delegates, as it were.

The report was not bad. Volskiy's tastes remain constant: "I have spoken about China more than once and will continue speaking about it until people see the light," "and I consider that the idea of the hammer and sickle has not yet faded away—and what's bad about that?" They were asides. But to convey in general what he said, here are some excerpts: "The Russian imperial union of indistrialists and merchants was a very influential organization. The State Duma, the government, and the family of the czar always took it into account... Real power in the government has been obtained by senior scientific officials who have never seen the inside of a factory... Things have looked up somewhat since Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin's arrival... The monetarists are trying to get their own back again... It is time to leave reformist romanticism behind... I will not be writing any more letters to Gaydar. They are simply not understood there... The process of consuming fixed capital is going ahead at full steam... Russia's industrial output this year will be almost half down on 1989. This is only comparable perhaps with the periods of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War... In the last two weeks major enterprises like Rostselmash, GAZ, Moskvich and hundreds of others have simply ground to a halt... There has been an unprecedented increase in prices. A second 'shock,' and again without therapy... The Russian Government, which announced the reform in 1992, has begun to slow it down from above, and that is an antireformist approach. The monetarists have gotten carried away. Viktor Stepanovich will have to pull all the stops out." And so forth.

Nevertheless, Volskiy was constructive enough. We will highlight the main elements of his program. The creation of an integrated and durable system of social protection. The money for this is to come from a review of the budget items, redistribution of resources between the very rich and the extremely needy, and tax levied on sales not profits. It is essential to refrain from commercializing medicine. "Poverty cards" are to be introduced for the disadvantaged. The "union with the sickle" occupies second place in the industrialists' program. You can't build democracy in a country suffering from hunger. Volskiy described the Agrarian Union as his main ally in the elections. Reforms must start with the agrarian sector. Third comes structural reorganization, the enhancement of investment activity, and state regulation and control of prices. Then the persistent development of industrial enterpreneurial activity and protecting the economy against the random sway of middlemen, especially speculative ones. Cartel agreements and the creation of industrial finance groups and holding companies are proposed. And, in conclusion, a well-known thesis—we are a great industrial power and it is our sacred duty to do everything to ensure that we remain so in the new economic conditions.

There was discussion enough about the elections. The government was criticized and then Russia's Choice received the same. The information blockade was, naturally, talked about, and people were urged not to succumb to provocation.

The debate was frankly boring, as befits the speeches of those appearing on the captains of industry list. Once, admittedly, Volskiy did interrupt a speaker: "Viktor Stepanovich has sent his apologies and greetings and has said that he is with us." The congress then went on for another couple of hours, but the key phrase, it seems, had already been uttered.

Regional Affairs

Yeltsin Tours Tula, Stresses Military Conversion

PM1711181593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by special correspondent Vladimir Chuprin: "Conversion Must Not Run Counter to the Interests of the Country's Defense Capability—Russian President Boris Yeltsin States at Conference With Heads of Administration of Russian Regions"]

[Text] Tula—Journalists were not admitted to this conference, which was held at the Shtamp machine building plant. However, the president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, informed us that Boris Nikolayevich had described the pace of conversion as sufficiently fast and had noted new qualitative changes in its development. For example, the directors of defense plants realized that there would be no return to cheap loans or subsidies to the military-industrial complex.

However, the president sets the task in such a way that conversion is carried out without damaging the country's defense capability. He urged that the scientific cadres and the potential built up in the military-industrial complex be retained without fail. Budgetary appropriations for research connected with the defense sector and conversion must not be cut during the present period.

Figures were cited: In 1993 civilian output in Russia's military-industrial complex will amount to around 70 percent. This, you will agree, is not the tenths or hundredths of a percent with which conversion began three year ago. This marks a decisive step forward. The fact that the defense sector enjoys good—50 percent—profitability is also gratifying. The plants undergoing conversion generate around 1 trillion rubles in profit.

On the other hand, it was stressed at the conference that 400 enterprises in the country have not started to implement the relevant programs at all. Boris Yeltsin criticized the government first and foremost for its poor coordination of conversion measures. Many plants have a poor grasp of the requirements of the domestic and foreign markets.

Conference participants spoke with alarm about the fact that Russia has markedly reduced the sale of its weapons in world markets and is thereby losing billions of dollars. We must fight to recover our position with more determination.

On the whole the assembly came to the conclusion that the defense complex has managed in the last two years to do without generous injections of state money and that this is to the credit of the government's market course. However, the state policy of assisting those regions which have found themselves in a more difficult position, because production there was almost entirely military, is essential.

Clearly a contract system will soon be introduced in the military-industrial complex, as in the army, which will make it possible to pay good money to really major specialists in their own field.

The Russian president also urged the heads of executive power to step up their work during the election period. He stated that a trend has emerged: Wherever a head of administration is himself taking part in the election campaign, help is forthcoming from him. Those who have not put forward their candidature are adopting a passive attitude to political events.

Yesterday Boris Yeltsin also visited the Tula Guards Airborne Assault Division. He had earlier been to see the troops of the Moscow Military District and the Dzerzhinskiy Division. Asked about the aim of his visit to the "blue berets," Boris Yeltsin replied laconically: "We will learn to fight together."

Views Military Exercises

LD1711161093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] In the short term Russia is to adopt a 5-year program of conversion which is to take into consideration the necessity to create most advanced armaments for Russian army. "This must be equipment of supreme quality," President Boris Yeltsin told journalists on Wednesday following his visit to a Guard's air landing division in the Tula region. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev accompanied Yeltsin during his trip.

The president, dressed in a camouflage officer's field uniform, stayed about two and a half hours in temperatures of minus 20 Celsius visiting test ranges of this division. Yeltsin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, was a supervisor at the exercises with the participation of Air Force, armored vehicles, and artillery. In his words, the exercises and the level of forces' combat efficiency are impressive.

Russia, Yeltsin said, is restructuring its armed forces, and the Tula division is an example of forces staffed with highly professional servicemen and equipped with modern military equipment. In his words, such units are being created now in accordance with Russia's new military doctrine.

Having visited the division, the president conducted a conference with the highest leadership of the defense ministry and leaders of the defense and industry complex's enterprises behind closed doors. After the conference Yeltsin departed for Moscow by helicopter.

Talks With Military Leaders

LD1711163893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1246 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Vladimir Gondusov, Anna Melnikova and Valeriy Rudenko]

[Text] Tula November 17 TASS - President Boris Yeltsin's working tour of the Tula region ended on Wednesday with a conference with the commanders of the Russian Army on tasks connected with the new military doctrine.

Yeltsin conferred with commanders at the station of the 106th Tula Guards Airborne Division immediately after tactical exercises which involved an operation to land personnel and hardware.

The exercises were also watched by administration chiefs from more than 70 regions of Russia. On Tuesday [16 November] regional chiefs had participated in a meeting dealing with defence industry conversion issues.

In a brief talk to journalists, Yeltsin emphasised that he is satisfied with the trip. "Together with regional administration leaders, we have managed to resolve serious matters dealing with the furthering of the defence industry conversion processes," the president said.

He pointed out that the government is to work out a five-year programme for the defence industry sectors. The programme will formulate major orientations of their activities, including export-oriented ones.

The president highly appreciated the combat skills of paratroopers. "It is precisely such mobile, well-armed and well-equipped units that must become the core of a professional Russian Army," Yeltsin said.

The president was accompanied by Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, Commander of Airborne Troops Yevgeniy Podkolzin, and Air Force Commander-in-chief Petr Deinekin.

The president left for Moscow on Wednesday afternoon.

Press Secretary Comments

LD1711163793

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1410 GMT on 17 November carries a 15-minute report by Sergey Novikov on President Boris Yeltsin's visit to the Tula Airborne Division. Novikov says that the visit began at 1930 local time; the Russian president was accompanied by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev; Colonel General Sergey Podkolzin, commander in chief of the Russian Airborne Assault Troops; other generals; senior Defense Ministry officials; and heads of administrations from all Russian regions and members of the government, who took part in yesterday's conversion conference held in Tula.

After a brief description of the division's history, Novikov interviews Vyacheslav Kostikov, the president's press secretary. Vyacheslav Kostikov says that "conversion should pursue the twin goals of, on the one hand, fully preserving the country's defense capability; at the same time, account having been taken of the tremendous scientific, technological, and intellectual potential of the military-industrial complex, conversion should ensure that high-technology consumer goods are freely available on the country's markets without detriment to the country's defenses."

Conversion is a costly affair and enterprises are now able to act independently on the domestic and world arms and goods markets, to earn the necessary revenue themselves. "State subsidies will be unavoidable during the first stage because conversion is a very costly affair financially and sensible state subsidies, within sensible limits, are, of course, essential," Kostikov says.

Kostikov confirms that the state will step in to pay its debts to the enterprises involved where payments for state orders are concerned. Replying to Novikov's question as to whether state orders for military output have been continued for next year, Kostikov says that "sensible orders within sensible limits and within the confines of sensible sufficiency are naturally simply essential and of course these will be maintained."

New developments in arms production will be constrained by what is financially feasible, Kostikov declares, adding that "allocations for military science will be maintained." The best and latest Russian inventions which are still secret will not, of course, be sold abroad. The brain drain is continuing, but one must not panic here, because this is a worldwide process. Maybe it is not such a bad thing for Russian scientists to become a part of the international community of scientists working all over the world, because they are thus able to bring some knowhow back to Russia, Kostikov says, adding that numerous scientists will return after several years' absence abroad.

Referring to President Yeltsin's presence in Tula, Kostikov says that "the participation of the president of Russia in military exercises is a planned event, discussed several months ago. It stems from the fact that the president is aware of his role as the supreme commander in chief and that is why he should be familiarizing himself with military equipment, the life of our soldiers, and he should understand things here, because the military area is part and parcel of state affairs writ large—without a strong, vibrant, and modern army Russia cannot exist as a great state. The president is aware of this and that is why he devotes a great deal of attention to the life of the troops."

Novikov then says: "Following his visit to the facilities of the Tula Airborne Guards Division, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin had a meeting with senior generals of the Russian Army. There was discussion about Russia's new military doctrine. This concluded the president's working trip to Tula Oblast, but the heads of the executive authorities are still working according to the program and are due to leave for Moscow late this evening," Novikov concludes.

Tula Oblast, Federation Elections To Be Simultaneous

PM1711173193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Kireyev: "To Greater and Lesser Duma"]

[Text] Tula—The Tula Oblast Duma will be elected at the same time as elections to the Federation Council and State Duma. This decision was made by Administration Head N. Sevryugin.

There will be 29 deputies—one for each rayon—elected to the local parliament. To become a candidate you must collect at least 400 signatures by 27 November.

Daghestan Commission Reconsiders Khasbulatov Registration

LD1711164493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] In Makhachkala, capital of Daghestan, the district electoral commission Wednesday intends to reconsider the issuing to Ruslan Khasbulatov of a registration certificate as candidate to the Federal Assembly. Interfax has been told by the brother of the former speaker of the Russian Parliament that the commission which decided to register Khasbulatov at the 11th Makhachkala electoral district did not issue on the same date the registration certificate because of the absence of a photograph of the ex-speaker who is in custody at the Moscow Lefortovo prison on charges of organizing mass disturbances.

Meanwhile, the committee for protection of Khasbulatov in Makhachkala has told Interfax that both the republic's and the federal authorities were exerting pressure on members of the district electoral commission.

The district electoral commission is likely to meet later in the day.

Moscow Poll Shows Russia's Choice Leading

LD1711184193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to the figures of a Moscow sociological poll by the Ekspres service, 31 percent of Russians intend to vote in December for Russia's Choice, 24 percent for the Yavlinskiy- Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, and the communists stand third in the popularity ratings.

Three Candidates Named for Two-Seat District

PM1711172193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

["Own Information" report: "Head in the Lead Again"]

[Text] Three candidates who have collected signatures for the elections to the Federation Council are running from Moscow Oblast for a two-seat district.

They are Anatoliy Stepanovich Tyazhlov, the head of the oblast administration; Anatoliy Vasilyevich Dolgolaptev, Tyazhlov's first deputy; and Roman Semenovich Popkovich, head of the Krasnogorskiy Rayon Administration.

Moscow's Salyut Plant Alters Production Course

PM1711145193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By A. Peslyak and V. Belyayev; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Peslyak over shot of missile "sculpture" outside plant] There is gold at Moscow's Salyut Plant—this is how we might describe the powerful engines for the famous MiG and SU aircraft which have ended up as surplus to client requirements. The director understands the complexities of the market. Nevertheless, he feels that the military should make their position clear with regard to the state order. After all, these items are in demand abroad too.

For now, being prepared to produce other things, the plant is embarking on conversion. It is producing items like this 3-5 horsepower motorized cultivator—they are invaluable assets to any cultivated land plot or farm. When attached to a trailer, this little beauty can haul a 300-kg load. And take a look at these free-standing electronic scales, which can replace a conventional spring balance in any retail outlet and are accurate down to the last gram. In market conditions, attempts are also being made here to help others. So it is that veterans from the Afghanistan war, via the presidential structures, approached the "Salyut" management board, and it...

[Ye. Komarov, vice president of the Russian Fund for Invalids from the Afghanistan War, in progress] ...allocated space for them, and in this building, the production of artificial limbs was started up.

[Peslyak] Craftsmen in this field work on the latest equipment, with compound materials and semi-manufactured goods from the "Energiya" space firm. There is no markup on the prices, the cost is three times lower here than elsewhere, and the quality is out of this world. Furthermore, on presentation of a letter of authorization from the military commissariat or social security organs, artificial legs are allocated to invalids free of charge.

[V. Komchatov, representative of the Russian Federation president in Moscow] All the work of the last two years is worth it when you realize that over the course of a year just six people can provide 500 invalids with inexpensive, sturdy artificial limbs.

North Caucasian Leaders Laud Draft Constitution

PM1811093793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Alan Kasayev report: "Republics' Status as States Remains"]

[Text] "The adoption of the new Russian Federation Constitution will allow us to put a stop to the continuing chaos in all spheres of public life in Russia," President of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic Valeriy Kokov stated at a press conference in Nalchik. He said he was certain that the adoption of the new democratic Constitution will lead to a strengthening of Russia's unity.

In an interview with a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent, Akhsarbek Galazov, chairman of the Republic of North Ossetia Supreme Soviet, described the draft Russian Constitution as a vitally necessary document, which permits us to resolve social problems and to extricate the regions and the whole of Russia from the crisis through efforts at all levels of executive power. "For some time the republic heads demanded the mandatory inclusion in the draft's text of the concept of the Russian republics' sovereignty," Galazov said. "I consider that it is not necessary to see the fact that the republics' sovereignty is not reflected literally in the document as a tragedy, as the republics' status as states within Russia remains in Article 5."

Provision of Equality May Be 'Mere Rhetoric'

PM1811095193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Khabarovsk Kray Administration Head Viktor Ishayev: "Will the Federation Components Be Equal Only on Paper?"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—We intend to do everything we can to ensure that the elections to the federal organs of power, scheduled for 12 December, take place and, what is most important, the voters can calmly express their feelings toward the draft of the new Russian Constitution. Our country has never before known such a Fundamental Law. When it is adopted, there will finally be a real possibility to get away from confrontation in society which has absolutely sickened everybody and to really get down to carrying out the complex tasks facing Russians. Today it can already be predicted with certainty that people in the Far East will support the new Constitution as it strengthens the democratic principles in the state system, significantly broadens citizens' rights and freedoms, and gives people what was previously strictly prohibited, first and foremost the right to private ownership.

All these may be regarded as very positive elements in the document which has been submitted for society's verdict. It is with particular relish that people in the regions are familiarizing themselves with the section of the Constitution on the country's federative system. It proclaims that the republics, krays, oblasts, and other federation components have equal rights and status. But people in the Far East's rayons are afraid that this provision may remain mere rhetoric in the future.

Can you speak of equality when the republics within Russia function in accordance with their own constitutions, but krays and oblasts have to make do with the statute? Why is it that our Amur Region, which pays its taxes punctually into the federal budget, is deprived of the economic rights which, for example, the neighboring Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) enjoys today, when, according to our information, the latter is not noted for its conscientiousness in paying these very taxes? Can you in this instance talk about the equality of components in their mutual relations with the federal organs of state power? You can only hope that, after the adoption of new Russian Federation Constitution, we will have a clear and precise mechanism which will genuinely guarantee that the krays and oblasts have equal rights and status.

Speaker Favors Introducing Ossetian Presidency

LD1711192793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1227 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 17 Nov—A Supreme Soviet Presidium meeting was held in the North Ossetian capital today. It decided to convene a session of the republican Supreme Soviet on 19 November. Deputies are to examine a package of documents connected with the law on "introducing the post of president of the Republic of North Ossetia."

In an interview with ITAR-TASS, Supreme Soviet Chairman Akhsarbek Galazov expressed his firm belief in the need for presidential rule in the republic. He emphasized that North Ossetia is an integral part of Russia. None of the republic's peoples could conceive of themselves living outside Russia. Irrespective of what form of state rule is introduced, they will not countenance the idea of North Ossetia's secession from the Russian Federation.

He believes that, ultimately, the law will reign supreme in both North Ossetia and Russia, and all branches of power will be treated as equal before it. The president himself will act as a guarantor, a channel of communication between the representative and executive authorities.

Akhsarbek Galazov believes that mid-January 1994 would be the best time to hold presidential elections in the Republic of North Ossetia.

Chechen Opposition Denies Plans To Seize Power

LD1711143593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1103 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The headquarters of the armed opposition denied the assertions by ex-chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for International Affairs Yusup Soslanbekov that the opposition forces are planning to seize power in Chechnya.

Earlier, Soslanbekov told Interfax that the opposition formations were creating a single opposition block and that in November or December Dudayev would be removed from power.

A leader of the armed opposition told Interfax that the opposition did not consider the possibility of coming to power as a result of an armed coup. "The opposition will not repeat Dudayev's mistakes and will not resume clashes which can lead to a civil war," he said.

International Affairs

Sevastopol Awaits Warships From Georgian Operation

LD1711164593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] One of Russia's major naval bases at Sevastopol expects the arrival Wednesday afternoon of the basic team of ships involved in the peace-keeping mission in West Georgia.

Meanwhile, a big landing craft with 102 marines and hardware on board has remained at Poti to protect communication lines and approaches to the port.

As Interfax has learned from a well-placed military source, the two last vessels that took part in the peace-keeping operation in Georgia—the landing ship "Olshanski" and the guard ship "Endeavor"—are to arrive in Sevastopol on Thursday morning. The Black Sea Fleet Commander Eduard Baltin is aboard "Olshanski".

In all, 9 vessels helped to restore peace to West Georgia.

National Self-Defense Unit Returns From Georgia

LD1711233093 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2030 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev—On 16 November the last detachment of UNSO (Ukrainian National Self-Defense) units that took part in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict returned to Borispol airport by a "Tbilisi-Kiev" aircraft. As Viktor Melnyk, one of the Ukrainian National Assembly leaders, told a UNIAN correspondent on 17 November, "UNSO combatants did not take part in the civil war in Georgia but were engaged in protecting refugees and rendering humanitarian aid." According to Viktor Melnyk, 28 UNSO members have state awards of the Georgian Government for the protection of Georgia's independence and territorial integrity.

Black Sea Cooperation Parliament To Meet 29 Nov

LD1611185993 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1515 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 16 Nov—Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry held one of its regular briefings on current foreign policy issues. A Foreign Ministry spokesmen informed the audience that the Black Sea Cooperation Parliamentary Assembly [BSCPA] set up in June 1993 will hold a session from 29 November to 1 December in Kiev. Oleh Skoropad, acting head of department at the Foreign Ministry Directorate for International Economic Cooperation, said 50 members of the parliament from 11 member countries will arrive to take part in the BSCPA. The assembly session will be chaired by Husamettin Cindoruk, the president of the BSCPA and speaker of the Turkish National Assembly. Discussions on the development of political and economic cooperation will be held in the framework of the BSCPA.

The participants of the briefing were informed of the visit by Xavier San-Domingo, the deputy head of the Eastern Europe Directorate of the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry [title as received] to Ukraine on 8-11 November. The Ukrainian and Spanish delegations held consultations at Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry during the visit, which resulted in an agreement on the text of a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and Spain. The treaty lays the legal foundation for comprehensive relations between Ukraine and Spain. It may be signed during a meeting between the heads of the two states.

Kiev Joining CIS Economic Union as Associate Member

LD1711175993 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] As was reported by the press service of the Ukrainian president and Cabinet of Ministers, a meeting of the CIS consultative and coordinating committee dedicated to specific issues of the future activity of the Commonwealth's economic union was held in Moscow. This new interstate structure was formed during the last meeting of CIS heads of state. Ukraine and Turkmenistan announced their participation in such a union as associate members. This defined the position of the Ukrainian delegation headed by Vice Premier Valentyn Landyk at the meeting of the CIS Consultative and Coordinating Committee.

Of the issues discussed, a considerable number were adopted or are being reworked with proposals made by the Ukrainian delegation taken into account. In particular, these are the draft agreements on coordinating policy on prices and taxation with regard to which, Ukraine considers, more independence should be given to the states concerning taxation rates. The draft agreement on investment activity also needs to be more thoroughly reworked, although Ukraine proposes to limit itself to bilateral agreements.

Preliminary agreements were reached on general conditions and the mechanism for supporting the development of working cooperation and direct contacts between enterprises and sectors of CIS countries. This envisages a more favourable regime for moving component parts and other manufactured goods for the machine-building and other industrial enterprises. Experts will also continue to work on determining the conditions for states to join the economic union on the rights of associate membership.

Cooperation Agreement With Spain To Be Signed

LD1611204393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Foreign Affairs Ministry press center reports that the text of a Spanish-Ukrainian agreement on friendship and cooperation has been agreed. This was the aim of a Spanish diplomatic delegation's stay in Kiev. The document prepared, in both sides' view, lays a legal foundation for the development of bilateral relations in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. It is envisaged that the agreement will be signed by the two heads of state during a summit.

National Affairs

Supreme Council Discussion on Election Law Viewed

WS1711123193 Kiev KYYIVSKA PRAVDA in Ukrainian 11 Nov 93 pp 1,2

[Report by P. Vasyanovich: "Will Elections Be Held Without a Law on Elections?"]

[Text] According to V. P. Filenka, leader of the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, one of the leaders of the legislative opposition, it is not as important who is going to win the upcoming elections, as it is pressing that someone wins. They can be socialists or even communists, however, Ukraine requires that a political organization with a clear program takes responsibility for what is being done in the country. This can be done only when a certain political party has a majority in the legislature and creates a stable government.

In the opinion of Filenka and other democratic deputies, this can be realized if the upcoming elections are held on a proportional or a mixed basis. In this case, the elected deputies will be responsible both to their voters and their party or bloc of parties. Only in this case, are we going to have an organized and active legislature. The supporters of the majority system are convinced that the existing political parties that change their political stand too often are too weak to play a leading role in political life while their leaders are waiting for guaranteed places in a new legislature.

In any case, when on Tuesday [9 November] the Supreme Council started to discuss the draft law on elections in the first reading, the supporters of the first and the second systems were uncompromising, despite all the efforts of I. S. Plyushch to find a compromise, despite the fact that neither party has the required majority of voices. The situation is tragic and comical at the same time. New elections will be held on 27 March 1994, the electoral campaign will be launched in ten days while we have no law on elections and we cannot hope that it will be adopted.

Four draft laws on elections with different variations of the election system were submitted for consideration to the legislative commission. All of them have not been approved by the commission.

The Supreme Council chairman chose, in his opinion, the only possible way out—to discuss the draft law proposed by the commission for laws and lawfulness. I strongly doubt that this "majority" document will be unanimously adopted by the legislative majority. A. F. Tkachuk, heading the working group that had submitted this draft law for consideration, has proposed some novelties: Only citizens and political parties have the right to propose their candidates while working collectives, trade unions, and public organizations are deprived of this right. In the opinion of P. M. Movchan, his "Prosvita" including more than one million persons will be a loser, while the party of beer lovers will be a winner. Servicemen, militia men, officers of prosecutor's offices and the security services, cannot become deputies as their organizations are exempted from politics. In order to propose a candidate, you must have 300 signatures, and the required age level is above 25.

When I was writing this article, discussion was in full swing. I would like the pessimistic prognosis not be confirmed as our deputies look back at Russia which had agreed to have a mixed system of elections, and nothing criminal has come out of it yet. Given the dire economic situation, our deputies who care about the national well-being should find a common language.

Supreme Council Debates Draft Election Law

LD1711203493 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1645 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 17 Nov—Proceeding from a report by Anatoliy Tkachuk, the deputy chairman of the Commission for Issues of Legislation and Legality, the deputies were considering the draft law on election of people's deputies of Ukraine in the second reading. Deputy Oleksandr Chernyavskyy proposed that changes be introduced concerning the numerical composition of the parliament, namely, that the number of deputies be reduced by half. Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch expressed his opinion of this proposal, pointing out that the optimal number of deputies should be 350, because there were certain problems with the accommodation of the deputies who would work on a professional basis. The Supreme Council chairman pointed out that it was necessary to speed up the construction of housing for future deputies. The number of parliament deputies remained unchanged (450 people).

Deputy Vyacheslav Chornovil proposed that elections be held on the basis of a relative majority but the proposal was not accepted and, according to Article No. 1, the [election] system remains based on an absolute majority, i.e. the majority system.

An amendment to Article No. 2, submitted by Deputy Ivan Zayets, on lowering deputies' age qualification from 25 down to 21 years, was not adopted.

An amendment to Item 5 of Article No. 2 on the nomination of people's deputies of Ukraine was adopted: "The citizens of Ukraine who on the election day are doing active military or alternative non-military service, officers and warrant officers on the personnel of the Armed Forces, the National Guards, the Security Service, the Internal Affairs Ministry, and other militarized formations of Ukraine who have not been transferred to the reserve or have not retired, and also representatives of the president of Ukraine in the regions, judges and prosecutors cannot be elected deputies. The above persons can be registered as claimants to be a candidate if, during the registration, they submit an application to a district electoral commission with their consent to be dismissed from the post in case they are elected people's deputy, and an application on a temporary suspension of their official plenary powers for a period of the election campaign.

The deputies voted for a "compromise variant" of Article No. 8, as Ivan Plyushch said. It stipulates that working collectives have the right to nominate candidates to stand for deputy.

Discussions Continue

LD1711231293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2030 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev—On 17 November, the discussion of Article 24 of the draft law "On election of people's deputies of Ukraine" caused a scandal at the Supreme Council session. This article—"Nomination of candidates to stand for deputy" was supplemented with a provision on a compulsory collection of 300 signatures to support a candidate, nominated by a party to stand for deputy. As people's deputy Serhiy Holovatyy said in an interview with a UNIAN correspondent, "it is nonsense to supplement the law with a demand to collect 300 signatures for a candidate who is nominated by a party. As a matter of fact, this addition puts a candidate nominated by a party on the same footing as a claimant for candidacy."

During an improvised meeting of members of the People's Council, who left the session hall, Vyacheslav Chornovil explained that in his opinion "a road was opened for the ruling party. Hidden communists will be dragged out as deputies at the coming elections."

Having returned to the session hall, members of the People's Council began collecting the voting cards of the absent deputies which, in the opinion of the People's Council, were manipulated by the parliament majority. Because of this the parliament chairman was obliged to stop the debate of the draft law on elections. The People's Council scheduled a meeting to work out a statement and a plan of further actions for 0900 on 18 November. Some of the People's Council members again spoke out for the early termination of plenary powers by the faction deputies.

Election Law Adopted

LD1811110593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1007 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksandr Litvinov for TASS]

[Text] Kiev November 18 TASS—The Ukrainian Parliament adopted the election law on Thursday which the opposition branded as "communist."

Parliamentary elections in Ukraine will be held according to a majority system in 450 one-seat constituencies. Ukrainian citizens over 25 years of age permanently residing in the country for at least two years will be allowed to run for new legislature which is to work on a permanent basis.

Lawmakers clashed over the law for two days. Opposition deputies walked out on Thursday protesting against what they said was the "drafting of the law to suit the communist majority" in parliament.

The opposition believes the new law is more conservative than the previous one and has thrown Ukraine backwards.

The law is to come into force on November 27.

Deputies on Ratification of START I Treaty

LD1711231493 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2030 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Larysa Skoryk: "The Supreme Council must ratify START I. The deputies will probably approve a decision on Ukraine's accession to the Lisbon Protocol too, however, without Article 5 which deals with the soonest possible accession to the nuclear weapons Nonproliferation Treaty of 1 June 1968 as a nonnuclear state. In my opinion, there should be no reservations whatsoever concerning the fact that all the countries that sign the START I Treaty should confirm Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol without fail."

Stepan Khmara: "I will do everything possible to stop this document being ratified. The government is incapable of ensuring the fulfillment of a relevant resolution by the Supreme Council in a form appropriate for Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers has to work out a full-blooded program with a clear-cut mechanism of the treaty implementation. Changes should be introduced to certain items of the protocol which is part of the START I Treaty, in particular, this refers to the terms, methods of reduction, etc. We must take into account political changes that have occurred of late. Article 5 has to be withdrawn from the Lisbon Protocol. One should know clearly what the dismantling of the missiles will cost, and where the money is to be obtained for this purpose."

Volodymyr Shovkoshytnyy: "My attitude toward this issue is ambiguous because it would be unwise to leave Ukraine defenseless. We must obtain guarantees from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia, and not from Russia only. In 1654, in 1917, and after every instance of Russia abiding by its 'guarantees' Ukraine lost its independence. Therefore, it is unwise to count on guarantees from a potentially dangerous force. This is why, when international guarantees of security on behalf of the entire nuclear bloc are fixed in a written form, when the money is provided to dismantle the missiles, then we will be able to ratify this document. But now there is no need to be in a hurry, in particular, as far as Article 5 is concerned."

Borys Oliynyk: "Proceeding from those diametrically opposed sentiments that dominate among the Supreme Council members it is difficult to forecast which decision they will take concerning the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty."

Serhiy Kolesnyk: "It is necessary to ratify the treaty. We already have warheads and delivery vehicles whose service life is longer than that envisaged by this treaty."

Official on Problems in Implementing CFE Treaty

AU1811084693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 16 Nov 93 p 5

[Article by Volodymyr Byelashov, deputy chief of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administration for Control Over Armament and Disarmament: "Through Disarmament Toward a New Europe"]

[Text] *One year ago, on 13 November, the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] was signed. The treaty, elaborated as far back as during the times of the "Cold War" and confrontation between two political systems, became effective immediately after the collapse of the USSR, having become a kind of bridge between the period of hostility and the period of cooperation on the continent.*

The CFE Treaty limits the quantity of the main categories of conventional weapons and technology—tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems (100-mm or larger), combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, and envisages a mechanism for inspection and control over its implementation. The treaty also established an open procedure for exchanging relevant military information. The main objective of the document is to lower the level of armaments and to rule out any sudden wide-scale offensive on the part of any country that is a signatory to the treaty.

The treaty limits both the technology and the numerical strength of the armed forces. For Ukraine, these figures are as follows: 4,080 tanks, 5,050 armored combat vehicles, 4,040 artillery systems, 1,090 combat aircraft, 330 attack helicopters, and 450,000 servicemen. In terms of these indexes, Ukraine's army is between the second and third strongest in Europe after Russia and, possibly, in terms of some indexes, also after Germany, France, and Turkey. This is quite sufficient for effectively ensuring our country's defense.

Since the treaty began to be implemented, Ukrainian enterprises have destroyed 567 tanks, 630 armored combat vehicles, and 164 combat aircraft. It is primarily obsolete models of weapons and technology that have completed their service life and must be used as scrap that are being destroyed. Some of the technology has been converted into tractors, tow trucks, and so on.

The work of the Joint Consultative Group [JCG], created to promote the proper fulfillment of the CFE Treaty, is continuing. The Ukrainian delegation to the JCG managed to have the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously on the territory of a member country reduced. More than 100 foreign delegations have visited Ukraine since the treaty began to be implemented.

The Ukrainian delegation also proposed an initiative in the JCG on the need to settle the problem of so-called "flank limitations." In Ukraine, the territory of the former Odessa Military District, which accounts for 23 percent of the entire territory of the country, falls under these additional limitations. In accordance with the Tashkent agreement on the principles and procedure for the fulfillment of the CFE Treaty by those countries that are successors to the former USSR, Ukraine may have 680 combat tanks, with just 280 of them in combat units, 350 armored combat vehicles, 890 artillery systems, with just 390 of the latter within regular troops.

The "flank limitations" were an additional measure taken when the situation in Europe was characterized by an acute confrontation between two alliances. However, now, these limitations only apply to two states—Ukraine and Russia.

From the time the treaty was signed (November 1990) until it began effective (June 1992), global changes took place on the European continent: The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist and new independent states emerged on the territory of the former USSR. In other words, the ratification of the treaty took place in a new military and political situation, although it was signed as a compromise between two antagonistic alliances. Therefore, "flank limitations" are presently a serious obstacle to the normal operation and deployment of Ukraine's Armed Forces. In order to comply with this limitation, which is artificial in the new conditions, Ukraine would not only be unable to deploy its armed forces logically and effectively, but would also be compelled to resort to huge additional expenditure. It would be necessary to abandon the well equipped military facilities in the Odessa Military District and build new ones in the Ciscarpathian or Kiev military districts. In view of the present economic difficulties, this is simply impossible.

Thus, the problem of "flank limitations" needs to be urgently resolved.

Today, Ukraine also has some other difficulties with the implementation of the CFE Treaty. The main obstacles for us are the shortage of money and the inadequate material and technological base. Owing to the difficult financial situation, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense is unable to ensure the participation of military specialists in the work of the JCG on a permanent basis, and this narrows down the possibilities for the Ukrainian delegation to defend the interests of our state to the fullest degree. The insufficient equipment and, again, the shortage of money stand in the way of proper inspection activity. For example, in the first stage of fulfilling the CFE Treaty, Ukraine did not use its quota of inspections.

Even though strict control over the fulfillment of the CFE Treaty and the reduction of weapons and technology is an important element in the implementation of the treaty, they are not the sole factors that make the treaty essential for establishing a new order in Europe. The exchange of military information, military openness, and confidence in the meticulous fulfillment of the treaty will contribute to strengthening trust, and this in turn will enhance security on the continent. In such conditions, the treaty will really become a reliable foundation wall for a new Europe.

Supreme Council To Omit Lisbon Protocol Article 5

LD1811095293 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 17 Nov—The special commission of the Supreme Council for ratification of the START I Treaty has decided to omit the fifth point of the Lisbon Protocol during discussions of this issue at the plenary session [not further specified]. The likelihood of Ukraine's acceding to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is thereby in doubt. At the commission meeting the necessity was noted of signing a document in accordance with which nuclear warheads which have exhausted their safe shelf life will be taken to Russia. The commission expressed itself in favor of the speediest examination of START I at the Supreme Council session.

Crimea's Bagrov, Kravchuk Discuss Gas Supply Problems

AU1811095493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 16 Nov 93 p 4

[Text] On behalf of the presidium of the Crimean Supreme Council, speaker of the parliament Nikolay Bagrov sent a telegram to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk on the "catastrophic situation with regard to gas deliveries" that has taken shape on the peninsula. "In Sevastopol, about 100 multistory buildings have no heating, a number of trading and public catering enterprises, including those providing services for servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet, have stopped functioning," reads the telegram. At the meeting of the Crimean Supreme Council Presidium that was held, as previously reported, on 12 November, N. Bagrov said that he was going to Odessa. There, he will take part in the conference of chairmen of southern and eastern Ukraine's oblast councils that will be held on 18 November. According to him, an agreement will be reached on coordinating joint actions. "It is necessary to cooperate with those regions that are close to ours and emerge from the economic crisis by joint efforts," stressed the chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council. At the conference in Odessa, it is also necessary to discuss the question on the attitude of the given regions toward the forthcoming elections of Ukraine's Supreme Council.

Defense Ministry on Freedom of Conscience in Army

LD1711181193 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2350 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 16 Nov—Answering letters from public and political organizations, that point out that it is unacceptable to introduce religion in the Army forcibly, the press service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry has issued a statement. It says that issues associated with religion are settled in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in accordance with the current legislation. The introduction of either religion or atheism in the Army is not provided for in the law and is not a practice in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Army Official Views Black Sea Fleet, Uniforms

AU1811123293 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 13 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, first deputy minister of defense, by Roman Pastukh in Drohobych; date not given: "Here, the People and the Army Are Truly United"—first two paragraphs are ZA VILNU UKRAYINU introduction]

[Text] Ukraine's Armed Forces are the main guarantor of our independence. Our state's leadership, servicemen, labor collectives, and national patriotic forces in those populated areas where military units are deployed all contribute, to a greater or lesser extent, to strengthening them. First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General Ivan Bizhan is considered to be one of the highest ranking military and state figures. He is, in fact, the second person in the Ukrainian Army. He started his work at the ministry in October 1991, when it was in the process of being created, and was at the source of building our young state's "shield." He was the commander of the army during the period after the resignation of the former defense minister, Kostyantyn Morozov, and until Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy was appointed to that post.

Ivan Bizhan still remains an unusually little publicized figure, not only for newspaper readers, but also for television viewers. Whether this is because he is constantly "pushed aside" by higher ranking officials, or because he does not like publicity, or because journalists have not given him due attention, it is still a fact. Recently, the first deputy minister of defense made an inspection tour of units of the Ciscarpathian Military District and visited, in particular, a rocket artillery unit commanded by officer Valeriy Sheyko. He was cordially received there and greeted by the Drohobych authorities. After inspecting the unit and visiting a crane-truck plant, Ivan Bizhan gave an interview to a correspondent of the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU.

[Pastukh] Drohobych enterprises have spent about 300 million karbovantsi on repairing the building, putting the territory in order, and preparing a visual display for showing off this military unit. Several months ago, Kostyantyn Morozov was expected to arrive here. The circumstances have changed and you have arrived instead. Is your visit a fulfillment of the previous plan to inspect rocket troops or is it a commission by the present minister?

[Bizhan] My visit has nothing to do with the one that you mention, but it is associated with the plans of our army's new leader. At present, this year's final inspection of formations and units and of their combat training is under way. I head a group of generals and officers in charge of this inspection in the Ciscarpathian Military District. A second such group headed by the chief of staff is presently in the Odessa Military District. We are acting in accordance with the new plans. However, generally speaking, there is nothing new about this, because the final inspections were planned long ago.

[Pastukh] What are your impressions and conclusions from your trip to Ciscarpathia and from talks with local leaders and ordinary citizens?

[Bizhan] Very favorable! Taking the opportunity of having this interview with you and of the fact that this interview will appear on the pages of your very good newspaper, ZA VILNU UKRAYINU, I want to express my gratitude and satisfaction to all those people for their great assistance and support rendered to our army. Here, the people and the army are truly united. Now, I will say everywhere: I have visited Lvov Oblast and Drohobych and could see, for the first time, in what high esteem defenders of the state are held in your region. This will also encourage us to do a better job in building and strengthening the army, no matter how difficult it might be.

[Pastukh] After the new military minister was appointed to the post, he was asked about the continuation of the policy pursued by his predecessor. He said more or less as follows: "I will work to build the Ukrainian Army." How clearly, in your opinion, is this continuity seen in the first steps of the activity of the present leader of the national army?

[Bizhan] Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy was also engaged in building Ukraine's Armed Forces when he commanded the Odessa Military District. We have a single state policy in the sphere of state defense. This is specified in the military doctrine that has been approved by parliament. It is based upon the need to have an army capable of defending the inviolability of our borders and our independence. On the other hand, every official introduces his own nuances into the practical implementation of the doctrine. This is quite understandable.

[Pastukh] Incidentally, what exactly is K. Morozov doing now?

[Bizhan] I know that prior to his resignation he had not had a vacation and so he has now taken the opportunity to enjoy some rest. Time will show what plans he has.

[Pastukh] It is known that you, Mr. Colonel General, are one of the members of a new state delegation authorized by the Ukrainian president to hold negotiations with the Russian side on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. It would be interesting to hear from you at what stage these negotiations are at present.

[Bizhan] We, the military, carry out decisions adopted by the state leadership and that is why I would not like to touch upon the political aspect of the question. As regards the fleet proper, following the Crimean Massandra negotiations between the two presidents, our delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk insists that a complete and comprehensive study of the issue of dividing the fleet is required and that a political decision may only be adopted on the basis of conclusions from such a study. We proposed that seven or eight commissions be created to deal with the inventory of the entire fleet, determination of its commercial value, social problems, and so on. Then it will be possible to talk about the possibility or impossibility of a particular way of resolving this acute interstate problem. It is on this that we are presently working.

[Pastukh] The adoption by our army of the state language (Ukrainian) is a most important factor in its acquisition of all the characteristics of national armed forces and, so to speak, in inspiring in them the national identity. The new defense minister's statements to the effect that this transition must be gradual is understood by many people as an indication that this process may extend over many years. What is the present state of the problem?

[Bizhan] I cannot fully agree with your formulation of the question, as though the former minister wanted to resolve it faster and the present one more slowly. There is not and will not be any slowing down in the rate of introducing the Ukrainian language into the army. When V. Radetskyy first became minister, a presidential edict introduced new Ukrainian statutes. In a number of military units, at inspections of troops, commanders already report in Ukrainian. Even Corps Commander Shekhovtsov, who is of Russian nationality, opened a notebook so as not to make a mistake and issue his commands in Ukrainian. It is true that the process is still quite slow. However, we realize that if we do not start it today, it will be even more difficult to do so tomorrow.

[Pastukh] Another distinguishing feature of a national army is its own uniform. How soon will we see Ukrainian soldiers in new uniforms? There is the impression that our industry is unable to manufacture, quickly and in sufficient quantities, even simple military emblems and badges with national symbols, let alone clothing.

[Bizhan] The Ukrainian president has approved models for military uniforms. The minister of defense has issued an order specifying when and which units must wear the new uniforms. For example, the Guard of Honor Company in Kiev and the band for official ceremonies such as receptions for foreign leaders already wear it, and it looks magnificent. On 6 December, a festive meeting on the occasion of the Armed Forces holiday will be held in Kiev. It is expected that the command staff will also attend the meeting in Ukrainian uniforms. Next year, a gradual transition will take place, so that it can be completed in 1995. Incidentally, the new uniform will be made exclusively from Ukrainian materials: A Chernihiv factory supplies the fabric, a Kharkiv factory the stripes, and yet another one the shoulder boards, and so on.

[Pastukh] Do you mind sharing with our readers your reading interests, especially considering that subscription to newspapers and magazines for 1994 is continuing?

[Bizhan] I read of lot of the press. I arrive in my office early and, after familiarizing myself with the operational situation, hasten to look through the latest newspapers. I will not point out any of them. We do not have enough western Ukrainian and, in particular, Lvov publications. I think that we must read different papers. It is another matter whether to agree with them or not.

[Pastukh] In view of the fact that readers know little about you, please satisfy their legitimate curiosity.

[Bizhan] I was born in 1941 in Vinnytsya Oblast. For one year, I studied at a Lvov general military school, which was then disbanded, and so I graduated from a tank school in Kharkiv, and have now served for 30 years. Fate (or, perhaps, the Moscow leadership—R.P. [Roman Pastukh]) so decided that I never served in Ukraine. My parents were simple villagers. In Vinnytsya Oblast, I have only a brother and a few relatives. I am married. My son is 24 and is a medical student. Outside service, I am a ordinary person, like everybody else.

[Pastukh] On behalf of our readers, I wish you health and success in strengthening the Ukrainian Army.

Political Parties To Hold Pre-Election Congresses

MK1711132193 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko report under the "NEGA Reports" rubric: "Ukraine"]

[Text] Although there is virtually no hope that the new election law will set forth a combination of majority and proportional electoral rules calling for elections by party lists, political parties, trade unions, and public movements are stepping up their political activity and searching energetically for political partners. Virtually all of them have announced that their regular congresses will be held in December 1993 to work out and approve electoral platforms and to devise the right tactics for the upcoming election campaign. In particular, the People's Rukh of Ukraine finally made clear its stance on 16 November. The organization will hold its regular, fifth, congress in two stages—between 10 and 12 December delegates will work out and approve Rukh's electoral platform and tactics, and on 16 and 17 April of next year they will assess the results of parliamentary elections, approve their campaign tactics for the presidential election, and possibly nominate Rukh's candidate for president. On the same day, Rukh made a statement concerning the situation with regard to presidential elections in the Republic of Crimea. In Rukh's view, there cannot be two presidents in a single state, and the current situation in Crimea is "a result of the Ukrainian president's and Supreme Council's capitulatory stance on Crimea," which would lead in the end to the peninsula's secession from Ukraine. Given this, Rukh called on the Supreme Council to bring Crimean legislation into line with that of Ukraine; they also urged Crimea residents "not to take part in the unlawful presidential elections which undermine Ukraine's authority as an independent state and its territorial integrity." Meanwhile, in Crimea the nomination of candidates to the presidency is in full swing; the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Crimea, the peninsula's largest public organization, held a meeting in Simferopol with representatives of political parties, again, with one single purpose—to familiarize itself with their political platforms and "to choose a running mate for the electoral campaign," the trade union's press service reported. Crimea's parties expressed their interest in this proposal.

On 20 and 21 November, yet another conference of the Anti- Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples, under Slava Stetsko, leader of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, an organization that will sponsor the gathering, will take place in Kiev.

The "State Independence of Ukraine" political association, which holds extreme nationalist views, has decided to conduct its fourth congress on 4 and 5 December. The purpose of the congress is to prepare for the election campaign that, according to the nationalists' scenario, would lead either to the definitive defeat or to the final triumph of the national idea.

UNSO Warns of 'Uncontrolled Actions' by Members

LD1611190793 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1424 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Lvov—A news conference was held on 15 November by leaders of the local UNA-UNSO [Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self Defense] on the occasion of the adoption by a session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 11 November of additions to the legislation on establishing responsibility for mercenary activity, setting up militarized formations, and the participation of Ukrainian citizens in wars beyond the state's borders without state authority. In the opinion of Oleh Vitovych, leader of the regional UNSO command, and Andriy Shkil, chairman of the UNA oblast organization, the additions that were adopted in the legislation are legally illiterate. In order to prove this view, Oleh Vitovych said: "I will officially try to get permission from the Frankovsk Rayon Council of People's Deputies on the territory of which I live, to take part in combat operations beyond Ukraine's borders for five years. I think that any chairman of a village council who is also the representative of state power, will provide 100 such authorizations in return for a bottle of moonshine."

At the news conference the view was expressed that certain circles of the Supreme Council are pushing UNSO into an illegal situation precisely at a time when UNA-UNSO is attempting with every effort to be legally registered. Ukraine's Justice Ministry did not reregister the political organization UNA and the Lvov Oblast Justice Directorate refused to register the fighting organization UNSO. The reason for the refusal was an appraisal of UNSO's founding document by the Justice Ministry that "considered that it would be a militarized formation." Touching upon the possible consequences of the ban on UNSO, Andriy Shkil said that the UNSO leadership ordered its fighters to refrain from radical measures and opposition. However, as O. Vitovych noted, "if not a single UNSO commander remains at liberty, then who will stop the boys from uncontrolled actions?"

Cabinet Creates Development, Reconstruction Center

AU1711180993 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Text] A Center for the Development and Reconstruction of the Economy has been created in Kiev by a Cabinet of Ministers decree. The main tasks of the new structure will be to reveal inefficient economic ties that have remained from the former Union and that were once imposed upon Ukraine. That is why the center must propose such a scheme for technological and interbranch cooperation as would make it possible to confine efficient and advantageous ties within Ukraine in order to reduce the dependence of the economy upon external factors. Of course, optimal variants of external cooperation will also be elaborated. Besides, the center will study possibilities of restructuring the economy, elaborating forecasts to promote scientific and technological development of branches of the economy and of Ukraine's regions, examine conditions prevailing on domestic and external markets, and so on.

Hungarian Minorities Say Draft Election Law 'Offensive'

LD1611133793 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia consider the draft election law of the Ukrainian Parliament to be unacceptable and, from their point of view, offensive. They hold this view because, through various constrictions, the draft would hinder the formation of parties by national minorities. It would also exclude them from the elections.

Sandor Fodo, chairman of the Cultural Association of Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia [KMKSz], expressed the view that the curbing of the rights of national minorities in this way will not promote social concensus and stability in Ukraine.

Kravchuk's Foreign Policies Criticized

WS1711093093 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 4 Nov 93 p 1,2

[Article by Taras Koshlaba: "Fear Is Not Always a Good Adviser; Some of Our President's Mistakes"]

[Text] Inconsistency in the domestic and foreign policy of our president seems to have become chronic. In an interview with Ukrainian television on 4 October, apparently impressed by the events in Moscow, Leonid Kravchuk declared that any paramilitary or militant formations should be legally banned. This is because they—obviously, he meant the Officers' Association and the Ukrainian National Self-Defense [UNSO]—"love Ukraine so much that they are ready to smother it." This phrase jangled sentiments of every Ukrainian patriot.

In my opinion, the Ukrainian Officers' Association and the UNSO are among the main patriotic forces that are ready to defend the sovereignty of our homeland through their deeds.

After Kravchuk's declaration, all the anti-Ukrainian papers and forces, including the president's permanent mouthpiece in the legislature, Charodyeyev, excitedly applauded this "shrewd" decision.

Russian national patriots and Ukrainian national patriotic forces are the same thing. Russian national patriots or, to be more precise, red-brown reactionaries want to restore the greatness of the former Soviet Union at the expense of young independent countries, including Ukraine.

Ukrainian national patriotic forces have never intended to oppress other people. Their position remains firm—to defend the native people from encroachments of imperial forces and uphold the sovereignty of our country. This is why the anti-Ukrainian press reacted so euphorically to the president's intention to outlaw the Ukrainian Officers' Association and the UNSO. Today, our potential adversary—and all the young independent countries of the CIS—are the red-brown imperial forces in Russia and outside its boundaries, including Ukraine. They are ready for everything—even certain concessions. This summer, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY published an article on a visit to Ukraine by some Russian deputies. Following the visit, People's Deputy N. Pavlov declared that for the sake of state unity (of the Russian empire, of course) and the people, one should create the state Kiev Rus spanning from Brest to the Kuril Islands. For this, he is even ready to learn Ukrainian. Kiev, the "mother of Russian cities," could become the state's capital.

The question arises here—who will defend the sovereignty of our state from imperial encroachments? The Ukrainian Army? In my opinion, it is not able to mount enough resistance to the red-brown imperial forces. Besides, the Army's national fabric provides no grounds for big expectations. As of August 1992, 90 percent of its generals are Russian, of which 85 percent hold key positions ranging from regiment commander and higher. It is unlikely that any major changes in the issue of the nationality of personnel has happened this year. Personnel issues have always been resolved very slowly. Plus, their resolution makes a strong impact on who the military will support.

During the Moscow events of October, the Russian Army was in no hurry to assault the White House. Colonel N. Burbyga, the military correspondent of IZVESTIYA covering the events from a personnel carrier wrote: "I saw the troops unenthusiastically assaulting the White House."

It was the Afghan war veterans who played the leading role in seizing the Khasbulatov-Rutskoy citadel. They replaced the missing crew members of personnel carriers from the Tasmanskaya Division and boldly spearheaded the assault. The "Afghans" were very efficient in clearing the Defense Ministry of militant groups. As we can see, the Russian patriotic forces in the form of Afghan war veterans should take credit for suppressing the red-brown coup—not special-designation paratrooper units or "Alfa" special detachments.

Who can guarantee that our military chiefs will not find themselves in a similar situation? Or that they will not adopt a wait-and-see attitude, as was the case in 1918, when the 30,000-strong Russian Army under General Myravyov was approaching Kiev. Ukrainian Army units, most of which were manned by former Russian officers, assumed a neutral position at that time.

As a result of an analysis of Kravchuk's presidency since December 1991, I came to the conclusion that he was not overly enthusiastic about Ukrainian national patriotic forces. I am far from thinking that he takes more kindly to different pro-Russian chauvinist groupings. However, those anti-Ukrainian elements feel more than comfortable in our state. They can desecrate the national symbols and dignity of the Ukrainian people, burn monuments, publicly call for overthrowing the present authorities, and even stage a mock "funeral of Ukrainian independence."

Is there any other country in the world where advocates of imperialist ideology can act so freely? No, there is not, because in those countries, the president, courts, and the law protect the state's interests. In Ukraine, the president himself, along with law-enforcement agencies, see those actions as nothing more than children's pranks, with a big northern neighbor standing behind them.

Speaking to the Constituent Assembly of the Ukrainian Popular Movement in September 1989, L. Kravchuk said: "I tolerate the delegates, but in this case I will take the advice of the wise Horatio: 'Today, it is worth saying what needs to be said. The rest should be put aside and said at the right time."

Apparently the president thought that after the Moscow events, it is the "right time" to put everything in its proper place, including the patriotic forces, which stand in the way of restoring the Soviet Union.

Leonid Kuchma, as if justifying his unwary signing of a draft "Treaty on the Creation of Economic Union" on 5 August of this year, wrote in URYADOVYY KURYER: "First of all, let me say that I did not sign any document. It was just a protocol outlining such an intention. To be specific, this issue was discussed at the CIS summit meeting in Minsk on 14 May. President Kravchuk put his signature on the documents on behalf of Ukraine, including the declaration on the need to create the economic union."

Kravchuk signed the declaration on the condition that some name other than "union" be coined, which would not "scare people off." In an interview with KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI this May, when asked about his attitude toward renting Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet to Russia in return for preferential oil and gas supplies, he spelled out his position: "The shore is the land. The president has no power to divide the land. This is a territorial problem that involves legislation."

But no later than September he signed the humiliating Masandra protocol, which will never be justified. After this, speaking on Ukrainian television, Leonid Kravchuk tried to smooth over mistakes made by the leaders of our executive branch, addressing primarily to housewives—Russia threatened to turn off the gas and oil faucets. If a housewife goes to the kitchen to cook dinner, there will be no gas. So the president would have been blamed once again.

Incidentally, at the last session of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, acting Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilskyy made assurances that Ukraine has enough oil to meet consumer needs; namely, 25 billion cubic meters. Ukraine extracts 18 billion cubic meters plus 7 billion meters of Russian debt for gas transit.

Many would think that this article was written to discredit Kravchuk deftly exposing his mistakes. No. It was written to remind Leonid Kravchuk that he is the president of a sovereign state and was elected by all the people, not by Moscow. This is why his behavior in the world's big political arena should be strictly in line with the status of the president of an independent state, and serve national interests that lie in the consolidation of Ukraine's statehood and security.

Of course, in the two years of our new-found independence, we have not managed to come up with our own concept of presidential rule that exists in every civilized country. All the more so that for centuries, Moscow beat national dignity and independent thinking out of our leaders. It is hard to perceive oneself a full-right leader of an entire nation and live and act as a real president. Paradoxically, fear was a rule of life for all of our former political figures. This is why the present-day Ukrainian leaders still look up to our northern neighbor, which does not add to their authority in the eyes of Moscow.

Detained Sect Members Hold Hunger Strike

AU1711184893 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[Text] As reported by the Press Center of Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs, as of today, 783 members of the so-called White Brotherhood have been detained. Out of them, 220 persons have been released and 329 have announced they are holding a hunger strike protesting against the detention. On 14 November, on the day that had been predicted by the "White Brotherhood" as the end of the world, several dozen journalists together with the militia and a group of onlookers spent a whole day in the square near the Sofia Cathedral, but nothing happened there. Only one woman suspected of affiliation with the sect was detained. The law-enforcement organs are in control of the situation.

Belarus

Shushkevich Says Clinton To Visit in Jan

WS1711145393 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpt] At the beginning of today's Supreme Soviet session, Stanislav Shushkevich said that he had received U.S. Ambassador David Swartz, who communicated to him the news that U.S. President Bill Clinton had accepted the Supreme Soviet chairman's invitation to visit our country. The official visit of the U.S. President will take place in January 1994. [passage omitted]

Parliament Ratifies Economic Union Treaty

LD1811113293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0957 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By BELINFORM for TASS]

[Text] Minsk November 18 TASS—The Belarusian Parliament ratified on Thursday [18 November] the treaty on the CIS economic union signed in Moscow on September 24.

264 lawmakers voted in favour of the treaty, four against and four abstained.

Votes To Join Ruble Zone

LD1811113393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0952 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By BELINFORM for TASS]

[Text] Minsk November 18 TASS—The Belarusian Parliament ratified the agreement on the rouble zone after a 30-minute discussion on Thursday [18 November].

232 lawmakers voted in favour of the agreement signed in Moscow on September 7, 15 were against and three abstained.

Kebich on Border Demarcation, Energy Supplies

WS1611144993 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[Report attributed to ELTA and BELINFORM: "Lithuania-Belarus: Mutually Acceptable Decisions"]

[Text] There was no difference of opinion between Lithuania and Belarus concerning the state border. The only controversial point was the railway station Adutyshkes including an area of 5.6 hectares belonging to the station. Now that area is the property of the Lithuanian Republic. Belarus, in its turn, leased the sanatorium "Belarus" in Druskininkai for a period of 99 years. Such an agreement was reached in Vilnius on 29 October during a meeting of official Lithuanian and Belarusian Government delegations headed by Prime Ministers Adolfas Slezevicius and Vyacheslav Kebich.

During the one and a half hour meeting an agreement was also reached on other issues of interest to both sides. Thus, the Belarusian delegation approved the Lithuanian decision to postpone the implementation of visa requirements for Belarusian residents until 1 January 1994.

Significant progress was also made in arrangements for an agreement on railway and motor vehicle traffic, as well as on the passage of goods and passengers through Lithuania. It is expected that this agreement will be signed by the appropriate ministers of both republics next week.

Lithuania will also create conditions for Belarus to open an office to represent its interests in the port of Klaypeda. The Belarusian delegation proposed investing capital for port expansion to get an outlet to the Baltic Sea. Trade representative offices are also expected to open on both sides.

During the meeting an agreement was reached on Belarusian loan repayment to Lithuania for electric power supplies. This debt amounts to $10 million. Not being paid for electric power export, the Lithuanian power industry stopped its supplies last May. Vyacheslav Kebich promised to repay the loan within a month. In his turn, A. Slezevicius stated that the electric power supplies to Belarus will be resumed immediately.

To speed up mutual settlements, the idea of a joint Belarusian- Lithuanian commercial bank was discussed, as well as joint customs and checkpoints at the border.

Both sides also reached an agreement on holding the next meeting. The meeting will take place in Minsk in early December. During that meeting the State Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between Lithuania and Belarus will be signed, as well as other agreements.

Shushkevich Comments

WS1711153893 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 11 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Ales Lipay: "Adutiskis Station—Territorial Surplus?"]

[Text] In an interview with a BELAPAN correspondent, Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich said no one informed him officially about the handover to Lithuania of the railroad station Adutiskis, situated on the Belarusian-Lithuanian border, along with 5.6 hectars of the adjoining territory. Belarusian media made public this information last week and portrayed it as the result of a visit by Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers Chairman Vyacheslav Kebich in Lithuania. Stanislav Shushkevich underlined that the issue of transferring any part of Belarusian territory lies within the competence of the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium. As is known, those bodies have not adopted any decision on this issue.

Border Troop Commanders Discuss Cooperation

WS1611144093 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 6 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Koktysh: "Ukraine Is Not Going To Strengthen Its Border With Belarus"]

[Text] A meeting of the CIS countries' border troop commanders was held at the Zaslawe government's residence. The meeting discussed the situation on the Afghan-Tajik border and joint efforts to combat smuggling across internal CIS borders. Delegations from Moldova and Tajikistan did not arrive at the meeting due to technical problems (as journalists were told). Georgia did not send its representative either, however, in this case, the reasons are quite understandable—the situation in this republic is very complicated nowadays.

The most important issue is that once again Belarusian border troops will not be deployed to the Afghan-Tajik border. Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian Federation Border Guard, reported that appropriate political and military-technical measures had already been undertaken. First of all, they relate to the Pyandzh and Moscow border troops units.

The second item on the agenda—drug trafficking in the CIS—will be examined thoroughly in the future. A scientific-technical conference is to be held next year, including a demonstration of modern drug-enforcement techniques. CIS border troops also agreed on a variety of general measures for curbing the trafficking of raw drugs via the CIS.

Asked about cooperation with the CIS Border Troop Commanders Council, Lieutenant General Ivan Karabeynikaw, chairman of the Council's Coordinative Service, said that no official contacts had been established so far.

Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian Federation Border Guard, and Lieutenant General Yawhen Bachorow, commander of Belarus's Border Troops, clarified Karabeynikaw's response, stating that relations with Baltic states had already been established, and a mutual understanding had been reached.

Regarding rumors that Ukraine was strengthening its border with Belarus by employing numerous military units, Ukraine's representative Major General Oleksandr Brukhovetskyy stated that there were no grounds for saying that Ukraine was doing this. On the thousand-kilometer-long border with our republic, there are only four checkpoints and 20 subunits wrestling with the problem of smuggling drugs, weapons, and food. Recently, for example, goods totaling two billion karbovanetses are being seized on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border every 24 hours.

Delegations Discuss Military Cooperation

WS1511152693 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel A. Mushta: "Bilateral Military Cooperation"]

[Text] Last week, the delegations of the Belarusian and Ukrainian Defense Ministries held a working meeting in Kiev within the framework of bilateral military relations between the Republics of Belarus and Ukraine.

The Belarusian delegation, headed by Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General P. Chaus, included representatives of practically all Defense Ministry departments and services. This is fully explicable—it is these representatives on whom the principal load of the development of relations between the two Armies and the resolution of the following problems is transferred: Production and maintenance of military technologies, arms, and communication facilities; interaction in the sphere of NIOKR [expansion unknown]; arrangement of military transportation and transit; cooperation in mutual deliveries of property and foodstuffs; information and exchange of experience in resolving the tasks of the personnel's moral and psychological education and social security.

The Belarusian delegation had a chance not only to discuss with its colleagues the proposals that could serve as the basis for the plan on cooperation between the two Defense Ministries in 1994, but also to familiarize itself with the experience of relevant structures at the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. This was of particular interest and importance, because the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is currently undergoing a certain reorganization—the Chief Headquarters have been renamed as General Headquarters, several chief administrations have been established, and there are plans to make some changes in the social and psychological management that is the key informational and educational structure in the ministry.

The delegations signed a relevant protocol on the results of the joint work. In the near future, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry delegation will visit its Belarusian counterpart with the aim of resolving immediately the issues on which they have already agreed and which can be implemented.

Platonov Appointed Interior Troops Commander

WS1711103293 Minsk VECHERNIY MINSK in Russian 8 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Viktor Vasilyev: "Order in the Interior Ministry Troops?"]

[Text] Recently, a meeting was held between Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and the officer corpsd. Also participating in the meeting were Interior Minister Vladimir Yegorov; G. Danilov, state secretary for national security and combating crime; the deputy interior minister [not further identified]; and Major General K. Platonov, chief of the general department for national security and the Special Militia.

In the course of the meeting, the prime minister answered certain questions related to military service procedures, the establishment of a military academy, and activities of the Interior Ministry troops.

General Vladimir Yegorov announced the government's decision to appoint Major General K. Platonov commander of the Interior Ministry troops.

Following the meeting, the prime minister visited a militia brigade base and acquainted himself with the soldiers' social life.

Popular Movement Leader on Policies

*WS1611100093 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian
4 Nov 93 p 5*

[Interview with Popular Movement leader Sergey Gaydukevich by Igor Gukovskiy under the "Politics" rubric; place and date not given: "Sergey Gaydukevich: 'Politicians Come and Go, While Nations Remain'"—first paragraph is RESPUBLIKA introduction]

[Text] The Ministry of Justice registered the Belarusian Popular Movement [BPM] at the beginning of this year. Uniting 19 different parties and organizations, the BPM has become probably the largest mass political force in the republic. Despite the active attacks from opponents and attempts to discredit some of the organizations constituting the BPM, as well as its individual leaders, the ranks of this leftist-centrist bloc are expanding rapidly. However, many people still do not know what the BPM is like, what organizations it unites, and what goals it pursues. We have asked BPM chairman Sergey Gaydukevich to answer these and several other questions.

[Gaydukevich] The BPM is a peculiar union of unions. It unifies registered organizations with their own structural networks that have joined it on a voluntary basis. All of them act in line with a common statute. I will list only a few of these organizations: The Communist Party—over 50,000 members; the Officers' Union—over 40,000; the Social Security Foundation—over 30,000; the Veterans' Organization—over 100,000.... Keep in mind, please, that I have named only the BPM members and not its supporters.

[Gukovskiy] **Opponents often call you red-brownish....**

[Gaydukevich] They do this probably because the BPM embraces the communists and the Slavic Assembly. However, this is nonsense. For example, what color is the social and cultural organization "Polisiye" or the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers? We have already had labels. Our block is leftist-centrist. By the way, I personally do not belong to any organization constituting the BPM.

[Gukovskiy] **But you work at one of the structures of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, many people draw the conclusion that the BPM is under government protection. Since all political forces in the republic have divided into two principal camps rallying around Shushkevich or Kebich, the BPM is seen as a political instrument of the Council of Ministers.**

[Gaydukevich] The issue of groupings is disputable. For example, I cannot yet make sense of what forces are rallying around Shushkevich. The BPM? The democrats? Today, they speak out for the parliament speaker. Yesterday they were against him, while the day before yesterday, they were his supporters....

No one is excited by the fact that the deputy chairman of the Minsk Executive City Council is a member of the Belarusian Social Democratic Assembly, and that its chairman Oleg Trusov is a deputy chairman of one Supreme Soviet committee—a position much higher than mine.

The government does not exert any pressure on the BPM through me. I dare assure you that such a chairman would not last even a month. We support the Council of Ministers only when its actions coincide with BPM goals.

[Gukovskiy] **What are these goals?**

[Gaydukevich] For example, the movement speaks out for the equal protection of economic interests of domestic producers regardless of the form of ownership; the equality of all citizens before the law; and the choice of forms of ownership for enterprises and land by workers and farmers themselves. Those who give their efforts to the state and society (the intelligentsia, servicemen, and others) should receive a deserving reward. We are for free health care, education, and housing, old age security, and full employment.... If some government moves contradict these objectives, we cannot support them.

I personally do not agree with the moves of many government officials. I have repeatedly criticized the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Finance, as well as the Council of Ministers' Administration in the press and openly named Mordashov, Yegorov, Yanchuk, and Kravchenko. I claim now that many people and things must be changed in these structures. For example, is the work of the Foreign Ministry of an independent state limited to the signing of protocols, the opening of missions, and the sending of greeting cables? I do not argue that we need such things. However, if our foreign policy is nothing more than this, it is a policy of a banana republic.

[Gukovskiy] **The BPM speaks out for both the development of a market economy and full employment. However, mass consciousness perceives unemployment as an integral attribute of market relations....**

[Gaydukevich] This is the case in the West. However, we do not need copy its way of life. We have developed our own attitudes and traditions over the 70 years of the Soviet system—history will tell whether they were right or wrong. Why must we break away from them in principle? Why must we begin from almost February 1917 when the provisional government assumed power? We can follow the course of market regulation. For example, China has found its own way.

Deputy Oleg Trusov calls for the revival of the Belarusian history, language, and culture. Let him do this! However, why should one consider it obliging to revive the past and destroy recent history?

The primary task in the republic is to curb the price rise and restore social guarantees. Will we really get some incredible foreign credits that will help us resolve all the problems? It may be worth developing our own domestic competitive market before entering the world market. Not a single CIS state can live independently today, the more so that 92 percent of Belarusian industry is associated with

Russia. If we want to restructure our economy, we should do this in cooperation with other republics, primarily Russia.

I do not call for a return to the former USSR. If someone does not like the word union, by Jove, let us replace it with another word. However, we must rebuild the destroyed common house. I am convinced that the majority of the Belarusian population shares my opinion.

The opposition held a joint conference of democratic forces following the events in Moscow. One of the speakers stated that about 60 percent of the Belarusian population was unemployed, that enterprises would soon be closed down, and that this was "all very good" for us. Certainly, it is "good." When a nation is in a difficult situation, it is easier to assume power by exploiting such issues.

Do you think that the BPM, numbering over 500,000 members, could not play on people's feelings if it wanted this? We could arouse all of our structures both in towns and villages with each price rise and stake everything. We do not resort to this because it is dishonest, while our opponents do not think so. Each price rise is followed by hundreds of statements—how long can one endure this and so on. Why do they not respond to proposals of cooperation, when they are offered positions in the government—in the Trade Ministry and the agricultural sector? Let them prove then that they need no ruble zone or relations with neighbors. However, the opposition does not want to come to the government, because it will have to assume responsibility in this case. It is much easier to stand at the microphone, accuse everyone and everything, cause a little noise, and hold a few rallies....

[Gukovskiy] **Following the events in Moscow, your opponents have called on the suspension of the organizations constituting the BPM. The movement has been accused of almost plotting a "coup". The opposition claims that a congress of the Belarusian nation was held first, attended by Baburin, Sterligov, and Alksnis, which was later followed by a congress of the USSR Officers Union in Minsk with Makashov participating in it.**

[Gaydukevich] There were no incitements to overthrow or attack anything at the congress. We were accused of holding a congress of like-minded people. Yes, we are like-minded. The fact that we are, seems to give someone no peace. The quota was between 180 and 190 delegates for 1.5 million. We presented all our documents to the prosecutor's office, and the latter has begun an investigation following a deputies' request.

What can one accuse us of? We did not maintain any contacts with the Russian Supreme Soviet. This was simply impossible. There were no ties. Yes, we talked with Nevzorov and Gulyayev from the "600 Seconds" program [popular St. Petersburg news cast] on the phone, who asked us whether we knew any details. Since we knew nothing, we could not tell them anything. We did not interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state. However, we considered it our duty to state that fundamental violations of the Constitution were developing in Russia. I am deeply convinced that the people who violated the Constitution in Russia will themselves fall victim to similar illegal actions at some time. A precedent occurred. Sensible journalists who tried to report on this lost their jobs immediately. Well, the story with Liyubimov and Politkovskiy [television reporters] is completely ridiculous. They were removed only because they had advised their countrymen to keep away from bullets and wished them a quiet night.

Russia is currently preparing for the elections. Is it a democracy when 25 percent of the population is enough to make them valid? This is a game.

[Gukovskiy] **Calls for an economic and political union with Russia were voiced at the congress. The situation has changed. Is the BPM not going to remove the issue of any union from its agenda?**

[Gaydukevich] No, it is not. Politicians come and go, while nations remain. Nations—both Russians and Belarusians—need a union. Nations determine their own fate. Politicians can either speed up or slow down such processes. Were the Belarusian people to decide to move toward the West, no BPM would be able to do anything. Were it to decide to rebuild traditional ties with its neighbors, no parties taken together would be able to prevent this.

[Gukovskiy] **That is why politicians are waging a war for moods among the masses. Prior to the events in Moscow, the mood was clear. The congress and opinion polls showed that people supported integration. How did the Moscow developments influence Belarus?**

[Gaydukevich] Between 4 and 20 October, our movement accepted almost 2,000 new members. About 1,000 people joined the Communist Party and over 400—the Slavic Assembly "Belaya Rus." These figures speak for themselves.

[Gukovskiy] **Would you risk predicting the immediate future?**

[Gaydukevich] If someone cherishes the illusion that early elections will be held in the spring of 1994, he or she is completely wrong. I believe, however, that our Supreme Soviet is sufficiently mature and it will not waste billions of rubles at the moment when the Republic is in a knockout. The opposition is not interested in holding immediate elections and distracting executive structures from definite economic moves in order to be able to accuse them later of doing nothing. It is obvious that no one will take care of the national economy during an election campaign.

The BPM speaks out for elections according to industrial and territorial constituencies. If elections were held according to party lists, we think that each party must have no less than 10,000 members. Parties must not be some fake structures, but organizations supported by large groups of people.

Resignation Unlikely Amid Shushkevich Criticism

MK1611110093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Vitaliy Tsygankov: "Shushkevich Harshly Criticizes the Government, but Does Not Dare Ask It To Resign"]

[Text] Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and Council of Ministers Chairman Vyacheslav Kebich delivered reports on ways out of the socioeconomic crisis at the Supreme Soviet session at the end of last week. The opposition may ask the Kebich cabinet to reign in the course of today's discussions on the reports. But chances for such a decision are not many.

While Stanislav Shushkevich has long been shooting arrows at the executive branch, his criticism of the government in this report was unprecedented. Shushkevich divided the reasons for the economic crisis into objective ("inherited" technological backwardness, military conversion) and subjective reasons (a crisis of the financial system, and the government's inaction in going ahead with reforms). Shushkevich stressed that the Supreme Soviet had created a legal basis for reform, and stated: "The government did not lead the republic along the path of reform and did not launch a pragmatic policy of adapting to the new circumstances, while it naively hoped for a return to the past—'all will come back, if there is the Union...' The result is disintegration of the economy, a breakdown of the credit and finance system, a rapid growth of inflation, and a catastrophic decline in the Belarus population's living standards." He based his words on facts and figures: The production slump over nine months of this year amounted to 14.6 percent instead of the 3 percent forecast by the government. Unlike Russia, where liberalization of prices began by ending the monopoly on trade, in Belarus they only raise prices: Since 1991 when parliament passed the concept of people's privatization, only 2.68 percent of the book cost of enterprises has been privatized. The Council of Ministers issued a decree postponing the issue of privatization checks till July 1994. "It is not a reform source that has lead to a total collapse of the economy, but the absence thereof," Shushkevich concluded, offering a number of urgent measures for a decisive reforming of the economy.

It was natural to expect that the chairman would go whole hog and ask the government either to alter its policy or go. But Shushkevich did not dare do that and limited himself to the streamlined and noncommittal statement: "It is quite impossible to manage without renewing the government." The impression is that Shushkevich became scared of the daring of his own report as he wound it up by his usual call for accord and interaction between the power branches.

This is quite explainable. First, the pro-Council of Ministers majority in the Supreme Soviet (more than 80 of its deputies work for executive branch organs) do not exactly relish the prospect of resigning. Second, having assumed the responsibility for the situation in the country, Shushkevich realizes that he can become victim of a political sacrifice at any moment. His situation is not firm enough for him to say: Either you go, or else.

Thus, the Kebich cabinet's resignation is hardly probable. It is in this knowledge perhaps that Prime Minister Kebich couched his report in moderately free-market terms as if to say "All is well, stabilization is close at hand, friendship with Russia is the main thing." Kebich did not present any specific reform program, paying his main attention to the current problems of provision of energy, food, and of preparing for the winter. And of course to "a closer integration with CIS partners." Thus the spotlight has once again shifted from internal reforms to external circumstances, and the procuring for the republic of gasoline which is now at long last on sale at more than world prices.

Opposition Official on Ways To Overcome Crisis

LD1611192693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1705 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By BELINFORM correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Minsk November 16 TASS—A morning session of the Belarusian parliament agreed today to listen to the opposition program aiming to overcome crisis in the republic. The previous session listened to reports of Parliament Speaker Stanislav Shushkevich and Prime Minister Vycheslav Kebich.

The opposition program presented by Shadow Cabinet Head Vladimir Zablotskiy is based on all values of the international community, from freedom to spiritual development. In the opinion of the opposition, Belarus should reach a balance of relations between the East and the West, Russia and Europe. It notes the republic must realize the U.S. and Western Europe have their own interests in the East and pursue a policy to prevent economic and political dependency on the West and minimize economic and political dependency on Russia.

In the words of Zablotskiy, consolidation of Belarus can be achieved in a Swedish-type neutrality and non-alliance with military unions and blocs, which will give the republic the best possibility of mutually beneficial relations with Russia, Central and Western Europe, mainly Germany.

New Party Urges 'Social-Oriented Economy'

WS1611144693 Minsk DOBRY VECHAR in Belarusian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Party of Working People Chooses Evolution"]

[Text] Yet another party has appeared on the horizon of the Belarusian political scene—the Party of Working People [Partiya Pratsownaha Naroda—PPN]. According to a statement issued by its Constituent Bureau, the PPN's main task is to exchange people from the top with well-educated individuals of high moral standing who understand the people's lives, intelligent and professional economists, technicians, lawyers, deputies, peasants, workers, and honest entrepreneurs. The PPN chooses a path of peaceful and evolutionary transformations. Its goal is to establish a society that would guarantee everybody a peaceful and prosperous life; health, family, maternity, child, and elderly care; development of science and culture; as well as liquidation of the Chernobyl aftermath. The strength and wealth of a nation, in the party founders' opinion, can be obtained through a sound social-oriented economy, which could be achieved, provided that no political forces interfere in its development. The PPN will restrict the power of authorities through controls on taxes, a labor code, and a foreign trade monopoly, among others.

Kazakhstan

Tereshchenko Meets With Russia's Kozyrev

LD1711164693 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko on 17 November received Andrey Kozyrev, foreign minister of the Russian Federation, who is on a short working visit to Almaty. The sides discussed the fulfillment of an agreement on friendship, cooperation, and mutual support between Kazakhstan and Russia. They emphasized the need for implementing [word indistinct] in the near future, which foresees signing of a consular convention and other agreements which are essential in ensuring the rights of citizens of one country who are living on the territory of the other. The Russian foreign minister proposed to study the possibility of introducing double citizenship. Our prime minister stressed that the Constitution of Kazakhstan does not foresee such a legal institution. The sides agreed that economic and trade cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan is of great importance, and displayed readiness to eliminate subjective and objective barriers in the way of establishing efficient cooperation.

Tereshchenko and Kozyrev touched upon the issue of mutually beneficial use of Baykonur, joint use of the test site, and other defense facilities. They also discussed the situation in Afghanistan and the situation which has developed on Tajik-Afghan border. Also attending the talks were Toulegen Zhukeyev, the state councillor, Foreign Minister Suleymenov, and other officials.

Kozyrev, Tereshchenko Discuss Talks

LD1711183593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1711 GMT 17 Nov 83

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has ended talks in Almaty with Kazakh Prime Minister Sergey Tereshehenko but failed to meet President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was taken ill.

Speaking afterwards, Kozyrev said humanitarian issues including dual citizenship dominated the agenda. He spoke of the need to consolidate the legal groundwork of humanitarian problems in relations between the two countries. "It is necessary that the two countries sign a consular convention on the legal protection of citizens as envisaged by the outline bilateral agreement," Kozyrev said.

He made it clear that Moscow would like to sign a dual citizenship agreement with all republics of the former Soviet Union. "But each of them, including Kazakhstan, has its laws and procedures," he said hoping that a compromise solution could be found.

"There are problems awaiting solution but these must be solved only in a legal way and without excessive politicization." The minister warned against any hysteria or exchange of threats. The question is one of devising a legal framework to try to resolve those issues so that members of any ethnic group—Russian or Kazakh—are able to defend their rights on the basis of law, he said.

Kozyrev stressed that Russia was in favor of extending the agreement on the protection of each other's citizens due to expire this year. He said the two sides were trying to clear the ground for a summit between Presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, who contact each other by telephone "almost every day."

Tajikistan and protection of the CIS borders in the south were also discussed, Kozyrev said.

In reply to a question from our correspondent about the status of the Russian-speaking community there, Tereshchenko said there were 120 ethnic groups residing in Kazakhstan. He spoke of the need for even-handed treatment of each individual calling on the press for a measured approach and against tough wording.

On dual citizenship, the prime minister described the issue as compounded given that ethnic Kazakhs made up only 42 percent of the country's population. He also put the number of Kazakhs living in Russia at about a million, saying their problems had to be taken care of as well. The president and government are committed to embrace a policy of continued ethnic harmony in the republic, Tereshchenko said.

Kozyrev has now flown out to Dushanbe for talks with Tajik officials.

The minister wants to raise again the question of a dialogue between the Tajik authorities and the opposition, a senior Russian diplomat told Interfax. "After all, no one will be able to help the Tajiks unless they help themselves," he said.

Kozyrev is also expected to visit a Russian border post on the Afghan border.

KAZAKHSTAN SARBAZY Views Nazarbayev's Problems

LD1711165293 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 0700 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The Defense Ministry newspaper KAZAKHSTAN SARBAZY has devoted a special issue to President Nursultan Nazarbayev. This issue, which is far from being a festival of showing-off, is also devoted to the numerous problems which the president has to tackle together with the Defense Ministry and the nation—the president being the commander in chief—in order to ensure the viability of the Armed Forces and the maintenance of military readiness. Nursultan Nazarbayev has firsthand experience of these problems as he often meets the military and speaks to them. Speaking to the airborne assault brigade, the commander in chief said in particular: My task here is to find out in the minutest detail how our soldiers and officers live, what worries them. I must know the state of the army and its units, and after having learned about this, I must draw conclusions.

We must say that the conclusions drawn are serious. This year military salaries were doubled. Recently the president adopted a new resolution according to which military salaries have been raised by a factor of 1.5 on average, and the payment for officers increased almost sixfold.

Nazarbayev Explains Defense Policy

LD1711203193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1942 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fedor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty November 17 TASS—"In keeping with our military doctrine, the army is set purely defensive tasks and is designed solely for the protection and defence of Kazakhstan. We have no territorial claims to make with respect to any other states. In our foreign policy we seek to reach mutual understanding and trust. But the troops which the republic has at its disposal must be mobile, armed with the latest weapons and manned with well-trained servicemen capable of acting in any conditions. We are seeking to accomplish these tasks not only through interaction with Russia's armed forces, but also with the armies of the European Community," President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan said in a special issue of the country's Defence Ministry's newspaper "KAZAKHSTAN SARBAZY" (Warrior of Kazakhstan) which was delivered to the army units on Wednesday.

President Nazarbayev discussed the role and place of the armed forces in the life of his sovereign republic. He touched upon numerous problems the president, who is the republic's commander-in- chief, has to handle to ensure the maintenance of the armed forces' efficiency and combat readiness.

The president told the personnel of a separate paratrooper brigade which he visited that his task was "to know in detail the vital interests of our officers and soldiers. I must know about the state of affairs in the arms, and having learned this I must draw conclusions".

This year alone, the president made clear that he has drawn certain conclusions— the upkeep of the servicemen and civilian employees in the armed forces has been raised twice and further rises are in view.

KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA Interviews Nazarbayev

LD1811102993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0857 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fyodor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty November 18 TASS—President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev wants a direct presidential rule in his Central Asian republic and believes the national legislature should be reduced by half.

"There should be direct presidential rule while the legislative authority should deal only with laws", the "KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA" newspaper quoted him as saying at a meeting with its editing board.

"Many problems can be solved if we elect a normal parliament in the future", the president said, adding that a new legislature is to be professional and thus should be reduced by half.

Nazarbayev said that representatives of all the 19 regions of the country and of the major cities of Almaty and Leninsk should join the new parliament. "I propose two of my candidates from each of those territorial entities. Although in other states the president appoints them, I still propose to allow them to participate in elections. If they are not elected I shall propose other (candidates)", Nazarbayev was quoted as saying.

The president admitted that financial problems force the republic to suspend two major social and ecological programmes aimed to save the inland Aral Sea which is drying out and to restore environment in the area of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range. "We shall provide everything what the people of the long-suffering regions deserve, but after 5-7 years. Now we have holes in our pants and we have to patch them up first", he said adding that the programmes are worth 800 and 900 billion roubles respectively.

Nazarbayev Backs Strong Russian Ties

LD1811102393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0909 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fedor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty November 18 TASS—President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev said he wishes that true democrats win upcoming parliamentary elections in Russia and warned against attempts to split Kazakhstan from the northern neighbour because it had to leave the rouble zone.

"Certain forces should not be allowed to drive a wedge into relations between Russia and Kazakhstan using the divorce of their financial systems," he told the editing board of the "KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA" newspaper.

"Russia faces a complicated situation—both political and economic. Let God help it come out from it strong and united. This will be good for Kazakhstan. We are sincere and friendly towards our neighbour, we wish Russia what we wish ourselves—prosperity. We wish that the December 12 elections bring to power truly democratic forces, real patriots who devotedly love the Russian people, the multinational Russians," he said.

Tenge Exchange Rate With Old Rubles Set at 500-1

LD1711183793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1225 GMT 17 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] On 15 November, Kazakhstan introduced its national currency. Rubles issued in 1961-1992 will be exchanged against the tenge at the rate of 500 to one. Any permanent resident over 16 years of age will be able to exchange up to 100,000 rubles at any one time.

Kyrgyzstan

Deputy Prime Ministers in Moscow for Economic Talks

LD1711174493 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 1040 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Omuraliyev left for Moscow yesterday. The main purpose of his visit is to discuss issues related to the creation of an economic union within the CIS. According to unofficial sources a Commowealth summit might be transferred from the end of November to January next year.

Almambet Matubraimov, deputy prime minister for issues of economic policy, left for Moscow a day before yesterday. He will focus his attention on isues of credits and developing and strengthening cooperation between the machine-building complexes of the Russian Federation and Kyrgyzstan.

Foreign Ministry Forms Information Center

LD1711173993 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1040 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] According to the Foreign Affairs Ministry press service, an information center called Kyrgyzstan has been set up and has begun to function in Bishkek. It was founded by an agency for commercial information called Kyrgyzstan and the republican Foreign Affairs Ministry. The main purpose of this center is to compile a list of Kyrgyzstan's works, banks, and companies that are interested in establishing cooperation with foreign partners, and to also create a data bank on all types of economic contracts that have been signed with different countries. The list of potential partners will be sent abroad through diplomatic channels.

Tajik-Language Newspaper Revived in Osh Oblast

LD1711174193 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 0000 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Tajiks, who comprise a majority of the population in the village of Uch-Korgon in Osh Oblast, will be able to read news in their native language: MASCHI ISPAYRAM newspaper, which was published here 30 years ago, is to resume publication. In four out of five village schools, tuition is in Tajik. The villagers have preserved their language, customs and traditions.

Tajikistan

Russia's Kozyrev Arrives in Dushanbe on Visit

LD1711141693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1337 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Dushanbe November 17 TASS—The situation on the Tajik- Afghan border, the strengthening of the combined peacekeeping force, matters aimed at stabilising the situation, including an economic one, in Tajikistan, and the conduct of a political dialogue—these and many other issues are to be discussed during our talks with the republic's leadership, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told journalists at Dushanbe airport upon arriving from Almaty on Wednesday.

The visit to Tajikistan is the final leg of the minister's four-day working tour of the three countries in the region. Earlier he visited Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

According to the programme of the visit, Kozyrev was to be helicoptered from Dushanbe to the Panj border-guarding detachment to familiarise himself with the situation on the border on the spot. However, adverse weather prevented the minister's helicopter ride which, weather conditions permitting, will be possibly made on Thursday morning.

On the Russian delegation are also Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov, and deputy commander of frontier forces Aleksander Bespalov.

Meets With Rakhmanov

LD1711162093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1512 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Galina Gridneva and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Dushanbe November 17 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said Russia will not abandon Tajikistan, including as far as the rouble zone is concerned.

Kozyrev held talks with Tajik leader Imamali Rakhmanov on Wednesday which he described as "very substantial." He added that the upcoming talks in Moscow will involve the entire spectrum of political, economic and social problems existing in relations between the two countries, including the rouble zone.

He stressed that all decisions will be adopted on the basis of cooperation with Tajikistan. There is no question of leaving Tajikistan or abandoning Tajikistan. This is a clear-cut position of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Kozyrev noted.

Kozyrev and Rakhmanov also discussed the expansion of political interaction between Russia and Tajikistan and ways to engage all political forces to stabilise social and political situation in Tajikistan.

The Russian foreign minister pointed out that it is extremely important now "not to swing, but stabilise the ship of Tajik advancement." He said Russia will work hand-in-hand with Tajikistan, adding, however, that this problem should be resolved largely by Tajik people themselves.

He emphasised that there is a growing understanding of this problem in Tajikistan and expressed the hope that additional steps will be taken in this direction. "We have discussed some of these steps today. We also discussed the problem of Russians in Tajikistan, including the possibility of dual citizenship for them, and their economic status. We will not leave Russians or other citizens of Tajikistan because we have a common future," Kozyrev said.

Briefed by Peacekeeping Commander

LD1711223393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2030 GMT 17 Nov 93

[by ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Dushanbe, 17 Nov—Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, on a short working visit here, visited the headquarters of the joint CIS peace-keeping forces this evening. Colonel General Boris Yankov, commander of the forces, said in a discussion with members of the Russian delegation that in accordance with the decision of the CIS summit in Moscow in September, joint peace-keeping forces were set up in Tajikistan consisting of the Russian 201st Motorized Infantry Division and Uzbek and Kyrgyz battalions. A Kazakh battalion is expected to join them very shortly. The main aim of these forces is to guard Tajikistan's outer borders. There are about 25,000 personnel in the joint peace- keeping forces at the moment.

Boris Yankov said the general situation on the Tajik-Afghan border remains "threatening." More fighters are joining the opposition, including some from among refugees, and new training camps are being set up. The situation is particularly difficult at the Moscow border post. There are frequent incursions by bandit groups along the whole border, he said.

'Satisfied' With Talks, Ends Visit

LD1811100493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] The visit to Tajikistan of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev ended today with the exchange of ratification instruments of the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan. In a short interview with journalists Kozyrev stressed that he is satisfied with the results of the talks with the leaders of Tajikistan on a package of problems dealing with the settlement of the public and political situation in Tajikistan and around it, measures to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border, and the creation of the ruble zone. yesterday, meeting representatives of the public, Andrey Kozyrev said Russia and Tajikistan had common strategic interests and old traditional ties.

Russian Officer Favors Government-Opposition Talks

LD1711184093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Russia does not want to transform Tajikistan into a new mini-Afghanistan. That's why it is in favor of a dialogue between Dushanbe and the Tajik opposition, Deputy Commander of the Russian Frontier Forces Aleksandr Bespalov, who is accompanying head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Andrey Kozyrev during his trip to Tajikistan, declared in an interview with INTERFAX.

Bespalov pointed out that the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, where Russian frontier guards serve, had stabilized recently. "However, there are no grounds for complacency, additionally, the Tajik leadership is not in a hurry to transform their words into reality and to start negotiations with the opposition," he said.

In Bespalov's words, irrespective of how successfully CIS joint forces fulfill their tasks in Tajikistan, one can hardly rely on a full-scale settlement in the republic. He reported that Russian frontier guards have been supplied with food products and ammunitions. "We have prepared for the winter. The only problem we face now is to increase reserves of lubricants," said Bespalov.

CIS Peacekeeping Forces Launch War Games

LD1711181693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1434 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe November 17 TASS—CIS peace-keepers began war games in Tajikistan on Wednesday to practice teamwork in mountainous and desert terrain and try out their combat capability.

Similar manoeuvres have been planned for all coalition peace- keeping units in Tajikistan to check their ability to provide an adequate response to possible attempts of large-scale penetration into Tajikistan by opposition guerrilla forces based in northern Afghanistan, military sources said.

It is no secret that the opposition has hired skilled military instructors to drill Tajik militants in the strategy and tactics of local warfare.

The war games which will last until November 21 are being held under the supervision of CIS peace-keeping forces commander in Tajikistan Colonel-General Boris Pyankov.

Ministerial Council Approves U.S. Agreements

LD1711165193 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan has approved by decree the agreements between the government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the government of the United States of America on assistance in capital investment, signed in Dushanbe on 25 June 1992; on trade relations, signed on 1 July 1993; and on cooperation in the speeding up the rendering of assistance, signed on 17 September 1993.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan is to inform the government of the United States of America through diplomatic channels on implementation by the Republic of Tajikistan of the legislative procedures for enacting these agreements.

Opposition Denies Negotiations With Dushanbe

LD1711185893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1608 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Report by correspondents Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] The Coordination Center of Tajikistan's Democratic Forces has denied reports by Dushanbe authorities concerning the holding of talks between the government and opposition. "Tajikistan's government has not officially invited the opposition to hold talks nor are talks underway," the Center's leader Otakhon Latifi said in a statement made public in Moscow.

In his words, the meetings Deputy Chairman of the country's Supreme Soviet Kozidavalat Koimdorov had with groups of refugees cannot be regarded as official events. Latifi emphasized that peaceful agreement is the sole way to resolve the problem.

The opposition believes that the government is split on the issue of talks.

The Tajik opposition leaders view Russia's peace efforts as having an exceedingly important role to play in resolving the situation and have said that they are prepared to accept its mediation and that of other interested countries and international organizations.

Meanwhile, opposition fighters and Afghan mujahideen are preparing to resume hostilities. Colonel Vladimir Maslivets, chief of the information analysis division in the headquarters of the Russian border guards in Tajikistan, thinks that the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border tends to deteriorate.

He told Interfax that fighters have been concentrating both on the Afghan side of the border and in the rear of numerous Russian border guard units in Tajikistan, in particular around the Turg mountain, the Moskovskiy border unit area. According to the border guards, there are now about 5000 fighters and mujahideen, some of whom have fought Russian border guards before.

Maslivets said that the tragedy of the 12th post of the Moskovskiy unit where 22 border guards and three soldiers of the 201st motorized division had been killed in July "will not repeat under any circumstances." All posts on the border have been reinforced with 201st division units and armored vehicles and have artillery protection. Reinforcements can be brought in rapidly by land and by air to any spot along the border where they are needed.

"We are capable of repelling any invasion with heavy losses for the attackers but would prefer having all problems on the border resolved peacefully."

CP Leader Interviewed on Peacekeeping Forces

LD1711181593 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0500 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Interview with Shodi Shabdolov, chairman of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Esteemed Shodi Shabdolov, a year has passed since the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan. You attended that session as a people's deputy. What is your opinion on the political, economic, and social changes in the life of the republic?

[Shabdolov] Fundamental changes have taken place in the political, social, and economic life of the Republic of Tajikistan in the year since the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. We have to speak about the positive aspects of those changes—these are the tasks assigned by the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the newly elected government.

One of the tasks was to improve all-round political, economic, and cultural relations with the independent republics of the former Soviet Union, especially with Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and other republics. I think that this task was successfully tackled. Most of the problems which existed between the republics have been solved.

The second task was a great one. The government and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had to ensure peace and to put an end to fratricidal war in the Republic of Tajikistan. Peace has been restored in the republic. Of course we have suffered big losses. The sending of CIS peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan, especially from the Russian Federation and other republics, was one of the most important tasks, which should have been very urgently and decisively tackled. As we know such forces are in Tajikistan, but in my opinion it was a bit late to send these peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan. [passage omitted]

All issues have been resolved in Tajikistan and peace has been restored. Of course we cannot say that the situation is completely calm in Tajikistan since time is needed for wounds to heal.

Uzbekistan

New Law on Court System Becomes Effective

LD1711174793 Tashkent UZBEKISTAN APN in Russian 1112 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] A new law on courts comes into effect from today in Uzbekistan. It establishes that there operate in the republic a constitutional, supreme, and higher economic courts elected for five years, oblast, town, and rayon courts, and also military and oblast economic courts appointed for the same period of time. The law proclaims the independence of judges, openness of court proceedings, equality before the law for all citizens, regardless of sex, nationality, race, language, and religion. The languages of court proceedings are Uzbek, Karakalpak, or the language of the majority of the population of the area. People not knowing the language of court proceedings have the right to use their own language and recourse to the services of an interpreter.

Armenia

Karabakh, Border Situations Reviewed

NC1711204893 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we now present a report on the latest incidents in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

There were no serious incidents along NKR's front lines during the past day. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan's military forces fired on the Armenian defense positions in various sectors. The Armenian side refrained from retaliating against the enemy's provocative activities. We wish to recall that NKR's military command headquarters ordered a unilateral cease-fire some time ago. The NRK's defense forces are carefully fulfilling that order. However, Azerbaijan has not issued a similar order. On the contrary, its forces have continued to fire on the Armenian positions. For example, they fired on the Armenian positions in [place name indistinct] in Agdamskiy Rayon the night before last night. Furthermore, they fired on the Armenian positions in Fizulinskiy Rayon with infantry combat vehicles and large-caliber machine guns yesterday morning. First reports said that no one was wounded. The Armenian forces refrained from taking retaliatory measures.

Although Azerbaijan's leaders and military command headquarters have claimed that they are prepared to resolve the confrontation through peace talks, they are preparing to maintain the fighting. The NKR military intelligence units have gathered information which confirms that state of affairs. Azerbaijan has been observed to mass a large number of military units in Beynagan Rayon. Afghan mujahidin and specially trained troops are among the enemy forces. According to the revelations made by the enemy soldiers who have been taken as prisoners of war more than 10 tanks, [words indistinct] artillery units, and more than 12 Grad rocket launchers have been deployed in that rayon. Meanwhile, a significant mobilization activity is continuing in Azerbaijan. The observers believe that Azerbaijan's officials and reactionary circles have not abandoned their intention to resolve the dispute through the use of force. [passage omitted]

The preparations made in Azerbaijan have forced the NKR military command headquarters to take appropriate measures. That is a legitimate move. The NKR people's security and territorial integrity must be maintained and safeguarded. The Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] people do not wish to lose their freedom and independence.

Here is a report on the situation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian Ministry of Defense Press Center has reported that the situation was relatively peaceful during the past day.

Yerevan Accuses Azerbaijan of Cease-Fire Violation

LD1711195693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1708 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ARMENPRESS-TASS]

[Text] Yerevan November 17 TASS—Armenia holds Azerbaijan particularly responsible for the violation of an eight-day ceasefire between this republic and Nagorno-Karabakh, says a statement made by the Armenian Foreign Ministry which was circulated on Wednesday in connection with Resolution No. 884 passed by the UN Security Council.

The Armenian Foreign Ministry expresses solidarity with the UN Security Council stressing the need to establish a stable ceasefire and in this connection, is prepared to offer assistance to the Russian Federation in its special mediatory efforts. Armenia calls upon Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh to resume a ceasefire, refrain from military operations and accept the specified (Vienna) schedule for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions Nos. 822 and 853.

Karabakh-Azerbaijan Phone Contacts Renewed

NC1711202493 Yerevan SNARK in English 1449 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Stepanakert, November 17. (SNARK). Snow cover 30 cm deep, which suddenly fell out in Karabakh, has changed the plans of the conflicting sides. There is a relative quietness in Karabakh during the last three days. However, as SNARK was informed at the Karabakh Department of Information and Press, in the opinion of war experts, this quietness is not connected with unusual coldness, not typical for these place. Karabakh Defence Forces are following the announced unilateral cease-fire trying not to use the retaliating measures. Meanwhile, according to the information of the Karabakh Foreign Ministry, the phone contacts between the representative of Karabakh and Azerbaijan, discussing the question of meeting's organization between the leaders of two republics.

Yerevan Studies CSCE Measures To Solve Conflict

LD1711174893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1657 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ARMENPRESS correspondent Boris Kyufaryan for TASS]

[Text] Yerevan November 17 TASS—The schedule of urgent measures to settle the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was moved by the CSCE Minsk group after the Vienna meeting, "has been received by Armenia and is now under consideration", Aram Abramyan, spokesman for the Armenian president, reported.

Commenting on the contents of the document at a request from ARMENPRESS news agency, Abramyan pointed to a few substantial changes as compared with the previous "Paris version". In particular, he noted, "for the first time, the conflicting sides are identified as Azerbaijan and Karabakh". Furthermore, Abramyan went on to say, the document calls not only for immediate cease-fire and disengagement, but also for "termination of any hostilities between the warring sides".

The presidential spokesman also attached much importance to the fact that after the three conflicting parties produce their response to the initiative, their delegations are expected to meet for talks. During this meeting, head of the CSCE Minsk group Mario Rafaelli will determine the status of the Karabakh delegation.

The same issue was in the focus of attention at today's meeting with journalists of Armenian Foreign Minister Vagan Papazyan.

Official Denies Russian TV Reports on Currency

LD1711184293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1545 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Kufarian]

[Text] Yerevan November 17 TASS—Deputy Chairman of the National Bank of Armenia Ararat Minasian today called "precocious" Russian television reports concerning the introduction by Armenia of its own national currency, the dram.

Responding to a question from the national news agency ARMENPRESS, Minasian said that the government is considering the move but declined to specify the date for the introduction of Armenian money into circulation.

Armenia is still using Russia's pre-1993 roubles as its currency, while most of the other former Soviet republics have already switched over to their own national currencies, even though they declared their willingness to work towards "a new rouble zone". The switch-over to national currencies has created additional problems for the republic sticking to the old notes, as the flow of roubles from the republics which have already discarded it is flooding it causing disruption of the local monetary circulation and boosting inflation.

Azerbaijan

President Aliyev Meets With Opposition Leaders

NC1711165093 Baku Radio Baku International Service in Azeri 1300 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] President Geydar Aliyev held talks with the leaders of opposition parties and social and political movements in the republic today. They discussed how the officials in power and the opposition parties can join forces to remove the social and political crisis in the republic.

The meeting between the sides is important from the point of view that a confrontation must not exist between the republic's leaders and the opposition parties during the tense situation in Azerbaijan that has been created by Armenia's bloody, extensive war against our republic. All the forces have to unite to fulfill the primary task, the liberation of Azerbaijan's territory from the Armenian occupationists.

The recently intensified aggression of the Armenian armed forces has very much upset the republic's people, leading officials, and opposition parties. That is due to the fact that the war, which has been going on for nearly six years, is claiming new victims every day. More than 1 million people have become refugees in their own homeland. None of Azerbaijan's citizens can remain unaffected by the problems Armenia's war has caused in our republic. All the steadfast forces of our homeland must support the National Army, actively participate in the effort made to resettle and help the refugees, and do everything they are required to do for victory. Everything must be for the front lines and for victory.

Further on Meeting

LD1711212193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1936 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev urged the country's political parties and public organizations to unite on the basis of a common ideal, national independence, a source in the presidential staff told Interfax.

Addressing representatives of various parties on Wednesday, Aliyev said that, with 25 percent of Azerbaijan's territory occupied by enemy forces and with over a million refugees, internal political strife should be ended and national objectives given priority, the source said. Journalists were given limited access to the meeting.

The source said the leader of the National Independence Party, Etibar Mamedov, proposed setting up a State Council, to include all leading politicians, as a body able to put an end to the current military and political crisis. However, Aliyev rejected the idea.

The main opposition organization, the Popular Front, refused to participate in the meeting, for it believes the present leadership took power through a military coup, the front's information center told Interfax. "The participation of the Popular Front in such meetings will make no sense before justice and the rule of law is restored," said one of the front's leaders, Ulvi Khakimov.

Representatives from another opposition party, Musavat, attended the meeting as observers.

The aim of the meeting was to work out the main principles for dealing with the grave military, political and economic situation.

Latest UN Resolution on Karabakh Viewed

PM1711165393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent Arif Useynov: "Karabakh Front Will Obviously Become Guerrilla Front"]

[Text] Baku—The "UN Karabakh series" has been added to by the fourth UN Security Council resolution denouncing Armenian armed formations' recent occupation of southwest Azerbaijan, particularly Zangelan and Goradiz. In contrast to previous resolutions the new one, to judge by the first commentaries from local observers, has drawn attention in earnest to the scale of the tragedy connected with the fate of over 1 million refugees. The UN Security Council has urged international organizations to take urgent steps to render humanitarian aid to the refugees and to save them from death under the wintry conditions.

As regards the rest, commentators note, the resolution repeats former appeals: for a cease-fire to be introduced, for the occupying troops to be withdrawn from the entire territory of Azerbaijan, and for the peace process to be continued within the CSCE framework to settle Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation. In addition the Security Council confirms the inviolability of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and the indestructibility of its borders.

Foreign observers have called the new resolution "lifeless," obviously having in mind the fact that it enumerates the consequences of the war but not its original causes. Nor does it name the country which started this war and is continuing aggression on larger scales.

On the eve of the UN Security Council session Colonel Aleksandr Vasyak, deputy chief of general staff of the Azerbaijan Defense Ministry, told journalists that in the Karabakh region the Republic of Armenia is in fact maintaining two armies—the national army and the Karabakh army, which are coordinated, controlled, and supplied from one center—Yerevan. According to Aleksandr Vasyak, it was as part of this collaboration that the Armenian side was acting in the recent attack on the Dzhebrail-Zangelan salient. In late October, he announced, about 1,000 Russian citizens—Armavir cossacks under the command of one Colonel Ayrakiryan—were transferred to Karabakh via Yerevan.

The Russian Foreign Ministry proposal to introduce Russian peacekeeping forces to the Karabakh zone is assessed extremely critically. The political parties are suggesting to the Azerbaijan leadership that it leave the CIS and no longer rely on this organization, which allegedly serves as cover for Russia in pursuing a "new colonialist policy."

In his Sunday commentary on the Azerbaijan "Seven Days" television program, Vafa Gulizade, state adviser for questions of foreign policy, voiced an unequivocal opinion: In continuing talks within the framework of international organizations it is better for Azerbaijan to rely on itself and its own national army.

It is expected that this week there will be an examination of the text of the updated schedule of urgent measures elaborated at the vienna meeting of the "nine"—the countries which belong to the Minsk CSCE group.

A distinguishing feature of the present situation is that Azerbaijan, in reacting as it should to appeals from the CSCE and the UN Security Council, is now relying more on its own efforts. The formation of volunteer battalions is being accelerated in the republic.

Incidentally, the rather belated report from the Russian "Vesti" on the alleged use of Afghan mujahidin in KArabakh should be viewed in the context of the organization of guerrilla warfare. But it must be specified that it is a case not of the Afghan mujahidin but of experienced instructors who once underwent excellent training at special bases and under the leadership of U.S. specialists for training cadres in guerrilla warfare against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It has been established that these instructors, mostly of Azerbaijani nationality, were invited to Azerbaijan by Abulfaz Elchibey's government. They have come and set about training special subunits. And no one has made any secret of the fact.

Karabakh Negotiations Continue With Russian Envoy

NC1711163293 Baku AZERTAC in English 1608 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Baku November 16 (AZERTAC)—Mr. Vladimir Kazimirov, the ambassador at large, the head of a Russian mediatory group on peaceful resolution of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is holding talks with the Azerbaijani authorities behind closed doors. The AZERTAG has been informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan that the Russian diplomat, who has been in the Republic since the last Saturday, is holding consultations with President Aliyev and Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov. According to the information available, the subject of the discussion is the CSCE's newly proposed plan on settlement of the conflict must adopt or reject it by November 22. However, the Azerbaijani party which has many objections concerning the Paris plan has not adopted it.

It is reliably reported that judging from the fact that negotiations between the Azerbaijani authorities and Vladimir Kazimirov are still being held, and the negotiating parties have yet come to any agreement.

Georgia

Black Sea Fleet Ready To Fight Zviadists

LD1711173593 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1545 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] According to Andrey Grachev, deputy head of the Black Sea Fleet press center, Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze and Fleet Commander Admiral Baltin have signed a bilateral agreement that stipulates that a contingent of the fleet will not only guard Georgian transport routes but will also, along with Georgian Government troops, participate in combat activities against illegal units loyal to Gamsakhurdia.

Prime Minister Meets Black Sea Fleet Commander

LD1711185293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1742 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By GIA correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Tbilisi, 17 Nov—Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia has met Admiral Eduard Baltin, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, in Poti. It was stressed during their discussion that 250 marines—of whom 120 are paratroopers—from the Black Sea Fleet operational group in Georgia on a humanitarian mission to guard vital transport links will stay behind. This number is deemed fully adequate for guarding the strategic objects itemized by the heads of four states in Moscow. Three ships carrying armored vehicles and arms will remain to control the situation in the area, two of which will be in waters close to Poti. The commandant's office, along with detached security units [pikety], will continue to observe order in the region.

Blast Destroys Railway Segment Near Armenian Border

LD1811095993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Text] A blast occurred at approximately 0400 on 18 November on the railway near the village Sadakhlo on the Georgian-Armenian border. INTERFAX was told at the press center of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs that a 90-meter long segment of the railway has been damaged as a result of this subversive action. There was also an attempt to blow up a support of a railway bridge, but there was no damage. This section of the railway is not under police or military protection. Railway traffic in Armenia has temporarily ground to a halt.

State, Opposition Forces Mass Along Inguri River

LD1811122893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1146 GMT 18 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tengiz Dzhibuti]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS—Georgian Government troops and armour are massing on the left bank of the Inguri river, while Abkhazian troops are digging in on the right bank. Experienced analysts have ample grounds to say that even a single well-prepared provocation can trigger off bloodshed.

The danger of an armed conflict is growing with every passing day, the press centre of the Georgian defence minister told ITAR- TASS by telephone on Thursday.

According to the same source, saboteur groups of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, which found shelter in Abkhazia, frequently cross the river and terrorise population in the Zugdidi district.

Georgian Government groups routed several saboteur groups. There is information that Gamsakhurdia sympathisers joined Abkhazian Armed Forces.

Paper Cites Military, Political Developments

PM1711123393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Vitaliy Alekseyev and Sergey Prokopenko: "Will the Inguri River Line Become a Rubicon?"]

[Text] Republic of Abkhazia Parliament Chairman Vladislav Ardzinba has appealed by telegram to Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin to examine the question of stationing peacekeeping forces and military observers, including UN ones, along the Georgia-Abkhazia border on the Inguri River. The telegram emphasizes that the cause of this appeal is the recent buildup of government forces' armored equipment and personnel observed on the Georgian side of the Inguri River.

For its part, the press secretariat of the Georgian head of state has made a statement condemning the transfer to Sukhumi of the headquarters of the Federation of Caucasus Peoples [FCP]. In Tbilisi this step was judged to be an illegal attempt to implement a plan to finally subordinate Abkhazia to the FCP's political and territorial interests. Speaking at a briefing for foreign and local journalists, Zaza Kandelaki, press secretary to the Georgian head of state, described as groundless the report on a buildup of government troops with a view to crossing the Inguri. According to him, subunits are being deployed along routes of the possible infiltration of Georgian territory by armed formations of supporters of the former president which have taken shelter in Abkhazia.

As for statements and assurances of peaceful intent, there are plenty of these coming from both banks of the Inguri. Nevertheless, the presence on its banks of troops who were just recently embroiled in conflict renders the situation here fairly unstable. Observers point out that any provocation may be enough to unleash the next conflict.

All the time new rumors are surrounding the presence of Black Sea Fleet personnel in western Georgia. For example, they are being credited with establishing order in Zugdidi, although KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that there are no paratroopers in the city. Clearly, what we have here is a case of wishful thinking, a desire "to rattle someone else's saber."

Thus emerged yet another "sensation" about how, during a meeting in Batumi with Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Ajarian Supreme Soviet Chairman Aslan Abashidze allegedly appealed for help to export Abkhazian (?) and Ajarian citrus fruit to Russia and...to place the autonomous entities under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. In the meantime it has emerged that Aslan Abashidze has rejected these inventions in a telephone conversation with Georgian Security Minister Igor Georgadze.

The report that the BDK-69 large amphibious warfare ship was fired on in Poti and a seaman wounded also bears no relation to the facts.

As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Pasyakin reported from the city, the situation in Poti remains calm. A conference attended by the city's mayor, Roman Meliya, the master of the port, Poti's prosecutor, leaders of the city's power structures, and representatives of the command of the Black Sea Fleet's operational force took place a couple of days ago. A version of the agreement "On Joint Actions To Guarantee the Special Situation Regime in Poti" was drawn up. This document stipulates a whole series of measures aimed at stabilizing the situation, stopping criminal elements infiltrating the city and carrying out actions there, and detecting and confiscating illegally held arms, ammunition, and explosives.

Refugees From Abkhazia Join Military Units

LD1711174593 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1545 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] According to a member of the Georgian parliament, Boris Kakubava, about 30,000 ethnic Georgian refugees from Abkhazia, who voiced an aspiration to carry on the armed struggle for the liberation of their native land, have been united into military units and are undergoing special training. They have a sufficient supplies of armaments and necessary military equipment.

Interior Troops Control Approaches to Zugdidi

LD1711174093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1713 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tenghiz Pachkoria]

[Text] Zugdidi November 17 TASS—Commander of Georgia's Interior Ministry troops Major-General Vladimir Chikovani told foreign journalists here today that all approaches to Zugdidi, its outskirts and streets are now controlled by units of Georgia's Government troops and police. He said the situation in the city, until recently the stronghold of ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was similar to that in a frontline city.

General Chikovani said Abkhaz and North Caucasian militants were building defence fortifications along the river Inguri, separating Abkhasia from Georgia. Chikovani also stressed that Gamsakhurdia forces or what was left of them were hiding in the forests of the Tsalendjikh district neighboring on Zugdidi. He said sorties and assaults on Georgian Government troops could be expected any moment..

The commander said that according to available information some of the former Zviadists were planning to lay down arms and return home. He added that the inhabitants of Zugdidi were showing few signs of aggressiveness with respect to government troops.

Chikovani also said that the city inhabitants were friendly toward the units of the Interior Ministry troops deployed int eh city. Some of the servicemen were quartered with local inhabitants in their houses where they were treated in a warm and friendly manner.

Chikovani also said that the number of local inhabitants seeking to flee Zugdidi is diminishing.

State of Emergency Extended in Tbilisi

LD1711192493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1847 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By GIA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi, 17 Nov—A state of emergency introduced in Tbilisi expires on 20 November. In this connection, there was a sitting of the headquarters of parliamentary supervision of the rules of the state of emergency, chaired by deputy parliament speaker Vakhtang Rcheushvili.

The headquarters analyzed the work of the city's law-enforcement bodies and recognized it expedient to extend the state of emergency. The parliament members in the headquarters and officials of the law- enforcement bodies within 24 hours will introduce a number of concrete proposals to the rules of the state of emergency taking into account the revealed shortcomings.

New Ajarian Government Head Supports CIS Membership

AU1811095693 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with Dzhemal Nakashidze, chairman of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic Council of Ministers, by Vakhtang Akhalaya in Batumi on 26 October: "Dzhemal Nakashidze: 'I Have Always Been in Favor of Georgia's Joining the CIS'"]

[Excerpts] During the evening of 26 October, on his first day in his new post, we met with the chairman of the Ajarian Council of Ministers. A fresh copy of the newspaper AJARA, containing the decree of the autonomous republic's Supreme Council Presidium on his appointment, was lying on the table in his new office.

"SG" [SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] dossier. Dzhemal Nakashidze is 51 years old. He was born and raised in the mountainous Kedskiy rayon of Ajaria. He is a qualified teacher, economist, and politician. He graduated from the Batumi Pedagogical Institute in 1963, Tbilisi State University in 1972, and the Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow in 1981. In 1963-65, he worked as a teacher in a rural school in his native rayon. Then, he held various top-level positions in the Communist Youth League, Communist Party, and economic sphere, which was typical for [advancing] one's career at that time. From 1992 until his appointment as head of the Ajarian Government, he had been general director of the Batumi main maritime agency "Inflot." He is married with two children and two grandsons.

[Akhalaya] **Your [illegible]n Badri is a member of the Georgian Parliament and Ajarian Supreme Council commission chairman. Now your appointment. How unexpected was this for you and your family?**

[Nakashidze] It came like a bolt from the blue. I was simply taken by surprise by Mr. Aslan Abashidze's [Ajarian Supreme Council chairman] offer. [passage omitted]

[Akalaya] **What is your opinion about Georgia's integration into the CIS?**

[Nakashidze] I have always been in favor of our sovereign country joining the CIS. I continue to support this. I believe that, if we had done this earlier, we would have avoided much suffering and deprivation. This is in no way a recreation of the empire but a completely normal process of integration similar to the creation of the EC. The developed countries of the West are far removed from us whereas the former republics of the USSR are nearby and closely connected. This is a natural and logical integration. In the main, it is an economic integration and is in our common interest. Furthermore, the restoration of economic ties is a vitally important problem for us today. It is a question of life and death for our economy. Reason should prevail over emotions and ambitions....

Ajaria Denies Wanting To Be Under Russia's Jurisdiction

LD1711195993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1855 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Tbilisi November 17 TASS—The press service of the parliament of the Republic of Ajaria denied on Wednesday reports by some foreign and Georgian mass media claiming that Ajaria's parliament chairman Aslan Abashidze had allegedly asked Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Baltin to take Ajaria under Russia's jurisdiction.

The press service stressed that the talks between Abashidze and Baltin "dealt only with general problems in Georgia and ways to solve them." The meeting was open and was held in presence of journalists.

Minister Wants 'Resuscitation' of Russian Links

LD1711165093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1355 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi, 17 Nov—Interviewed in the Tbilisi newspaper ZAKAVKAZSKIYE VOYENNYYE VEDOMOSTI [TRANSCAUCASUS MILITARY GAZETTE] today, Georgian Security Minister Igor Giorgadze spoke of the need for the joint development of the republic's armed forces with Russia. "We do not need any diplomatic curtseys," he stressed. "I see no tragedy in the resuscitation of the former links which in my view would lead to a revival of all the former USSR republics."

The minister spoke even more categorically about the withdrawal of units of the Russian frontier forces from the territory of the republic planned for the end of next year: "If the Russian frontiersmen are withdrawn from Georgia the country will face big problems. This step," Igor Giorgadze stressed, "could have unforeseeable consequences."

Chikvaidze Meets Iranian, Israeli Diplomats

LD1711225893 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Today, Georgian Foreign Minister Aleksandre Chikvaidze met the charge d'affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Georgia, Fereidun Haqbin. The Iranian official told the foreign minister that Iran will be sending 80 tonnes of goods of humanitarian aid including foodstuffs, medicines, tents, and other essential items to Georgia in the very near future. He added that he was going to Tehran soon to solve a number of problems in political, economic, cultural, and other spheres of bilateral cooperation with the aim of expediting the cooperation. Issues connected to Aleksandre Chikvaidze's upcoming visit to Iran were also discussed at the meeting.

Also today, Aleksandre Chikvaidze met the Israeli ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Georgia, Barukh Birnbaum. In the beginning, Aleksandre Chikvaidze thanked the Israeli official for bringing humanitarian goods to Tbilisi and expressed the hope that Georgia and Israel will keep on cooperating. Then, the conversation touched upon the Georgian foreign minister's upcoming trip to Israel, and issues connected to the preparation of the Georgian head of state's, Eduard Shevardnadze, official visit to Israel.

Estonia

Talks With Russia End; Delegation To Consider Proposal

LD1711162993 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1500 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Another round of Estonian-Russian talks, the 15th round, ended today at Lohusalu [near Tallinn]. As is known the Russian side announced a proposal yesterday for the Russian troops to be withdrawn from Estonia by 31 August of next year.

Today Vasiliy Svirin, the leader of the Russian delegation added a clarification that they would not be able to complete the dismantlement of Paldiski nuclear reactors [at a former staff training centre near Tallinn] and a separate agreement would be drawn up on this issue.

The Russian delegation's proposal on the troop withdrawal includes, incidentally, a condition. Estonia is to provide $23 million for the construction of housing for the withdrawing Russian servicemen. Tomorrow the Estonian Government will discuss whether to accept the Russian delegation's proposal.

Vasiliy Svirin was sharply critical in connection with the Estonian delegation having—as he put it—frozen the agreement on regulating life in the adjoining disputed border areas in southeast Estonia. Svirin also criticized the amendments introduced into the agreement by the Estonian side. According to Juri Luik, the leader of the Estonian delegation, the amendments are necessary so as to improve the living conditions of the people living in the border area.

Two documents were initialled at this round of talks—an agreement on the preservation of the cultural heritage and an agreement on standards.

'End of November' Summit Possible

LD1711185693 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1600 GMT 17 Nov 93

[text] Juri Luik, the leader of the Estonian delegation at the Estonian-Russian talks, said that a possible meeting between Estonian and Russian presidents may take place at the end of November but no date has been set yet. According to Juri Luik, the parties are actively preparing for the summit.

Vasiliy Svirin, leader of the Russian delegation, stated that a summit between presidents Yeltsin and Meri would be extremely important for the relations between the two countries. However, effective preparations must precede it.

Four documents are being prepared for the planned Estonian-Russian summit, Vasiliy Svirin said to BALTIC NEWS SERVICE. They are an agreement on the Russian troop withdrawal and conditions for their temporary presence in Estonia, an agreement on military pensioners' and their families' social security, an agreement regulating life on the adjoining border areas, and a trade agreement for 1994.

After yet another round of talks ended today at Lohusalu, Svirin said that he is pessimistic about any prospects for concluding an agreemment on citizenship. During the talks, the Russian side had indeed presented a draft, to regulate the granting of citizenship, but the Estonian delegation had resolutely refused to discuss it.

'Decolonization Center' Targets Foreigners

PM1711181793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 6

[Report by Jaan Must: "Trap for the Naive"]

[Text] About a year ago a new public organization called the "Decolonization Initiative Center" [DIC] was created in Estonia. Its founders and members are right-wing Estonian radicals who believe that it is an irrefutably proved fact that the Soviet Union turned the Baltic states (and Estonia in particular) into its colony. The center is seeking that this fact be recognized by the United Nations and that all legal norms connected with decolonization be extended to Estonia.

Is it worth mentioning that in the eyes of the DIC every person who came to Estonia after the war is a colonialist. And it is most consistently aiming at expelling the "alien element" from Estonia.

Recently the DIC issued a statement in which it refutes the figures cited by the Russian Embassy for Russian Federation citizens living in Estonia (over 40,000). The "decolonizers" assert that Russia as the successor to the USSR must regard as its citizens all former USSR citizens who have not taken out citizenship of Estonia or a third country and have not announced their desire to be stateless. In its statement the DIC cites UN international documents and urges the Estonian Government to refute the Russian Embassy's figures.

What is guiding the "decolonizers" in unilaterally deciding the fate of hundreds of thousands of people? They obviously secretly hope that Russia will accept these arguments and declare that all those who have not yet determined their citizenship are its citizens. And then the DIC will obviously undertake its next ploy: It will demand that Russia repatriate them immediately.

A trap for simpletons, of course. But it is a pity that this is again playing on the nerves of hundreds of thousands of people in whose choice no one has even been interested. In addition the DIC members are ignoring the fact that the Russian Federation has through legislative channels given people a three-year deadline for choosing their citizenship, which expire only in February 1995.

Laar Pledges 'Ruthless War' Against Attacks

WS1711111993 Tallinn BNS in English 1722 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 16, BNS—Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar said he will personally oversee the progress of an investigation on crimes targeting the police.

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The Estonian premier said he will also receive the all materials concerning the last explosion at the Kadriorg police station.

A bomb went off in front of the Kadriorg police station in Tallinn the night of November 14. The explosion wrecked three police cars. Two policemen were injured. There was another powerful explosion at the Kadriorg police station October 28 that wrecked two police cars.

"The explosions show that the police are finding their feet: some time ago it made no sense to plant a bomb against them," Laar said.

The premier reiterated that the government sees combating crime as one of its priorities next year.

"A ruthless war against criminals is going to start soon," he said. The premier pledged the state's all-around care for the policemen who have been attacked, as well as their families.

Latvia

Russia's New Proposals, Agreements Detailed

LD1711171893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1545 GMT 17 Nov 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Jurmala, 17 Nov—The latest round of Latvian-Russian talks, which was held over three days in Jurmala, was adjourned today. The talks will be concluded in Moscow in early December. Sergey Zotov, head of the Russian delegation, told journalists that during the intervening period the Latvian delegation will will carefully study Russia's new proposals and prepare a reply.

This round, Sergey Zotov continued, "was unusual in that the Russian delegation put forward a number of new proposals which take account of Latvia's wishes. These proposals boil down to a quicker withdrawal of our forces from Latvia."

Russia, the delegation head recalled, has offered to complete this process by the end of August 1994, rather than by the end of December next year, as originally envisaged. Furthermore, Russia has offered to abandon two strategic installations in Latvia, in Ventspils and Liepaja. It also offered to reduce the period of its control over a strategic installation at Skrunda. This installation is a radar station which provides early warning of missile attack. Sergey Zotov disclosed that his country wishes to hold on to this station for another six years—until a similar installation has been built in Russia. "This period of six years makes allowance for the time it will take to dismantle the station, which will not be easy," Sergey Zotov stressed.

He disclosed that seven agreements were initialled during the three-day talks in Jurmala. These are to be signed later by the governments of the two countries. They include an agreement on social security for servicemen belonging to subunits which are to be withdrawn from Latvia. Others concern protection of industrial assets and simplification of procedures for cross-border visits by inhabitants of border districts. Four agreements cover a range of issues related to cooperation in transport. Work was also done on the main treaty. Two issues in it remain to be resolved—the final date for the withdrawal of forces from Latvia and the radar station at Skrunda.

In conclusion Sergey Zotov expressed hope that the Russian delegation will receive a reply to its proposals at the Moscow meeting in early December. "I have no doubt that there will be a reply," he said, "but I cannot guarantee that the treaty will be signed."

Lithuania

Slezevicius, Chernomyrdin Sign Agreements

LD1811110993 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 18 Nov 93

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The heads of the Russian and Lithuanian governments arrived at the government palace at 1000 and negotiations began at 1030.

Zenonas Miksys reports by telephone:

[Miksys] Important and significant documents were just signed in the green hall of the government palace. The portfolio consists of 10 agreements and protocols. Among the documents signed are: an agreement granting favored trading status to Lithuania; agreements on air and road transport and river and sea transport; an agreement on military and general pensions to Russian citizens residing in Lithuania; an agreement on military transport and on other important issues.

These agreements and protocols were signed by Russian Transportation Minister Lefimov, Lithuanian Transportation Minister Birziskis, Russian Internal Affairs Minister Yerin, Lithuanian Internal Affairs Minister Vaitekunas, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Krylov, Lithuanian Deputy Foreign Minister Januska, and others.

The most important agreement on cooperation between the Russian Federation and Lithuania on relations in trade and economic life was signed by Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The prime ministers also signed an agreement on social guarantees to Russian pensioners permanently residing in Lithuania.

A news briefing for journalists is to begin now. Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will be received by President Algirdas Brazauskas.

Legislature Approves New Central Bank Chairman

WS1811095793 Tallinn BNS in English 1723 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Vilnius, Nov 17, BNS—The Lithuanian parliament approved Kazys Ratkevicius as the new chairman of the Bank of Lithuania Wednesday [17 November], on a 75-33 vote, with four abstentions. [passage omitted]